Managerial Pay and Governance in American Nonprofits

This article examines the compensation of top managers of nonprofits in the United States using panel data from tax returns of the organizations from 1992 to 1996. Studying managers in nonprofits is particularly interesting given the difficulty in measuring performance. The article examines many areas commonly studied in the executive pay (within for-profit firms) literature. It explores pay differences between for-profit and nonprofit firms, pay variability within and across nonprofit industries, managerial pay and performance (including organization size and fund raising) in nonprofits, the effect of government grants on managerial pay, and the relationship between boards of directors and managerial pay in nonprofits

Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation

Is executive compensation influenced by the composition of the board of directors? About 8% of chief executive officers (CEOs) are reciprocally interlocked with another CEO—the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms have at least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm and vice versa. I investigate how these and other features of board composition affect CEO pay by using a sample of 9,804 director positions in America\u27s largest companies. CEOs who lead interlocked firms earn significantly higher compensation. Also, interlocked CEOs tend to head larger firms. After controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, the pay gap is reduced dramatically. However, when firms that are interlocked due to documented business relationships are considered not interlocked, the measured return to interlock is as high as 17%. There also is evidence that the return to interlock was higher in the 1970s than in the early 1990s

[Review of \u3ci\u3ePay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation\u3c/i\u3e]

[Excerpt] Every once in a while someone comes out with an important book concerning corporate governance or executive compensation. Like Aldolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means\u27s The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1932) and Graef S. Crystal\u27s In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), Bebchuk and Fried\u27s new book is thought-provoking and interesting. It is a very important book and should be read not just by those interested in executive pay or corporate governance but by anyone interested in how corporations work

Are Formal Corporate News Announcements Still Newsworthy? Evidence from Three Decades of U.S. Data on Earnings, Splits, and Dividends

This paper considers the share price reaction to dividend, earnings, and stock split announcements over a 30 year period. It first considers whether there is differential information content in similar corporate news announcements for different types of firms. Second, it investigates whether the value of news information about these firms has declined over time (has become “less newsworthy”). We categorize firms into groups by whether corporate news announcements regarding the firms will be more valuable to the public. For example, since the public may know more about larger firms, we expect the market to react less strongly (in absolute value) to new information from large firms. We find strong support for this idea. We find little evidence that is consistent with the idea that “news is less newsworthy” over the past few decades. Although, we do find that the share price reaction to “good” dividend news has become less positive and to “bad” dividend news has become less negative over time, no such related evidence exists for stock splits and earnings announcements. Additional investigation of entire distributions of returns using kernel density estimators also rejects the “news is no longer newsworthy” idea

The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs

Using the ExecuComp data set, which contains information on the five highest-paid executives in each of a large number of U.S. firms for the years 1992–97, the authors examine the gender compensation gap among high-level executives. Women, who represented about 2.5% of the sample, earned about 45% less than men. As much as 75% of this gap can be explained by the fact that women managed smaller companies and were less likely to be CEO, Chair, or company President. The unexplained gap falls to less than 5% with an allowance for the younger average age and lower average seniority of the female executives. These results do not rule out the possibility of discrimination via gender segregation or unequal promotion. Between 1992 and 1997, however, women nearly tripled their participation in the top executive ranks and also strongly improved their relative compensation, mostly by gaining representation in larger corporations

The Value of Stock Options to Non-Executive Employees

This study empirically investigates the value employees place on stock options using information from the option exercise behavior of individuals. Employees hold options for another period if the value from holding them and reserving the right to exercise them later is higher than the value of exercising them immediately and collecting a profit equal to the stock price minus the exercise price. This simple model implies the hazard describing employee exercise behavior reveals information about the value to employees of holding options another time period. We show the parameters of this model are identified with data on multiple option grants per employee and we apply this model to the disposition of options received in the 1990s by a sample of over 2000 middle-level managers from a large, established firm outside of manufacturing. Exercise behavior is modeled using a random effects probit model of monthly exercise behavior that is estimated using simulated maximum likelihood estimation methods. Our estimates show there is substantial heterogeneity (observed and unobserved) among employees in the value they place on their options. Our estimates show most employees value their options at a value greater than the option's Black-Scholes value.

Executive Compensation in American Unions (CRI 2009-007)

Studying compensation in the nonprofit sector is difficult. In nonprofit organizations, it is not always clear what the objectives of the organization are and, therefore, perhaps even more difficult to consider how to compensate managers than in the for-profit sector. This paper investigates the determinants of executive compensation of leaders of American labor unions. We use panel data on more than 75,000 organization-years of unions from 2000 to 2007. We specifically concentrate on two issues of importance to unions – the level of membership and the wages of union members. Both measures are strongly related to the compensation of the leaders of American labor unions, even after controlling for organization size and individual organization fixed-effects. Additionally, the elasticity of pay with respect to membership for unions is very similar to the elasticity of pay with respect to employees in for profit firms over the same period

Employees’ Choice of Method of Pay

Who chooses what type of pay? The costs and benefits of “flexible” and “cafeteria-style” benefit plans have been discussed for some time. Additionally, many papers have considered the potential costs and benefits of certain types of pay plans (e.g. salaries versus piece rates). In this paper, we use detailed data from a specific firm that annually set the total compensation level for each of its employees but then did something extremely unusual. At the start of each pay year, the firm set an exchange rate for the dollar trade-off between cash pay and stock option pay. It then gave every employee nearly complete choice over the fraction of their pay that was contingent (stock options, bonus) versus guaranteed (salary). There are several empirical findings. There is substantial variation in the choice of contingent pay with some workers choosing almost all base pay and others choosing almost entirely stock options. Younger employees, more experienced employees, higher paid employees, and male employees are more likely to allocate a larger fraction of their total compensation to at-risk alternatives. The robustness of these results varies somewhat depending on the empirical specification and set of covariates used

The Geography of Giving: The Effect of Corporate Headquarters on Local Charities

We use data on the locations of the head offices of publicly traded U.S. firms to study the impact of corporate headquarters on the receipts of local charitable organizations. Cities like Houston, San Jose, and San Francisco gained significant numbers of corporate headquarters over the past two decades, while cities like Chicago and Los Angeles lost. Our analysis suggests that attracting or retaining the headquarters of an average firm yields approximately $10 million per year in contributions to local non-profits, while the headquarters of a larger firm (one ranked among the top 1000 in total market value) yields about$25 million per year. Likewise, we find that each $1000 increase in the market value of the firms headquartered in a city yields 70 cents or more to local non-profits. Most of the increase in charitable contributions arises from an effect on the number of highly-compensated individuals in a city, rather than through direct donations by the corporations themselves

Performance-Based Long Term Incentive Compensation and Firm Performance

Awarding executives long-term incentive pay based on firm performance is often described as a natural way to improve firm performance. This brief uses an analytical approach to examine that proposed relationship. We first document the prevalence of performance-based long-term incentive (PB LTI) measures and the trends in the relative size of these measures compared to aggregate measures of compensation. We then compare the characteristics and performance of firms that have implemented a PB LTI measure in the past to those that have not. In order to understand the impact of PB LTI awards on firm performance, we separately assess the roles of the existence of the PB LTI measures, the relative size of the measures, and the type of PB LTI measure on firm performance