Estimating liquidity risk using the exposure-based cash-flow-at-risk approach: an application to the UK banking sector

This paper uses a relatively new quantitative model for estimating UK banks' liquidity risk. The model is called the exposure-based cash-flow-at-risk (CFaR) model, which not only measures a bank's liquidity risk tolerance but also helps to improve liquidity risk management through the provision of additional risk exposure information. Using data for the period 1997–2010, we provide evidence that there is variable funding pressure across the UK banking industry, which is forecasted to be slightly illiquid with a small amount of expected cash outflow (i.e. £0.06 billion) in 2011. In our sample of the six biggest UK banks, only the HSBC maintains positive CFaR with 95% confidence, which means that there is only a 5% chance that HSBC's cash flow will drop below £0.67 billion by the end of 2011. RBS is expected to face the largest liquidity risk with a 5% chance that the bank will face a cash outflow that year in excess of £40.29 billion. Our estimates also suggest Lloyds TSB's cash flow is the most volatile of the six biggest UK banks, because it has the biggest deviation between its downside cash flow (i.e. CFaR) and expected cash flow

The sub-prime crisis, the credit squeeze, Northern Rock and beyond: the lessons to be learnt

On 14 September 2007, after failing to find a 'White Knight' to take over its business, Northern Rock bank turned to the Bank of England ('the Bank') for a liquidity lifeline. This was duly provided but failed to quell the financial panic, which manifested itself in the first fully-blown nationwide deposit run on a UK bank for 140 years. Subsequent provision of a blanket deposit guarantee duly led to the (eventual) disappearance of the depositor queues from outside the bank's branches but only served to heighten the sense of panic in policymaking circles. Following the Government's failed attempt to find an appropriate private sector buyer, the bank was then nationalised in February 2008. Inevitably, post mortems ensued, the most transparent of which was that conducted by the all-party House of Commons' Treasury Select Committee. And a variety of reform proposals are currently being deliberated at fora around the globe with a view to patching up the global financial system to prevent a recurrence of the events which precipitated the bank's illiquidity and the wider financial instability which set in towards the end of 2008. This article briefly explains the background to these extraordinary events before setting out, in some detail, the tensions and flaws in UK arrangements which allowed the Northern Rock spectacle to occur. None of the interested parties – the Bank, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Treasury – emerges with their reputation intact, and the policy areas requiring immediate attention, at both the domestic and international level, are highlighted. A review and assessment of both the House of Commons Treasury Committee's Report on Northern Rock and the Tripartite Authorities' proposals for reform are also provided before analysis of the subsequent measures taken to stabilise the UK financial sector – involving further nationalisation of banks, the brokering of takeover rescues of banks and building societies, a £400 billion bailout of the deposit-taking sector and a subsequent bank bailout scheme – is undertaken. Accordingly, this paper represents an update, covering developments until end-January 2009, of my earlier paper on the Northern Rock affair (Working Paper No. WP 2008-09), which was published in September 2008. Specifically, it covers the latest domestic (i.e. UK) developments on a number of fronts. The text, for example, provides updates on the reform proposals of the Tripartite Authorities, amendments to deposit protection arrangements, and the emergency funding initiatives adopted by the Bank of England. Table 2 (where, along with Table 1, most of the new material is located), meanwhile, provides updates and analysis of the following: the latest developments in the UK housing market; the latest developments in the real economy; the latest financial statements of the major banks; the latest nationalisation moves;* the latest inflation figures and interest rate decisions of the MPC; the latest government bailout plans for deposit-takers; the latest official support packages introduced for the housing market, mortgage borrowers and small businesses; the latest fiscal stimulus plans (e.g. as contained in the Pre-Budget Report of November 2008); and the latest domestic financial and regulatory developments. Meanwhile, Table 1 provides up-to-date information on: emergency funding initiatives undertaken by the Fed, the ECB and other major central banks; financial institution takeovers/bailouts in the US and Europe; interest rate developments in the major economies; financial and regulatory developments in the US and Europe; developments in the real economies of the US and Europe; the financial statements of banks in the USA and Europe; the evolution of official bailout plans in the US ('TARP') and Europe; deposit protection developments in the US and Europe; fiscal stimulus packages adopted in the US, Europe and the wider international community; G7/EU plans to tackle the worsening financial crisis; IMF 'bailouts' of beleaguered countries; and the Basel Committee's proposals for revamping Basel II in the light of the crisis. *A more detailed discussion of these developments is provided in Hall (2008)

The sub-prime crisis, the credit squeeze, Northern Rock and beyond: the lessons to be learnt

On 14 September 2007, after failing to find a 'White Knight' to take over its business, Northern Rock bank turned to the Bank of England ('the Bank') for a liquidity lifeline. This was duly provided but failed to quell the financial panic, which manifested itself in the first fully-blown nationwide deposit run on a UK bank for 140 years. Subsequent provision of a blanket deposit guarantee duly led to the (eventual) disappearance of the depositor queues from outside the bank's branches but only served to heighten the sense of panic in policymaking circles. Following the Government's failed attempt to find an appropriate private sector buyer, the bank was then nationalised in February 2008. Inevitably, post mortems ensued, the most transparent of which was that conducted by the all-party House of Commons' Treasury Select Committee. And a variety of reform proposals are currently being deliberated at fora around the globe with a view to patching up the global financial system to prevent a recurrence of the events which precipitated the bank's illiquidity and the wider financial instability which set in towards the end of 2008. This article briefly explains the background to these extraordinary events before setting out, in some detail, the tensions and flaws in UK arrangements which allowed the Northern Rock spectacle to occur. None of the interested parties – the Bank, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Treasury – emerges with their reputation intact, and the policy areas requiring immediate attention, at both the domestic and international level, are highlighted. A review and assessment of both the House of Commons Treasury Committee's Report on Northern Rock and the Tripartite Authorities' proposals for reform are also provided before analysis of the subsequent measures taken to stabilise the UK financial sector – involving further nationalisation of banks, the brokering of takeover rescues of banks and building societies, a £400 billion bailout of the deposit-taking sector and a subsequent bank bailout scheme – is undertaken. Accordingly, this paper represents an update, covering developments until end-January 2009, of my earlier paper on the Northern Rock affair (Working Paper No. WP 2008-09), which was published in September 2008. Specifically, it covers the latest domestic (i.e. UK) developments on a number of fronts. The text, for example, provides updates on the reform proposals of the Tripartite Authorities, amendments to deposit protection arrangements, and the emergency funding initiatives adopted by the Bank of England. Table 2 (where, along with Table 1, most of the new material is located), meanwhile, provides updates and analysis of the following: the latest developments in the UK housing market; the latest developments in the real economy; the latest financial statements of the major banks; the latest nationalisation moves;* the latest inflation figures and interest rate decisions of the MPC; the latest government bailout plans for deposit-takers; the latest official support packages introduced for the housing market, mortgage borrowers and small businesses; the latest fiscal stimulus plans (e.g. as contained in the Pre-Budget Report of November 2008); and the latest domestic financial and regulatory developments. Meanwhile, Table 1 provides up-to-date information on: emergency funding initiatives undertaken by the Fed, the ECB and other major central banks; financial institution takeovers/bailouts in the US and Europe; interest rate developments in the major economies; financial and regulatory developments in the US and Europe; developments in the real economies of the US and Europe; the financial statements of banks in the USA and Europe; the evolution of official bailout plans in the US ('TARP') and Europe; deposit protection developments in the US and Europe; fiscal stimulus packages adopted in the *A more detailed discussion of these developments is provided in Hall (2008). US, Europe and the wider international community; G7/EU plans to tackle the worsening financial crisis; IMF 'bailouts' of beleaguered countries; and the Basel Committee's proposals for revamping Basel II in the light of the crisis

The basle Committee's proposals for a new capital adequacy assessment framework: a critique

In June 1999, the Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors issued a consultative paper proposing the introduction of a new framework for the capital adequacyassessment of internationally-active banks operating in the G10 area. The initiative reflected a desire to address some of the long-acknowledged deficiencies in the current regime, operating under the guise of the Basle Capital Accord since 1988, and to accommodate recent market developments (especially in risk management) and financial innovations. This article critically analyses the new proposals, as amended in January 2001, providing a "cost-benefit" analysis of the proposed framework and assessing the extent to which the flaws in the current assessment regime would be overcome

Japan : the banks are back! Or are they?

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how Japanese bank “performance” has improved markedly since fiscal 2003 but to caution against over-optimism. Design/methodology/approach – The methodological approach adopted involves using aggregate balance sheet data dating from around 1990 to identify the trends in industry performance with respect to profitability, asset quality and capital adequacy. Findings – The bursting of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s clearly had a major adverse impact on “performance”, as measured by the above-mentioned indicators, but, after fiscal 1992, the industry's fortunes began to improve. Problems on each front, however, remain to be resolved. Practical implications – By identifying the main problems still besetting the Japanese banks, both the industry and their supervisors are given advice as to which areas they need to focus on to improve future bank performance. Originality/value – The paper clearly explains the nature of, and reasons for, the recent improvement in Japanese bank performance whilst highlighting the areas on which they still have to focus if they are to regain their former glory within the international banking community. It should be of interest to all serious scholars of the Japanese banking system and interested commentators alike.Banking, Capital profit, Equity capital, International banks, Japan, Performance measures

The sub-prime crisis, the credit squeeze and Northern Rock: the lessons to be learned

Purpose – On 14 September 2007, after failing to find a “White Knight” to take over its business, Northern Rock bank turned to the Bank of England (the Bank) for a liquidity lifeline. This was duly provided but failed to quell the financial panic, which manifested itself in the first fully-blown nation-wide deposit run on a UK bank for 140 years. The purpose of this paper is to analyse why these events unfolded and what can be done to prevent a repetition. Design/methodology/approach – This paper briefly explains the background to these extraordinary events before setting out, in some detail, the tensions and flaws in UK arrangements which allowed the Northern Rock spectacle to occur. Findings – None of the interested parties – the Bank, the Financial Services Authority and the Treasury – emerges with their reputation intact, and the policy areas requiring immediate attention, at both the domestic and international level, are highlighted. Some reform recommendations are also provided for good measure, particularly in the area of formal deposit protection. Originality/value – The analysis and recommendations contained in this paper are offered up as a contribution towards and stimulant of this wider debate which is urgently needed, given the continuing threats faced by the domestic and international financial system.Banking, Banks, Business failures, Financial institutions, United Kingdom