Stopping hot money

While high interest rates and foreign exchange sales are the most common way of dealing with a speculative attack in the foreign exchange market, several countries resorted to capital controls during recent periods of currency market turbulence. The purpose of this study is to use daily financial data to examine four of these capital controls episodes--Brazil, 1999, Malaysia 1998, Spain 1992, and Thailand 1997. We aim to assess the extent to which the capital controls were effective in delivering the outcomes that motivated their inception in the first place. We conclude that in two of the three cases (Brazil and Thailand), the controls did not deliver much of what was intended--although, one does not observe the counterfactual. By contrast, in the case of Malaysia the controls did align closely with the priors of what controls are intended to achieve: greater interest rate and exchange rate stability and more policy autonomy.capital controls financial crises contagion Asia

Capital Account Liberalization and Economic Performance: Survey and Synthesis

This paper reviews the literature on the effects of capital account liberalization and stock market liberalization on economic growth. The various empirical measures used to gauge the presence of controls on capital account transactions as well as indicators of stock market liberalization are discussed. We compare detailed measures of capital account controls that attempt to capture the intensity of enforcement with others that simply capture whether or not controls are present. Our review of the literature shows the contrasting results that have been obtained. These differences may reflect differences in country coverage, sample periods and indicators of liberalization. In order to reconcile these differences, we present new estimates of the effects on growth of capital account liberalization and stock market liberalization. We find some support for a positive effect of capital account liberalization on growth, especially for developing countries.

Asset bubbles, domino effects and 'lifeboats': elements of the East Asian crisis

Credit market imperfections have been blamed for the depth and persistence of the Great Depression in the USA. Could similar mechanisms have played a role in ending the East Asian miracle? After a brief account of the nature of the recent crisis, we use a model of highly levered credit-constrained firms due to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) to explore this question. As applied to land-holding property companies, it predicts greatly amplified responses to financial shocks – like the ending of the land price bubble or the fall of the exchange rate. The initial fall in asset values is followed by the ‘knock-on’ effects of the scramble for liquidity as companies sell land to satisfy their collateral requirements – causing land prices to fall further. This could lead to financial collapse where – like falling dominoes – prudent firms are brought down by imprudent firms. Key to avoiding collapse is the nature of financial stabilisation policy; in a crisis, temporary financing can prevent illiquidity becoming insolvency and launching ‘lifeboats’ can do the same. But the vulnerability of financial systems like those in East Asia to short-term foreign currency exposure suggests that preventive measures are also required

Stopping hot money

While high interest rates and foreign exchange sales are the most common way of dealing with a speculative attack in the foreign exchange market, several countries resorted to capital controls during recent periods of currency market turbulence. The purpose of this study is to use daily financial data to examine four of these capital controls episodes--Brazil, 1999, Malaysia 1998, Spain 1992, and Thailand 1997. We aim to assess the extent to which the capital controls were effective in delivering the outcomes that motivated their inception in the first place. We conclude that in two of the three cases (Brazil and Thailand), the controls did not deliver much of what was intended--although, one does not observe the counterfactual. By contrast, in the case of Malaysia the controls did align closely with the priors of what controls are intended to achieve: greater interest rate and exchange rate stability and more policy autonomy

Capital controls during financial crises: The case of Malaysia and Thailand

This study examines the impact capital controls had in Malaysia (1998-1999) and Thailand (1997). We aim to assess the extent to which the capital controls were effective in delivering the outcomes that motivated their imposition. We conclude that in Thailand the controls did not deliver much of what was intended--although, one does not observe the counterfactual. By contrast, in the case of Malaysia the controls did align closely with the priors of what controls are intended to achieve: greater interest rate and exchange rate stability and more policy autonomy

Stopping hot money

While high interest rates and foreign exchange sales are the most common way of dealing with a speculative attack in the foreign exchange market, several countries resorted to capital controls during recent periods of currency market turbulence. The purpose of this study is to use daily financial data to examine four of these capital controls episodes--Brazil, 1999, Malaysia 1998, Spain 1992, and Thailand 1997. We aim to assess the extent to which the capital controls were effective in delivering the outcomes that motivated their inception in the first place. We conclude that in two of the three cases (Brazil and Thailand), the controls did not deliver much of what was intended--although, one does not observe the counterfactual. By contrast, in the case of Malaysia the controls did align closely with the priors of what controls are intended to achieve: greater interest rate and exchange rate stability and more policy autonomy

Understanding the empirical literature on purchasing power parity: the post-Bretton Woods era

Foreign exchange ; Purchasing power