Legislative Threats

The Article presents a theory of legislative threats that pierces the fundamental concept of the legal system as a regulatory institution and more generally as a mechanism of social governance. It examines ten case studies that demonstrate the use of legislative threats in diverse areas of law and social policy. Conceptually, legislative threats encompass a variety of threats that legislators exert on firms and financial institutions, organizations and institutional shareholders, professions and industrial sectors, universities and public institutions, federal agencies, and possibly even U.S. states, according to which legislators will exercise their legislative mandate and enact adverse legislation in order to regulate the conduct or condition in question, unless the recipients of the threat alter their behavior so as to bring it in line with the legislators’ demands (Implicit in the threat is the inverse promise that the legislators will forgo the threatened legislation if, and only if the recipients of the threat comply with the demands). The Article also offers an analytic taxonomy of threats that includes explicit, implicit, and anticipatory legislative threats. Using non-cooperative game-theory, the Article models the strategic interaction between legislators and threat-recipients and generates predictions concerning the inducement effect of legislative threats on behavior. Specifically, the analysis considers conditions that may render threats credible, including (i) legislators’ pre-game commitment; (ii) legislators’ reputation; and (iii) legislators’ emotional motivations. The analysis also examines (i) the effects of the probabilistic nature of legislative threats; (ii) the effects of imperfect and asymmetric information on the threat’s inducement effects; (iii) the effects of legislative threats on the properties of regulatory bargaining in the shadow of the threat (e.g., the magnitude of transaction costs, information revelation, and degree of contractual incompleteness); and (iv) the effects of strategic interaction within homogenous and heterogeneous as well as organized and unorganized groups on threat-induced compliance. The Article considers the effects of legislative threats on (i) social control efficacy and (ii) democratic and constitutional legitimacy. To that end, the analysis highlights functional and institutional considerations pertaining, respectively, to the comparative capacity of legislative threats to effectively control behavior in an increasingly-complex and information-intensive social reality; and to various political, constitutional, and democratic implications arising from the use of legislative threats. Functional considerations include: (i) the asymmetric information of social planners and its effects on social control; (ii) the superiority of threat-induced self-regulation of conduct compared with “top down” regulation of conduct; (iii) the capacity of threat-induced self-regulation to accommodate rapidly-changing demands of social control; and (iv) the effects of threat-induced self-regulation on reducing the costs of law enforcement. In this respect, the analysis advances the following claim: legislative threats can be viewed as a spontaneous response to the institutionally-handicapped position of lawmakers and to the limits of the law in effectively controlling social activities; to that end, legislative threats are designed to reduce information and transaction costs of policy-making and regulatory bargaining. Institutional considerations encompass ways in which the use of legislative threats enables legislators and regulators to evade procedural safeguards, institutional constraints, and substantive controls designed to limit the power to make law and effect policy changes. These considerations are based upon the following observations: (i) using legislative threats, legislators opt-out of the “rules of the game,” disenfranchise fellow legislators, and are therefore able to effect policy changes notwithstanding a possible lack of majoritarian support; (ii) legislative threats disenfranchise the executive branch by preventing a possible presidential veto and by sidestepping the government’s role in law enforcement; (iii) legislative threats disenfranchise the states by redrawing the federal-state allocation of regulatory powers; (iv) legislative threats bypass constitutional safeguards by evading judicial review of statutes; and (v) legislative threats disenfranchise the judiciary by circumventing precedent-setting interpretation of statutes. The Article argues that notwithstanding the superior functional capacity of legislative threats to control behavior in an increasingly-complex and information-intensive society, the institutionally-unregulated and politically-unaccountable use of implicit and explicit threats poses formidable normative challenges for the most treasured attributes of American constitutional democracy. On balance, it seems that even though the benefits of legislative threats may exceed their short-term cost (thus becoming efficient in the short-term), in the long-term the reverse is true, thus suggesting that the best domain of legislative threats consists, in fact, of an empty set. For, any increase in individual well-being and aggregate social welfare—due to the improved efficacy of social control—is inevitably outweighed by a higher commensurate decrease in well-being and social welfare, reflecting in turn the toll of violating constitutional and democratic principles; the negative impact on societal stability and the disincentive on private investment; and the consequential decline in economic growth. In turn, the discussion develops a social control scheme that is rooted in the province of legislation and is designed to ensure the socially-optimal trade-off between regulatory efficacy and the toll on democratic accountability, namely: an outcome-oriented or risk-focused, deferred-implementation, contingent sunset legislation. Lastly, the Article argues that the exponential increase in the complexity of activities and the rapid changes in behavior across all social domains are two major sources of growth-driven social instability. Paradoxically, absent effective social control, the processes that drive well-developed market economies towards economic growth and social progress, may ultimately propel their economic decline, increase social instability, and lead to their gradual societal deterioration. Thus, the more advanced a society becomes the more demanding is the lawmakers’ role. Viewed from this perspective, the emergence of legislative threats—though institutionally illegitimate and socially unwarranted—demonstrates the limits of law and the severe limitations of lawmakers. Moreover, they underscore the growing incapacity of the legal system to deliver its pre-eminent promise: to maintain ordered liberty and to promote sound public policies. Viewed from an ever broader perspective, the widespread use of legislative threats demonstrates an increasing tendency towards (what I label) a second-order social control system, where legislators establish second-order rules designed to create the incentives necessary to induce entities and groups to adopt socially-desired rules of conduct. Inevitably, the trend toward second-order social control diminishes the traditionally-extensive role of the regulatory state, but increases the power of groups that, in shaping their regulatory environment, practically turn into islands of self-regulation

Top-down self-organization: state logics, substitutional delegation, and private governance in Russia

Version of Record online: 12 MAR 2015This study investigates the counterintuitive emergence of self-regulation in the Russian construction sector. Despite its proclivity for centralizing political authority, the government acted as the catalyst for the delegation of regulatory powers to private industry groups. The article argues that a factor little considered in extant literature—namely, a weak and corrupt bureaucracy—is key to explaining why the normally control-oriented executive branch began to promote private governance despite industry's preference for continued state regulation. The article's signal contribution is to theoretically explain and empirically demonstrate how a government's prior inability to establish intrastate control over an ineffective and bribable public bureaucracy creates incentives for political authorities to search for alternative means for policy implementation outside of existing state agencies. These findings are important for understanding the impetus and logic behind particular regulatory shifts in countries where the state apparatus is both deficient and corrupt

Elucidating the Mechanisms of Influenza Virus Recognition by Ncr1

Natural killer (NK) cells are innate cytotoxic lymphocytes that specialize in the defense against viral infection and oncogenic transformation. Their action is tightly regulated by signals derived from inhibitory and activating receptors; the later include proteins such as the Natural Cytotoxicity Receptors (NCRs: NKp46, NKp44 and NKp30). Among the NCRs, NKp46 is the only receptor that has a mouse orthologue named Ncr1. NKp46/Ncr1 is also a unique marker expressed on NK and on Lymphoid tissue inducer (LTI) cells and it was implicated in the control of various viral infections, cancer and diabetes. We have previously shown that human NKp46 recognizes viral hemagglutinin (HA) in a sialic acid-dependent manner and that the O-glycosylation is essential for the NKp46 binding to viral HA. Here we studied the molecular interactions between Ncr1 and influenza viruses. We show that Ncr1 recognizes influenza virus in a sialic acid dependent manner and that N-glycosylation is important for this binding. Surprisingly we demonstrate that none of the predicted N-glycosilated residues of Ncr1 are essential for its binding to influenza virus and we thus conclude that other, yet unidentified N-glycosilated residues are responsible for its recognition. We have demonstrated that N glycosylation play little role in the recognition of mouse tumor cell lines and also showed the in-vivo importance of Ncr1 in the control of influenza virus infection by infecting C57BL/6 and BALB/c mice knockout for Ncr1 with influenza

MS4a4B, a CD20 Homologue in T Cells, Inhibits T Cell Propagation by Modulation of Cell Cycle

MS4a4B, a CD20 homologue in T cells, is a novel member of the MS4A gene family in mice. The MS4A family includes CD20, FcεRIβ, HTm4 and at least 26 novel members that are characterized by their structural features: with four membrane-spanning domains, two extracellular domains and two cytoplasmic regions. CD20, FcεRIβ and HTm4 have been found to function in B cells, mast cells and hematopoietic cells respectively. However, little is known about the function of MS4a4B in T cell regulation. We demonstrate here that MS4a4B negatively regulates mouse T cell proliferation. MS4a4B is highly expressed in primary T cells, natural killer cells (NK) and some T cell lines. But its expression in all malignant T cells, including thymoma and T hybridoma tested, was silenced. Interestingly, its expression was regulated during T cell activation. Viral vector-driven overexpression of MS4a4B in primary T cells and EL4 thymoma cells reduced cell proliferation. In contrast, knockdown of MS4a4B accelerated T cell proliferation. Cell cycle analysis showed that MS4a4B regulated T cell proliferation by inhibiting entry of the cells into S-G2/M phase. MS4a4B-mediated inhibition of cell cycle was correlated with upregulation of Cdk inhibitory proteins and decreased levels of Cdk2 activity, subsequently leading to inhibition of cell cycle progression. Our data indicate that MS4a4B negatively regulates T cell proliferation. MS4a4B, therefore, may serve as a modulator in the negative-feedback regulatory loop of activated T cell

Human Tumour Immune Evasion via TGF-β Blocks NK Cell Activation but Not Survival Allowing Therapeutic Restoration of Anti-Tumour Activity

Immune evasion is now recognized as a key feature of cancer progression. In animal models, the activity of cytotoxic lymphocytes is suppressed in the tumour microenvironment by the immunosuppressive cytokine, Transforming Growth Factor (TGF)-β. Release from TGF-β-mediated inhibition restores anti-tumour immunity, suggesting a therapeutic strategy for human cancer. We demonstrate that human natural killer (NK) cells are inhibited in a TGF-β dependent manner following chronic contact-dependent interactions with tumour cells in vitro. In vivo, NK cell inhibition was localised to the human tumour microenvironment and primary ovarian tumours conferred TGF-β dependent inhibition upon autologous NK cells ex vivo. TGF-β antagonized the interleukin (IL)-15 induced proliferation and gene expression associated with NK cell activation, inhibiting the expression of both NK cell activation receptor molecules and components of the cytotoxic apparatus. Interleukin-15 also promotes NK cell survival and IL-15 excluded the pro-apoptotic transcription factor FOXO3 from the nucleus. However, this IL-15 mediated pathway was unaffected by TGF-β treatment, allowing NK cell survival. This suggested that NK cells in the tumour microenvironment might have their activity restored by TGF-β blockade and both anti-TGF-β antibodies and a small molecule inhibitor of TGF-β signalling restored the effector function of NK cells inhibited by autologous tumour cells. Thus, TGF-β blunts NK cell activation within the human tumour microenvironment but this evasion mechanism can be therapeutically targeted, boosting anti-tumour immunity

The Natural Cytotoxicity Receptors in Health and Disease

The Natural Cytotoxicity Receptors (NCRs), NKp46, NKp44, and NKp30, were some of the first human activating Natural Killer (NK) cell receptors involved in the non-MHC-restricted recognition of tumor cells to be cloned over 20 years ago. Since this time many host- and pathogen-encoded ligands have been proposed to bind the NCRs and regulate the cytotoxic and cytokine-secreting functions of tissue NK cells. This diverse set of NCR ligands can manifest on the surface of tumor or virus-infected cells or can be secreted extracellularly, suggesting a remarkable NCR polyfunctionality that regulates the activity of NK cells in different tissue compartments during steady state or inflammation. Moreover, the NCRs can also be expressed by other innate and adaptive immune cell subsets under certain tissue conditions potentially conferring NK recognition programs to these cells. Here we review NCR biology in health and disease with particular reference to how this important class of receptors regulates the functions of tissue NK cells as well as confer NK cell recognition patterns to other innate and adaptive lymphocyte subsets. Finally, we highlight how NCR biology is being harnessed for novel therapeutic interventions particularly for enhanced tumor surveillance

NK cells and cancer: you can teach innate cells new tricks

Natural killer (NK) cells are the prototype innate lymphoid cells endowed with potent cytolytic function that provide host defence against microbial infection and tumours. Here, we review evidence for the role of NK cells in immune surveillance against cancer and highlight new therapeutic approaches for targeting NK cells in the treatment of cancer