Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale

According to the theory of incomplete contracts, given nonverifiable entrepreneurial project choices together with divergent objectives between an entrepreneur and its outside financier, the entrepreneur can credibly pledge only part of its project outcome for external funding. Meanwhile, entrepreneurial net worth must be put as down payment to ameliorate agency costs. In a real dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and nonverifiable project choices, endogenous agency costs significantly change the businesscycle pattern in the sense that the model can replicate an important empirical fact, the amplified hump-shaped output behavior. Furthermore, variable asset prices can a ect entrepreneurial net worth and then subsequently change the dynamic features of aggregate output along business cycles.Asset Prices, Business Cycles, Credit Constraints, Hump-Shaped Output Dynamics, Nonverifiable Project Choice

Financial Development and International Capital Flows

We develop a general equilibrium model with nancial frictions in which internal capital (equity capital) and external capital (bank loans) have different rates of return. Financial development raises the rate of return on external capital but has a non-monotonic effect on the rate of return on internal capital. We then show in a two-country model that capital account liberalization leads to outflow of financial capital from the country with less developed financial system. However, the direction of foreign direct investment (FDI, henceforth) depends on the exact degrees of financial development in the two countries as well as the specific capital controls policy. Our model helps explain the Lucas Paradox (Lucas, 1990). Countries with least developed financial system have the outows of both financial capital and FDI;countries with most developed financial system witness two-way capital ows, i.e., the inflow of financial capital and the outow of FDI; countries with intermediate level of financial development have the outow of financial capital and the inflow of FDI. It is consistent with the fact that FDI ows not to the poorest countries but to the middle-income countries.Capital account liberalization, capital controls, financial frictions, foreign direct investment, Internal capital, External capital

Financial openness and macroeconomic volatility

We analyze the implications of financial openness to macroeconomic volatility in a small open economy. Major macroeconomic aggregates show non-monotonic volatility patterns with respect to the degree of financial openness in the model without domestic financial frictions. The introduction of domestic financial frictions makes the volatility patterns flatter. Our model explains the lack of empirical evidence on the linkage between financial openness and macro volatility. If the empirical data of countries with different degree of financial openness are pooled, we cannot estimate a significant linear relationship between financial openness and macro volatility, because the underlying relationship is non-monotonic. --Financial friction,Financial Openess,Foreign borrowing,Macroeconomic volatility

International Capital Flows with Limited Commitment and Incomplete Markets

Recent literature has proposed two alternative types of financial frictions, i.e., limited commitment and incomplete markets, to explain the patterns of international capital flows between developed and developing countries observed in the past two decades. This paper integrates both types of frictions into a two-country overlapping-generations framework to facilitate a direct comparison of their eects. In our model, limited commitment distorts the investment made by agents with different productivity, which creates a wedge between the interest rates on equity capital vs. credit capital; while incomplete markets distort the investment among projects with different riskiness, which creates a wedge between the risk-free rate and the mean rate of return to risky capital. We show that the two approaches are observationally equivalent with respect to their implications for international capital flows, production eciency, and aggregate output.financial development, financial frictions, foreign direct investment, incomplete markets, limited commitment, international capital flows

International Capital Flows and Aggregate Output

We develop a tractable multi-country overlapping-generations model and show that cross-country differences in financial development explain three recent empirical patterns of international capital flows. Domestic financial frictions in our model distort interest rates and aggregate output in the less financially developed countries. International capital flows help ameliorate the two distortions.International flows of financial capital and foreign direct investment a ect aggregate output in each country directly through affecting the size of aggregate investment. In addition, they affect aggregate output indirectly through affecting the composition of aggregate investment and the size of aggregate savings. Under certain conditions, the indirect effects may dominate the direct effects so that, despite "uphill" net capital flows, full capital mobility may raise the steady-state aggregate output in the poor country as well as raise world output. However, if foreign direct investment is restricted, "uphill" financial capital flows strictly reduce the steady-state aggregate output in the poor countries and it is more likely that the steady-state world output is lower than under international financial autarky.Capital account liberalization, financial frictions, financial development, foreign direct investment, world output gains