Determining Context Factors for Hybrid Development Methods with Trained Models

Selecting a suitable development method for a specific project context is one of the most challenging activities in process design. Every project is unique and, thus, many context factors have to be considered. Recent research took some initial steps towards statistically constructing hybrid development methods, yet, paid little attention to the peculiarities of context factors influencing method and practice selection. In this paper, we utilize exploratory factor analysis and logistic regression analysis to learn such context factors and to identify methods that are correlated with these factors. Our analysis is based on 829 data points from the HELENA dataset. We provide five base clusters of methods consisting of up to 10 methods that lay the foundation for devising hybrid development methods. The analysis of the five clusters using trained models reveals only a few context factors, e.g., project/product size and target application domain, that seem to significantly influence the selection of methods. An extended descriptive analysis of these practices in the context of the identified method clusters also suggests a consolidation of the relevant practice sets used in specific project contexts

In defense of correspondence truth:A reply to Markus

In his response to our article, Keith Markus argues that our recommendation that psychologists adopt correspondence truth is not supported by sound argument. In our rejoinder, we show that Markus's critique only has force against a minor part of our article. Additionally, we show that he does not accurately reconstruct our argument in favor of correspondence truth. Moreover, we rebut two of his arguments for taking up alternative theories of truth. We maintain that the ability of correspondence truth to explain important features of scientific practice is yet to be demonstrated for rival theories of truth

How to practise Bayesian statistics outside the Bayesian church: What philosophy for Bayesian statistical modelling?

Unlike most other statistical frameworks, Bayesian statistical inference is wedded to a particular approach in the philosophy of science (see Howson & Urbach, 2006); this approach is called Bayesianism. Rather than being concerned with model fitting, this position in the philosophy of science primarily addresses theory choice. Naturally, in some cases there exists a relation between scientific theories and statistical models, and this relation can be so tight that choosing the model is tantamount to accepting the theory. However, in many cases of data analysis, the statistical model bears only an indirect relation to scientific theory, and in such cases the act of statistical modelling is distinct from the act of theory choice

Truth, science, and psychology

According to the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if and only if the world is as the proposition says it is. This theory has been both promoted and rejected by philosophers and scientists down through time. In this paper, we adopt the correspondence theory as a plausible theory of truth and relate it to science. First, we briefly outline the major extant theories of truth. We then present the correspondence theory in a form that enables us to show that the theory uniquely fulfills a crucial function in psychological research, because the interpretation of truth claims as suppositions that concern states of affairs in the world clearly explicates what it means for a theory to be true, and what it means for a theory to be false. For this reason, correspondence truth has the advantage of allowing researchers to properly understand the assumptions of scientific research as claims about the factual state of the world, and to scrutinize these assumptions. It is concluded that correspondence truth plays an important part in our understanding of science, including psychology

Scientific realism <em>with</em> correspondence truth: A reply to Asay (2018)

Asay (2018) criticizes our contention that psychologists do best to adhere to a substantive theory of correspondence truth. He argues that deflationary theory can serve the same purposes as correspondence theory. In the present article we argue that (a) scientific realism, broadly construed, requires a version of correspondence theory and (b) contrary to Asay’s suggestion, correspondence theory does have important additional resources over deflationary accounts in its ability to support generalizations over classes of true sentences

On the conceptual foundations of psychological measurement

This special double issue of Measurement addresses a number of foundational issues in psychological measurement. It assembles three focus articles, with associated peer commentary, and replies by the authors. The first article challenges the routine assumption that psychometrics is a quantitative science; it argues that there may be no such thing as psychological measurement at all. The second article lays out a systematic framework for latent variable modeling that is intended to capture the notion of psychological measurement in its terms. The third article seeks to provide a conceptual distinction between theoretical variables that allow for an extension in possible worlds, and theoretical variables that do not. These focus articles are followed by a number of associated peer commentaries and replies by the authors

Taxonomic considerations in listing subspecies under the U.S. Endangered Species Act

The U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA) allows listing of subspecies and other groupings below the rank of species. This provides the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service with a means to target the most critical unit in need of conservation. Although roughly one-quarter of listed taxa are subspecies, these management agencies are hindered by uncertainties about taxonomic standards during listing or delisting activities. In a review of taxonomic publications and societies, we found few subspecies lists and none that stated standardized criteria for determining subspecific taxa. Lack of criteria is attributed to a centuries-old debate over species and subspecies concepts. Nevertheless, the critical need to resolve this debate for ESA listings led us to propose that minimal biological criteria to define disjunct subspecies (legally or taxonomically) should include the discreteness and significance criteria of distinct population segments (as defined under the ESA). Our subspecies criteria are in stark contrast to that proposed by supporters of the phylogenetic species concept and provide a clear distinction between species and subspecies. Efforts to eliminate or reduce ambiguity associated with subspecies-level classifications will assist with ESA listing decisions. Thus, we urge professional taxonomic societies to publish and periodically update peer-reviewed species and subspecies lists. This effort must be paralleled throughout the world for efficient taxonomic conservation to take place