Essays on the economics and regulatory design of power systems

Regulation has always been at the core of power systems. Two of the most important reasons for regulatory interventions to be present in today's power systems are negative environmental externalities from power generation, and the fact that the power grid is a natural monopoly. Against this background, this thesis investigates several aspects of the economics and regulatory design of power systems with a focus on the generation and transmission sector. Specifically, it investigates design alternatives for the organization of the different economic activities in these sectors with the goal to induce short- and long-term efficiency. Novel approaches are suggested to identify and tackle economic and regulatory deficits. The specific challenges that are addressed stem from the time-varying and interdependent temporal and spatial distribution of production (especially, from variable renewable energies) and demand, as well as from the degree and exchange of information between different players in the supply chain for electric power. It is shown in the thesis that weak designs in these fields may entail significant losses of social welfare. Moreover, it provides insights and suggestions regarding the efficient handling of those challenges

Reliability with interdependent suppliers

We study reliability and the role of interdependent suppliers with reference to electricity systems. Individual availability of supply is uncertain and may exhibit dependencies with other suppliers as well as with the stochastic demand. Aiming at a comprehensive and consistent reliability assessment, we first investigate the system as a whole, and then derive a general solution for an individual supplier's contribution. Implicitly, we identify changing returns to scale, gains of diversification, and non-additivity. As these properties are often undesirable, e.g., for the purpose of accounting or in specific auction formats, we build on concepts from cooperative game theory to provide the Shapley value as the unique consistent reliability allocation rule. We then illustrate practical relevance and applicability of our approach for the case of wind power contributing to the reliability of Germany's electricity system, and discuss how today's reliability mechanisms may be improved by considering interdependencies between suppliers. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Regulation of non-marketed outputs and substitutable inputs

We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm that provides a non-marketed output based on multiple substitutable inputs. The regulator is able to observe the effectiveness of the provision, but faces information asymmetries with respect to the efficiency of the firm's activities. Specifically, we consider a setting where one input and the output are observable, while another input and related costs are not. Multi-dimensional information asymmetries are introduced by discrete distributions for the functional form of the marginal rate of substitution between the inputs as well as for the input costs. For this novel setting, we investigate the theoretically optimal Bayesian regulation mechanism. We find that the first-best solution cannot be obtained in case of shadow costs of public funding. The second-best solution implies separation of the most efficient type with first-best input levels, and upwards distorted (potentially bunched) observable input levels for all other types. Moreover, we compare these results to a simpler non-Bayesian approach, i.e., a single pooling contract, and hence, bridge the gap between the academic discussion and regulatory practice. In a numerical simulation, we identify certain conditions in which a single contract non-Bayesian regulation can indeed get close to the second-best solution of the Bayesian menu of contracts regulation

Spatial dependencies of wind power and interrelations with spot price dynamics

Wind power has seen strong growth over the last decade and increasingly affects electricity spot prices. In particular, prices are more volatile due to the stochastic nature of wind, such that more generation of wind energy yields lower prices. Therefore, it is important to assess the value of wind power at different locations not only for an investor but for the electricity system as a whole. In this paper, we develop a stochastic simulation model that captures the full spatial dependence structure of wind power by using copulas, incorporated into a supply and demand based model for the electricity spot price. This model is calibrated with German data. We find that the specific location of a turbine - i.e., its spatial dependence with respect to the aggregated wind power in the system - is of high relevance for its value. Many of the locations analyzed show an upper tail dependence that adversely impacts the market value. Therefore, a model that assumes a linear dependence structure would systematically overestimate the market value of wind power in many cases. This effect becomes more important for increasing levels of wind power penetration and may render the large-scale integration into markets more difficult. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Reliability in Multi-regional Power Systems: Capacity Adequacy and the Role of Interconnectors

Based upon probabilistic reliability metrics, we develop an optimization model to determine the efficient amount and location of firm generation capacity to achieve reliability targets in multi-regional electricity systems. A particular focus lies on the representation and contribution of transmission capacities as well as variable renewable resources. Calibrating our model with a comprehensive dataset for Europe, we find that there are substantial benefits from regional cooperation. The amount of firm generation capacity to meet a perfectly reliably system could be reduced by 36.2 GW (i.e., 6.4%) compared to an isolated regional approach, which translates to savings of 14.5 bn EUR. Interconnectors contribute in both directions, with capacity values up to their technical maximum of close to 200%, while wind power contributions are in the range of 3.8-29.5%. Furthermore, we find that specific reliability targets heavily impact the efficient amount and distribution of reliable capacity as well as the contribution of individual technologies

Congestion management in power systems

In liberalized power systems, generation and transmission services are unbundled, but remain tightly interlinked. Congestion management in the transmission network is of crucial importance for the efficiency of these inter-linkages. Different regulatory designs have been suggested, analyzed and followed, such as uniform zonal pricing with redispatch or nodal pricing. However, the literature has either focused on the short-term efficiency of congestion management or specific issues of timing investments. In contrast, this paper presents a generalized and flexible economic modeling framework based on a decomposed inter-temporal equilibrium model including generation, transmission, as well as their inter-linkages. The model covers short-run operation and long-run investments and hence, allows to analyze short and long-term efficiency of different congestion management designs that vary with respect to the definition of market areas, the regulation and organization of TSOs, the way of managing congestion besides grid expansion, and the type of cross-border capacity allocation. We are able to identify and isolate implicit frictions and sources of inefficiencies in the different regulatory designs, and to provide a comparative analysis including a benchmark against a first-best welfare-optimal result. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we calibrate and numerically solve our model for a detailed representation of the Central Western European (CWE) region, consisting of 70 nodes and 174 power lines. Analyzing six different congestion management designs until 2030, we show that compared to the first-best benchmark, i.e., nodal pricing, inefficiencies of up to 4.6% arise. Inefficiencies are mainly driven by the approach of determining cross-border capacities as well as the coordination of transmission system operators' activities

Decarbonizing Europe's power sector by 2050-Analyzing the economic implications of alternative decarbonization pathways

The European Union aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% in 2050 compared to 1990 levels. The transition towards a low-carbon economy implies the almost complete decarbonization of Europe's power sector, which could be achieved along various pathways. In this paper, we evaluate the economic implications of alternative energy policies for Europe's power sector by applying a linear dynamic electricity system optimization model in over 36 scenarios. We find that the costs of decarbonizing Europe's power sector by 2050 vary between 139 and 633 (sic)(2010), which corresponds to an increase of between 11% and 44% compared to the total system costs when no CO2 reduction targets are implemented. In line with economic theory, the decarbonization of Europe's power sector is achieved at minimal costs under a stand-alone CO2 reduction target, which ensures competition between all low-carbon technologies. If, however, renewable energies are exempted from competition via supplementary renewable energy (RES-E) targets or if investments in new nuclear and CCS power plants are politically restricted, the costs of decarbonization significantly rise. Moreover, we find that the excess costs of supplementary RES-E targets depend on the acceptance of alternative low carbon technologies. For example, given a complete nuclear phase-out in Europe by 2050 and politically implemented restrictions on the application of CCS to conventional power plants, supplementary RES-E targets are redundant. While in such a scenario the overall costs of decarbonization are comparatively high, the excess costs of supplementary RES-E targets are close to zero. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

A Service of zbw The economic inefficiency of grid parity: The case of German photovoltaics The economic inefficiency of grid parity: The case of German photovoltaics CORRESPONDING AUTHOR The economic inefficiency of grid parity: The case of German photov

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Abstract Since PV grid parity has already been achieved in Germany, households are given an indirect financial incentive to invest in PV and battery storage capacities. This paper analyzes the economic consequences of the household's optimization behavior induced by the indirect financial incentive for in-house PV electricity consumption by combining a household optimization model with an electricity system optimization model. Up to 2050, we find that households save 10 % -18 % of their accumulated electricity costs by covering 38 -57 % of their annual electricity demand with self-produced PV electricity. Overall, cost savings on the household level amount to more than 47 bn e 2011 up to 2050. However, while the consumption of self-produced electricity is beneficial from the single household's perspective, it is inefficient from the total system perspective. The single household's optimization behavior is found to cause excess costs of 116 bn e 2011 accumulated until 2050. Moreover, it leads to significant redistributional effects by raising the financial burden for (residual) electricity consumers by more than 35 bn e 2011 up to 2050. In addition, it yields massive revenue losses on the side of the public sector and network operators of more than 77 and 69 bn e 2011 by 2050, respectively. In order to enhance the overall economic efficiency, we argue that the financial incentive for in-house PV electricity consumption should be abolished and that energy-related network tariffs should be replaced by tariffs which reflect the costs of grid connection

The relevance of grid expansion under zonal markets

The European electricity market design is based on zonal markets with uniform prices. Hence, no differentiated locational price signals are provided within these zones. If intra-zonal congestion occurs due to missing grid expansion, this market design reveals its inherent incompleteness, and might lead to severe short and long-term distortions. In this paper, we study these distortions with a focus on the impact of restricted grid expansion under zonal markets. Therefore, we use a long-term model of the European electricity system and restrict the allowed expansion of the transmission grid per decade. We find that the combination of an incomplete market design and restricted grid expansion leads to a misallocation of generation capacities and the inability to transport electricity to where it is needed. This results in an energy imbalance in some regions of up to 2-3% and difficulty when reaching envisaged political targets in the power sector

The Relevance of Grid Expansion under Zonal Markets

The European electricity market design is based on zonal markets with uniform prices. Hence, no differentiated locational price signals are provided within these zones. If intra-zonal congestion occurs due to missing grid expansion, this market design reveals its inherent incompleteness, and might lead to severe short and long-term distortions. In this paper, we study these distortions with a focus on the impact of restricted grid expansion under zonal markets. Therefore, we use a long-term model of the European electricity system and restrict the allowed expansion of the transmission grid per decade. We find that the combination of an incomplete market design and restricted grid expansion leads to a misallocation of generation capacities and the inability to transport electricity to where it is needed. This results in an energy imbalance in some regions of up to 2-3% and difficulty when reaching envisaged political targets in the power sector