Does the group leader matter? The impact of monitoring activities and social ties of group leaders on the repayment performance of groupbased lending Eritrea

This paper analyzes whether the effects of monitoring and social ties of the group leader and other group members on repayment performance of groups differ, using data from an extensive questionnaire held in Eritrea among participants of 102 groups. We hypothesize that the monitoring activities and social ties of the group leader have a stronger positive impact on the repayment performance of groups. The results show that social ties of the group leader do have a positive effect on repayment performance of groups, whereas this is not true for social ties of other group members. We do not find evidence for the hypothesis that monitoring activities of the group leader have a stronger positive impact on group repayment performance. All variables measuring monitoring activities, either of the group leader or the other group members, are found to be statistically insignificant.

Peer monitoring, social ties and moral hazard in group lending programmes: evidence from Eritrea. World Development 33

Abstract In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact of monitoring and social ties within group lending programs on moral hazard behavior of its participants, based on data from an extensive questionnaire held in Eritrea among participants of 102 groups. We find support for the fact that peer monitoring by and social ties of group leaders do help to reduce moral hazard behavior of group members. In contrast, peer monitoring by and social ties of other group members are not related to reducing the occurrence of moral hazard within groups. (also downloadable in electronic version: http://som.rug.nl/ JEL Classification: D82, G29, O1

Peer monitoring, social ties and moral hazard in group lending programmes: evidence from Eritrea

In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact of monitoring and social ties within group lending programs on moral hazard behavior of its participants, based on data from an extensive questionnaire held in Eritrea among participants of 102 groups. We find support for the fact that peer monitoring by and social ties of group leaders do help to reduce moral hazard behavior of group members. In contrast, peer monitoring by and social ties of other group members are not related to reducing the occurrence of moral hazard within groups.