The Market Place for Ideas: An Analysis of Knowledge Diffusion in Academic Journals

econometrics, experimental techniques, economics of science

How portable is level-0 behavior? A test of level-k theory in game with non-neutral frames

We test the portability of level-0 assumptions in level-k theory in an experimental investigation of behavior in Coordination, Discoordination, and Hide and Seek games with common, non-neutral frames. Assuming that level-0 behavior depends only on the frame, we derive hypotheses that are independent of prior assumptions abou tsalience. Those hypotheses are not confirmed. Our findings contrast with previous research which has fitted parameterized level-k models to Hide and Seek data. We show that, as a criterion of successful explanation, the existence of a plausible model that replicates the main patterns in these data has a high probability of false positives

Preferences, preference formation and position taking in a Eurozone out: Lessons from the United Kingdom

In the literature on member state position-taking in the eurozone crisis, the debate has mainly centred on whether national preferences are shaped exclusively within the domestic setting or influenced by shared EU-level norms or interaction within EU institutions. This article goes beyond this discussion. Drawing on original data collected by the authors, it uses the UK’s experience to test the claims both of society-centred approaches, including liberal intergovernmentalism, and perspectives that emphasise the importance of shared EU norms or interaction. It argues that while the first overlook the role of institutions as both actors and mediating variables in preference formation, the second have so far focused on the experience of eurozone members, thereby raising the possibility of selection bias. Treating eurozone form as a series of processes rather than a single event, it contests the claim that preference formation is always driven by societal interests, highlights instances where government acts in the absence of or contrary to expressed societal interests, and reveals limitations of the shared norms critique of liberal intergovernmentalism. It shows that the UK government was driven by a scholars concern to protect the UK economy from financial contagion rather than solidarity with its European partners

Vote and Voice::An experiment on the effects of inclusive governance rules

We present an experiment that examines three mechanisms through which the extent of inclusivity in an organization’s governance arrangements might affect its performance. We distinguish extent of inclusivity along two dimensions: members of the organization may or may not be able to (a) vote on collective decisions (‘vote’) and (b) discuss with others what should be done (‘voice’). We find that the inclusivity can affect performance and that each dimension of inclusivity matters, but for different decision problems within an organization. The ‘voice’ matters for motivation whereas ‘voting’ matters for processing and aggregating information; and the decisive difference for performance comes from ‘voice’, not ‘voting’

Endowment inequality in public goods games: A re-examination

We present a clean test of whether inequality in endowments affects contributions to a public good. It is a clean test because, to our knowledge, it is the first to control for possible endowment effects. We find that the key adverse effect of inequality arises because the rich reduce their contributions when there is inequality

The political influence of peer groups: experimental evidence in the classroom

People who belong to the same group often behave alike. Is this because people with similar preferences naturally associate with each other or because group dynamics cause individual preferences and/or the information that they have to converge? We address this question with a natural experiment. We find no evidence that peer political identification affects individual identification. But we do find that peer engagement affects political identification: a more politically engaged peer group encourages individual political affiliation to move from the extremes to the centre

‘Doggedness’ or ‘disengagement’?:An experiment on the effect of inequality in endowment on behaviour in team competitions

Teams often suffer from a free rider problem with respect to individual contributions. That putting teams into competition with each other can mitigate this problem is an important recent insight. However, we know little about how inequality in endowment between teams might influence this beneficial effect from competition. We address this question with an experiment where teams contribute to a public good that then determines their chances of winning a Tullock contest with another team. The boost to efforts from competition disappears when inequality is high. This is mainly because the ‘rich’ ‘disengage’: they make no more contribution to a public good than they would when there is no competition. There is evidence that the ‘poor’ respond to moderate inequality ‘doggedly’, by expending more effort compared to competition with equality, but this ‘doggedness’ disappears too when inequality is high

What makes for prize-winning television?

We investigate the determinants of success in four international television awards festivals between 1994 and 2012. We find that countries with larger markets and greater expenditure on public broadcasting tend to win more awards, but that the degree of concentration in the market for television and rates of penetration of pay-per-view television are unrelated to success. These findings are consistent with general industrial organisation literature on quality and market size, and with media policy literature on public service broadcasting acting as a force for quality. However, we also find that ‘home countries’ enjoy a strong advantage in these festivals, which is not consistent with festival success acting as a pure proxy for television quality

Media pluralism: What matters for governance and regulation?

Media pluralism is valued in most jurisdictions because it contributes to a well-informed citizenry. The authors examine what media policy and regulatory levers appear to affect five types of citizen knowledge across the European Union. They conclude that concentration of titles matters more than ownership in newsprint; and that neither type of concentration matters in broadcasting in the same way, but the regulatory regime for public service broadcasting does, particularly for political knowledge