Wholesale pricing in a small open economy

This paper addresses the empirical analysis of wholesale profit margins using data of the Dutch wholesale sector, 1986. At the heart of the analysis is the typical nature of wholesale production: wholesalers do not produce a tangible product, but offer a service capacity. This has an immediate impact on the identification, interprelation and measurement of determinants of profit variations. A model is set up to explain variations in wholesale profit margins, which is inspired by two widely applied approaches to industry pricing: the behavioural mark-up model and the marginalist price-cost model

Retailer Heterogeneity, Intra-Brand Competition and Social Welfare

This paper considers a model where a manufacturer sells its product to consumers through competitive retailers who are heterogeneous in marginal distribution costs and geographic locations. We study the welfare implications of resale price maintenance (RPM), which eliminates the intra-brand competition. We show that with RPM, the manufacturer can make more profit at the cost of the consumers. RPM helps the high-cost retailers to stay competitive in the market, and therefore increases the total distribution cost of the society. We suggest that antitrust authorities should be concerned when intra-brand competition is lessened. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005retailer heterogeneity, intra-brand competition, resale price maintenance, social welfare,

Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence

This paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors. Thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying. We show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying, when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross-price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high. The empirical evidence from the U.S.supports the theory. Greater collusionreduces the level of PAC contributions. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004