351 research outputs found
Is risk aversion irrational? Examining the “fallacy” of large numbers
A moderately risk averse person may turn down a 50/50 gamble that either results in her winning 100. Such behaviour seems rational if, for instance, the pain of losing 200. The aim of this paper is to examine an influential argument that some have interpreted as showing that such moderate risk aversion is irrational. After presenting an axiomatic argument that I take to be the strongest case for the claim that moderate risk aversion is irrational, I show that it essentially depends on an assumption that those who think that risk aversion can be rational should be skeptical of. Hence, I conclude that risk aversion need not be irrational
Ambiguity Aversion behind the Veil of Ignorance
The veil of ignorance argument was used by John C. Harsanyi to defend Utilitarianism and by John Rawls to defend the absolute priority of the worst off. In a recent paper, Lara Buchak revives the veil of ignorance argument, and uses it to defend an intermediate position between Harsanyi's and Rawls' that she calls Relative Prioritarianism. None of these authors explore the implications of allowing that agent's behind the veil are averse to ambiguity. Allowing for aversion to ambiguity---which is both the most commonly observed and a seemingly reasonable attitude to ambiguity---however supports a version of Egalitarianism, whose logical form is quite different from the theories defended by the aforementioned authors. Moreover, it turns out that the veil of ignorance argument neither supports standard Utilitarianism nor Prioritarianism unless we assume that rational people are insensitive to ambiguity
Land Users – Land Watchers
GróLind is a collaborative project with the aim of monitoring Icelandic vegetation and soil resources. It was founded in 2017 by the Icelandic National Associations of Sheep Farmers, the Farmers Association of Iceland, Ministry of Industries and Innovation, and the Soil Conservation Service of Iceland. GróLind is a collaborative project and cooperation with stakeholders, such as the science community, landowners, and others, is a fundamental concept in the project.
In this project, the state of vegetation and soils are evaluated. Currently, a citizen science project is being developed within GróLind, in which land-users will annually monitor, using a mobile app, the conditions of the land they utilize. The monitoring will be based up on permanent photo-points and simple ecological measurements. These data will be used together with more detailed measurements done by specialists, to assess the state and changes in Iceland\u27s vegetation and soil resources.
Land users\u27 participation provides more extensive and accurate monitoring, both spatially and temporally. Cooperation between scientists and land users increases the flow of knowledge and trust between groups, ensuring that the knowledge gained in the project will be used for sustainable land management. Furthermore, the data will be used to develop research-based indicators for sustainable land-use that later can simplify the monitoring
Belief Revision for Growing Awareness
The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described as conservative
change from one probabilistic belief or credence function to another in response to
newinformation. Roughly: ‘Hold fixed any credences that are not directly affected
by the learning experience.’ This is precisely articulated for the case when we
learn that some proposition that we had previously entertained is indeed true (the
rule of conditionalisation). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended
to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts
of which one was previously unaware? The economists Karni and Vierø (2013,
2015) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the
same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative
probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling,
but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general
requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples.
And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and
‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion
of conservative change in this setting
How a pure risk of harm can itself be a harm: A reply to Rowe
Argues that given an appropriate understanding of objective probabilities, pure objective risk of harm can itself be a harm
Continuity and Catastrophic Risk
Suppose that a decision-maker's aim, under certainty, is to maximise some continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare. Can such a decision-maker rationally satisfy what has been called "continuity for easy cases" while at the same time satisfying what seems to be a widespread intuition against the full-blown continuity axiom of expected utility theory? In this note I argue that the answer is "no": given transitivity and a weak trade-off principle, continuity for easy cases violates the anti-continuity intuition. I end the note by exploring an even weaker continuity condition that is consistent with the aforementioned intuition
The tragedy of the risk averse
Those who are risk averse with respect to money, and thus turn down some gambles with positive monetary expectations, are nevertheless often willing to accept bundles involving multiple such gambles. Therefore, it might seem that such people should become more willing to accept a risky but favourable gamble if they put it in context with the collection of gambles that they predict they will be faced with in the future. However, it turns out that when a risk averse person adopts the long-term perspective, she faces a decision-problem that can be analysed as a noncooperative game between different "time-slices" of herself, where it is in the interest of each time-slice (given its prediction about other slices) to turn down the gamble with which it is faced. Hence, even if a risk averse but rational person manages to take the long-term perspective, she will, in the absence of what Hardin called "mutual coercion", end up in a situation analogous to the "tragedy of the commons"
Longtermism and social risk-taking
A social planner who evaluates risky public policies in light of the other risks with which their society will be faced should judge favourably some such policies even though they would deem them too risky when considered in isolation. I suggest that a longtermist would—or at least should—evaluate risky polices in light of their prediction about future risks; hence, longtermism supports social risk-taking. I consider two formal versions of this argument, discuss the conditions needed for the argument to be valid, and briefly compare these conditions to some risky policy options with which actual public decision-makers are faced
In defence of Pigou-Dalton for chances
I defend a weak version of the Pigou-Dalton principle for chances. The principle says that it is better to increase the survival chance of a person who is more likely to die rather than a person who is less likely to die, assuming that the two people do not differ in any other morally relevant respect. The principle justifies plausible moral judgements that standard ex post views, such as prioritarianism and rank-dependent egalitarianism, cannot accommodate. However, the principle can be justified by the same reasoning that has recently been used to defend the core axiom of ex post prioritarianism and egalitarianism, namely, Pigou-Dalton for well-being. The arguably biggest challenge for proponents of Pigou-Dalton for chances is that it violates State Dominance for social prospects. However, I argue that we have independent reason for rejecting State Dominance for social prospects, since it prevents a social planner from properly respecting people's preferences
Beyond Uncertainty: Reasoning with Unknown Possibilities
The main aim of this book is to introduce the topic of limited awareness, and changes in awareness, to those interested in the philosophy of decision-making and uncertain reasoning. (This is for the series Elements of Decision Theory published by Cambridge University Press and edited by Martin Peterson
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