9 research outputs found
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Confined organization of fullerene units along high polymer chains
Conductive fullerene (C_60) units were designed to be arranged in one dimensional close contact by locally organizing them with covalent bonds in a spatially constrained manner. Combined molecular dynamics and quantum chemical calculations predicted that the intramolecular electronic interactions (i.e. charge transport) between the pendant C_60 units could be controlled by the length of the spacers linking the C_60 units and the polymer main chain. In this context, C_60 side-chain polymers with high relative degrees of polymerization up to 1220 and fullerene compositions up to 53% were synthesized by ruthenium catalyzed ring-opening metathesis polymerization of the corresponding norbornene-functionalized monomers. UV/vis absorption and photothermal deflection spectra corroborated the enhanced inter-fullerene interactions along the polymer chains. The electron mobility measured for the thin film field-effect transistor devices from the polymers was more than an order of magnitude higher than that from the monomers, as a result of the stronger electronic coupling between the adjacent fullerene units within the long polymer chains. This molecular design strategy represents a general approach to the enhancement of charge transport properties of organic materials via covalent bond-based organization
Three-candidate spatial competition when candidates have valence: stochastic voting
Stochastic (probabilistic) voting, Valence, Three-candidate competition,
Social interactions in voting behavior: distinguishing between strategic voting and the bandwagon effect
Prior studies of strategic voting in multi-party elections potentially overestimate the extent of it by counting erroneously votes cast under different motivations as strategic votes. We propose a method that corrects some of this overestimation by distinguishingbetween strategic voting (voting for a candidate other than the most preferred one to reduce the likelihood of an election victory by a third candidate that is disliked even more) and the votes cast under the âbandwagon effectâ (voting for the expected winner instead of the most preferred party to conform to the majority or to be on the winning side). Our method follows from the observation that a vote cannot be strategic unless the voter believes that it will affect the outcome of the election with a non-zero probability, while a vote cast under the bandwagon effect requires no such belief. Employing survey data that include the respondentâs assessment of the importance of his vote, we illustrate this method by estimating the extent of strategic voting in the 2005 UK general election. The estimated extent of strategic voting (4.22 %) is strictly less than self-reported strategic voting (6.94 %), but the discrepancy cannot be attributed in a statistically significant way to the bandwagon effect, suggesting that motivations other than those identified inthe literature may be at work.
Regulation through a revenue contest
Oligopoly, Regulation, Yardstick competition, Revenue contest, D43, L13, L51,