Environment Dependence of Disk Morphology of Spiral Galaxies

We analyze the dependence of disk morphology (arm class, Hubble type, bar type) of nearby spiral galaxies on the galaxy environment by using local background density ($\Sigma_{n}$), projected distance ($r_{p}$), and tidal index ($TI$) as measures of the environment. There is a strong dependence of arm class and Hubble type on the galaxy environment, while the bar type exhibits a weak dependence with a high frequency of SB galaxies in high density regions. Grand design fractions and early-type fractions increase with increasing $\Sigma_{n}$, $1/r_{p}$, and $TI$, while fractions of flocculent spirals and late-type spirals decrease. Multiple-arm and intermediate-type spirals exhibit nearly constant fractions with weak trends similar to grand design and early-type spirals. While bar types show only a marginal dependence on $\Sigma_{n}$, they show a fairly clear dependence on $r_{p}$ with a high frequency of SB galaxies at small $r_{p}$. The arm class also exhibits a stronger correlation with $r_{p}$ than $\Sigma_{n}$ and $TI$, whereas the Hubble type exhibits similar correlations with $\Sigma_{n}$ and $r_{p}$. This suggests that the arm class is mostly affected by the nearest neighbor while the Hubble type is affected by the local densities contributed by neighboring galaxies as well as the nearest neighbor.Comment: 13 pages, 14 figure

If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers

This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative losses associated with free riding. In practice, the outcomes of our experiment, while quite closely tracking theory in the effective absence of an option to resolicit, differed dramatically from theory when a significant probability of resolicitation was introduced: The option to resolicit reduced the costs of free riding fairly substantially. Both the raider offers and the shareholder tendering responses generally exceeded equilibrium predictions.Corporations - Finance ; Game theory

Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence

We model experimentally the governance of an institution. The optimal management of this institution depends on the information possessed by insiders. However, insiders, whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the institution, may choose to use their information to further personal rather than institutional ends. Researchers (e.g., Palfrey 1990) and the business press have both argued that multiagent mechanisms, which inject trustworthy but uninformed “watchdog” agents into the governance process and impose penalties for conflicting recommendations, can implement institutionally preferred outcomes. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. In the experimental treatments in which watchdog agents were included, the intuitionally preferred allocation was implemented in the vast majority of cases. Surprisingly, implementation occurred even in the absence of penalties for conflicting recommendations.Corporations - Finance ; Game theory

Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation

We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently, but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsidercontrolled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider, adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria.