Living with Gertz: A Practical Look at Constitutional Libel Standards

None available

Posner on Literature

Judge Richard A. Posner has expanded the scope of his writing. We have previously known him as one of the leaders in law and economics. He is now moving into the field of law and literature. His offering is an article, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, which has been published in the Virginia Law Review. As one might expect, he performs intelligently. Posner is well read in literature; he displays a genuine love for that which he has read; and he writes with wit and grace. In short, in law and literature, as in law and economics, Posner is a force to be reckoned with. The evidence for these assertions can be found in the article: his comments on W.B. Yeats\u27 poems Easter 1916 (pp. 1363-64, 1366) and The Second Coming (pp. 1378-79) demonstrate his skill as a reader of poetry; his literary analysis of Justice Holmes\u27 dissent in the Lochner case (pp. 1379-85, 1389-90) shows that he can apply these literary skills to a reading of judicial opinions. However, I must utter a however. As I read Posner (and I would recommend others read him) he builds his analysis on the base of several dichotomies that seem to be drawn from ordinary common sense. One of the dichotomies is the distinction of pleasure versus instruction. Another is form (or style) versus content. Yet another is science versus rhetoric. These several dichotomies are linked into a logic that provides the structural underpinning for Posner\u27s analysis; my caveat is that the logic of these dichotomies limits rather than strengthens his analysis. This is my conclusion, so let me now start at the beginning

Motives for Idealizing the Pragmatic

None available

Neither Force Nor Will

Not available

The Story About Clinton\u27s Impeachment

Part of a special section on the Constitution under President Bill Clinton. The prosecution in the Clinton impeachment played their hand based on Clinton\u27s actions representing a threat to the rule of law, when it should have been over breach of trust. It is possible that they avoided the breach-of-trust issue, sensing that although it may have been easy to show Clinton\u27s untrustworthiness, it would have also highlighted their own. The irresponsible actions of the Republicans, who were in the majority on the House Judiciary Committee, gave no basis for trust; therefore, it is no surprise that they were unable to demonstrate that Clinton did not deserve trust. The Republicans\u27 mishandling of the issue is based on two factors: They focused on sex rather than on perjury and obstruction of justice; and when they tried to reverse that position, they applied the threat to the rule-of-law approach. In doing so, they sounded dogmatic, rigid, and abstract