A Polynomial-time, Truthful, Individually Rational and Budget Balanced Ridesharing Mechanism

Ridesharing has great potential to improve transportation efficiency while reducing congestion and pollution. To realize this potential, mechanisms are needed that allocate vehicles optimally and provide the right incentives to riders. However, many existing approaches consider restricted settings (e.g., only one rider per vehicle or a common origin for all riders). Moreover, naive applications of standard approaches, such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves or greedy mechanisms, cannot achieve a polynomial-time, truthful, individually rational and budget balanced mechanism. To address this, we formulate a general ridesharing problem and apply mechanism design to develop a novel mechanism which satisfies all four properties and whose social cost is within 8.6% of the optimal on average

Exact dimer ground state of the two dimensional Heisenberg spin system SrCu_2(BO_3)_2

The two dimensional Heisenberg model for SrCu_2(BO_3)_2 has the exact dimer ground state which was proven by Shastry and Sutherland almost twenty years ago. The critical value of the quantum phase transition from the dimer state to the N\'{e}el ordered state is determined. Analysis of the experimental data shows that SrCu_2(BO_3)_2 has the dimer ground state but is close to the transition point, which leads to the unusual temperature dependence of the susceptibility. Almost localized nature of the triplet excitations explains the plateaus observed in the magnetization curve.Comment: 4 pages, 5 figures, to appear in PR