Extra care housing: a paradigm shift

This paper sets out to investigate if and how a spatial typology for extra care housing (ECH) can be defined within the context of housing for older people in the UK. In particular, it focuses on the concept of domesticity in relation to the perception of public, semi-public and private domains. Four sheltered housing schemes that have been remodelled into ECH within the past four years, have been selected as case studies. The spatial distribution of various public, semi-public, and private domains of the pre-remodelled and remodelled schemes have been analyzed quantitatively and interpretively, to determine how their distribution might help bolster or undermine the ethos behind ECH. Likewise, the spatial layouts of the sheltered, as well as the extra care schemes have been analysed syntactically, to determine how different spatial morphologies and their probabilistic functions might begin to help define ECH as a new type of group housing for older people. The findings of the paper suggest that the extent to which the spatial configuration of a scheme affects one’s notions of self-containment and control, has a direct impact on whether the scheme performs as a building or as a settlement. It is furthermore argued that the more a scheme functions as a settlement, the less institutional it may feel. Thus, as a typology, a successful extra care scheme can be defined as a building that works as a settlement

What Has Happened to Wages in Mexico since NAFTA?

In this paper, I examine the impacts of trade and investment liberalization on the wage structure of Mexico. Part one of the paper surveys recent literature on the labor-market consequences of Mexico's economic reforms in the 1980?s. Mexico's policy reforms appear to have raised the demand for skill in the country, reduced rents in industries that prior to reform paid their workers high wages, and raised the premium paid to workers in states along the U.S. border. These changes have resulted in an increase in wage dispersion in the country. Part two of the paper examines changes in Mexico's wage structure during the 1990's. In the last decade, Mexico has experienced rising returns to skill, which mirror closely wage movements in the United States. There is, however, little evidence of wage convergence between the two countries. Regional wage differentials in Mexico have widened and appear to be explained largely by variation in regional access to foreign trade and investment and in regional opportunities for migration to the United States. I discuss implications of Mexico's experience for the rest of Latin America in the event a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas is enacted.

Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico

In this paper, I examine changes in the distribution of labor income across regions of Mexico during the country's decade of globalization in the 1990's. I focus the analysis on men born in states with either high-exposure or low-exposure to globalization, as measured by the share of foreign direct investment, imports, or export assembly in state GDP. Controlling for regional differences in the distribution of observable characteristics and for initial differences in regional incomes, the distribution of labor income in high-exposure states shifted to the right relative to the distribution of income in low-exposure states. This change was primarily the result of a shift in mass in the income distribution for low-exposure states from upper-middle income earners to lower income earners. Labor income in low-exposure states fell relative to high-exposure states by 10% and the incidence of wage poverty (the fraction of wage earners whose labor income would not sustain a family of four at above-poverty consumption levels) in low-exposure states increased relative to high-exposure states by 7%.

Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States

In this paper, I selectively review recent literature on illegal migration from Mexico to the United States. I begin by discussing methods for estimating stocks and flows of illegal migrants. While there is uncertainty about the size of the unauthorized population, new data sources make it possible to examine the composition of legal and illegal populations and the time-series covariates of illegal labor flows. I then consider the supply of and demand for illegal migrants. Wage differentials between the United States and Mexico are hardly a new phenomenon, yet illegal migration from Mexico did not reach high levels until recently. An increase in the relative size of Mexico%u2019s working-age population, greater volatility in U.S.-Mexico relative wages, and changes in U.S. immigration policies are all candidate explanations for increasing labor flows from Mexico. Finally, I consider policies that regulate the cross-border flow of illegal migrants. While U.S. laws mandate that authorities prevent illegal entry and punish firms that hire unauthorized immigrants, these laws are imperfectly enforced. Lax enforcement may reflect political pressure by employers and other interests that favor open borders.

Localization Economies, Vertical Organization and Trade

This paper develops a model of regional production networks based on localization economies. I consider an industry with two activities: one with location-specific external economies, the other with constant returns. Under autarky, localization economies imply the formation of an industry center. Agglomeration drives up wages in the center, causing the constant returns activity to disperse to outlying regions. Trade recreates the regional production network on a global scale. I apply the model to data from the Mexican apparel industry. Estimation results on Mexico's pre- and post-trade regional apparel wage structure are consistent with localization economies. Implications for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are discussed.

The Governance of Migration Policy

In this paper, I examine high-income country motives for restricting immigration. Abundant evidence suggests that allowing labor to move from low-income to high-income countries would yield substantial gains in global income. Yet, most high-income countries impose strict limits on labor inflows and set their admission policies unilaterally. A core principle underlying the World Trade Organization is reciprocity in tariff setting. When it comes to migration from poor to rich countries, however, labor flows are rarely bidirectional, making reciprocity moot and leaving labor importers with all the bargaining power. One motivation for barriers to labor inflows is political pressure from groups that are hurt by immigration. Raising immigration would depend on creating mechanisms to transfer income from those that immigration helps to those that it hurts. Another motivation for immigration restrictions is that labor inflows from abroad may exacerbate distortions in an economy associated with redistributive tax and transfer policies. Making immigration more attractive would require creating mechanisms that limit the negative fiscal impacts of labor inflows on natives. Fiscal distortions create an incentive for receiving countries to screen immigrants according to their perceived economic impact. For high skilled immigrants, screening can be based on educational degrees and professional credentials, which are relatively easy to observe. For low skilled immigrants, illegal immigration represents an imperfect but increasingly common screening device. For policy makers in labor-importing nations, the modest benefits freer immigration brings may simply not be worth the political hassle. To induce high-income countries to lower border barriers, they need to get more out of the bargain.international migration, labor mobility, political economy, illegal migration