Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information

In this paper, the authors define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players’ continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. They characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.game theory; equilibria; information

Mediation and peace

This paper applies mechanism design to conflict resolution. We determine when and how unmediated communication and mediation reduce the ex ante probability of conflict in a game with asymmetric information. Mediation improves upon unmediated communication when the intensity of conflict is high, or when asymmetric information is significant. The mediator improves upon unmediated communication by not precisely reporting information to conflicting parties, and precisely, by not revealing to a player with probability one that the opponent is weak. Arbitrators who can enforce settlements are no more effective than mediators who only make non-binding recommendations

Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance

This paper shows that state control of some industries may have contributed to theincrease in European unemployment from the 1970s to the early 1990s. We develop asimple model with both publicly-run and privately-run enterprises and show that wheneconomic turbulence increases, higher unemployment rates may result in economies thathave a larger public sector.European Unemployment, Public Sector Employment

\u27Technik\u27 and \u27Technology\u27: some consequences of terminological differences for educational policy-making

This article questions the adoption in some recent British publications of the German term Technik. This term is interpreted in Britain as "third culture between science and the arts" to be taught at school. By means of a brief comparison of the historical roots of the education of engineers in Great Britain and Germany in the nineteenth century, the author shows the theoretical and institutional differences of the origins of technical education in the two countries. In particular, the German attempt at an institutional and conceptual synthesis of the two logics - of academic science and technical efficiency - is emphasised as the real background of the terminological differences. In the light of this analysis, the particularity of German Technik is given a different accentuation: in Germany, Technik is not a third culture, but the guiding concept of professional training (including higher education). The results of the comparative analysis, however, change the perspectives of educational policy-making inasmuch as it refers to the new concept of Technik. (DIPF/Orig.

Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions

We study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this information is eventually revealed and the seller extracts es-sentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players.payoþs tend to zero as the discount factor tends to one. However, the uninformed bidder does relatively better than the informed bidder. We discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information, and argue that, under a Markovian re.nement, the outcome is pooling: information is revealed only insofar as it does not aþect prices. Bidders submit a common, low bid in the tradition of .collusion without conspiracy

Motivational Ratings

Rating systems not only provide information to users but also motivate the rated agent. This paper solves for the optimal (effort-maximizing) rating system within the standard career concerns framework. It is a mixture two-state rating system. That is, it is the sum of two Markov processes, with one that re-effects the belief of the rater and the other the preferences of the rated agent. The rating, however, is not a Markov process. Our analysis shows how the rating combines information of different types and vintages. In particular, an increase in effort may affect some (but not all) future ratings adversely

Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment

We study a discrete-time model of repeated moral hazard without commitment. In every period, a principal finances a project, choosing the scale of the project and a contingent payment plan for an agent, who has the opportunity to appropriate the returns of a successful project unbeknownst the principal. The absence of commitment is reflected both in the solution concept (perfect Bayesian equilibrium) and in the ability of the principal to freely revise the project’s scale from one period to the next. We show that removing commitment from the equilibrium concept is relatively innocuous — if the players are sufficiently patient, there are equilibria with payoffs low enough to effectively endow the players with the requisite commitment, within the confines of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In contrast, the frictionless choice of scale has a significant effect on the project’s dynamics. Starting from the principal’s favorite equilibrium, the optimal contract eventually converges to the repetition of the stage-game Nash equilibrium, operating the project at maximum scale and compensating the agent (only) via immediate payments