Challenges in Modelling and Evaluating Effects of Agricultural Policy Reforms and Trade Agreements

International Relations/Trade,

PUBLIC POLICY IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS: A COURNOT OLIGOPOLY-OLIGOPSONY MODEL

We use a partial equilibrium two-country model, with two vertically related markets, with perfect competition in the primary good sector and with a fixed number of processing firms in each country, characterized by a Cournot behavior upstream and downstream. In the first stage of the game, the government of the exporting country chooses the level of price instruments on both goods. The targeting principle is used to characterize optimal intervention in presence of a minimum revenue constraint towards primary producers. Keywords: vertically related markets, imperfectvertically related markets, imperfect competition, Industrial Organization, International Relations/Trade, F1, H2, L1, Q1,

Situ8: browsing and capturing geolocated user-created content

The idea behind Situ8 is a simple one: enable learners to browse and/or create their own content that is geolocated, i.e. somehow related to a physical place in the “real world” (FitzGerald, 2012a). It was inspired by the popular mScape platform (Stenton et al., 2007), that enabled users to attach multimedia content to a map and deploy it through a mobile device, with such media being ‘triggered’ by a user’s geographical position, as measured by GPS (Global Positioning System) technology. However, unlike mScape, Situ8 allows both the creation and delivery of geolocated media i.e. it is a two-process

Multilateral Agricultural Negotiations and Multifunctionality: Some Research Issues

International Relations/Trade,

Mapping the Decoupling : Transfer Efficiency of the Single Farm Payment Scheme

This paper focuses on the question of the transfer efficiency of the SFP scheme and represents graphically the results of an analytical framework with the seminal Surplus Transformation Curve initiated by Josling (1974) and developed by Gardner (1983). The special feature of the SFP scheme resides in the paradox that exists between the tradability of the entitlements and the activation constraint that creates a particular link to the land. The main result is that redistributive effects between landowners and farmers depend on the total number of entitlements, so they have to be considered as a lever to increase the transfer efficiency of the scheme.Single Farm Payment, transfer efficiency, surplus transformation curve, Agricultural and Food Policy, Agricultural Finance,

PROMOTING MULTIFUNCTIONALITY WHILE MINIMIZING TRADE DISTORTION EFFECTS: THE RELATIVE MERITS OF TRADITIONAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS

In relation to the growing debate around multifunctionality, this paper attempts to classify alternative measures of agricultural income support according to their ability in achieving three policy objectives (supporting agricultural income, promoting positive externalities and reducing negative ones) as well as to their induced trade distortion effects. Four income support programs are considered: a production-linked payment program, a land-based payment program and two decoupled payment programs. Their effectiveness as regards to the three policy objectives and their relatives induce trade distortion effects are examined on an equal cost/support basis through a conceptual framework that allows for free entry in the sector and the land price to adjust endogenously. Analytical results show clearly that no program uniformly dominates others. They also allow to identify the key parameters that have a substantial bearing on the relative merits of these programs.International Relations/Trade,

The Tariff-only Import Regime for Bananas in the European Union: Setting the Tariff at Right Level is Impossible Mission

On 29 November 2005, the European Union (EU) unilaterally introduced a tariff of 176 per tonne to apply from 1 January 2006 to bananas imported from countries enjoying the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. The new EU trade policy includes a duty-free annual import quota of 775,000 tonnes for bananas originating from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. This regime replaces the very complex and highly contested tariff-rate quota policy in place in the EU between 1993 and 2005. However, the banana international trade war very likely has not come to an end. Several Latin American countries have announced their intention to challenge the new EU trade policy by initiating a new WTO complaint. In this paper, we first propose an analysis of the two WTO arbitration awards that ruled against the initial EU tariff proposals. We show that the arbitrators' awards are incomplete notably because they do not explain why CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight) import unit values in the EU-15 from MFN suppliers are much higher than FOB (Free on Board) export unit values in corresponding MFN countries adjusted by all relevant costs that should theoretically be added to transform FOB into CIF prices. One plausible explanation to this apparent paradox is that reported CIF prices include at least part of quota rents generated by the tariff-rate quota policy. On this basis, we analyse the impacts of different MFN tariff levels on EU banana imports under contrasting hypotheses regarding, first whether the price gap between CIF and FOB unit values does include at least part of quota rents, second whether banana exports to the EU from Western African ACP countries were constrained under the previous regime where a specific import quota were reserved to ACP countries. We also analyse the consequences of an "augmented" tariff-only import regime including a MFN tariff and a duty-free import quota for ACP bananas.Tariff-rate quota, tariff, bananas, European Union, World Trade Organisation, Most Favoured Nation, African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, Crop Production/Industries, International Relations/Trade,

Impacts of Agri-Environmental Policies on Land Allocation and Land Prices

We develop a Ricardian framework with heterogeneous land quality to analyse the effects of agricultural and agri-environmental support policies on land allocation decisions and land prices. Four agri-environmental policy instruments are considered: a uniform area payment, a quality-dependent area payment, a mandatory buffer strip policy and a voluntary buffer strip payment. We also analyse how general tax and monetary policies may affect agricultural land prices. The theoretical framework is illustrated by an empirical model applied to Finnish agriculture. The empirical model shows that macroeconomic factors, such as general tax and monetary policies, may exert a greater impact on land prices than some minor fine-tuning in agrienvironmental policies.agri-environmental policy, acreage subsidy, land price, Q11, Q18, Environmental Economics and Policy, Land Economics/Use,

Impact of CAP Direct Payments on French Farms’ Managerial Efficiency

This paper investigates the relationship between CAP direct payments and managerial efficiency for French crop and beef farms. Managerial efficiency scores are calculated using a four-step approach that allows to disentangle managerial inefficiency from other technical inefficiency components, notably what is due to unfavourable environment conditions. Then managerial efficiency scores are regressed over a set of explanatory variables, including CAP direct payments. Our empirical application, based on individual farm data and meteorological data at the municipality level for the year 2000, shows that there is a substantial component of inefficiency that is due to unfavourable conditions. Moreover, there is a significant negative relationship between managerial efficiency and CAP direct payments for crop farms, but a positive relationship for livestock farms. The type of payments also matter, with area-based and Less Favoured Area payments reducing crop farms’ efficiency but headage and agri-environmental payments increasing beef farms’ efficiency.technical efficiency, managerial efficiency, subsidies, crop farms, beef farms, France, Agricultural and Food Policy, Farm Management,

THE CAP REFORM AND EC-US RELATIONS: THE GATT AS A "CAP" ON THE CAP

Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy has entailed the substitution of new income support instruments for the former price based instruments, mainly in the cash crop sector. Our first point is that the domestic political balance was unable to generate such a large change in policy design, in spite of inefficiencies and inbalances. The pressure of the US has been a major factor in the design of the reform. We argue that trade interests have been crucial to catalyze international collective action in order to countervail domestic pressure groups. The pursuit of an agreement in the GATT is therefore a means to place a cap on the CAP and foster some reform and control over sectors such as sugar and dairy in other countries. We do not foresee the disappearance of sources of tensions between the two countries, as EC animal products become more competitive and as the working of the CAP in the vicinity of world prices will make trade flows sensitive to world macro-economic and agricultural shocks. The Uruguay Round, should not be considered as fully satisfactory, and the long-run objective of further decoupling of payments from production incentives should be pursued.Agricultural and Food Policy,