The On-Street Parking Premium and Car Drivers' Choice between Street and Garage Parking

We introduce a methodology to estimate the effect of parking prices on car drivers' choice between street and garage parking. Our key identifying assumption is that the marginal benefit of parking duration does not depend on this choice. The endogeneity of parking duration is acknowledged in the estimation procedure. We apply the methodology during daytime hours to an area where cruising for parking is absent, street parking is ubiquitous and garage parking is discretely located over space. So, in this area, the average distance to the final destination is longer for garage parking than for street parking. We find that drivers are willing to pay a premium for street parking which ranges from € 0.37 to € 0.60. Given a parking duration of 1 h, we find that the demand for street parking is price elastic: the price elasticity of demand for the share of street parking is - 5.5. However, this price elasticity is much smaller for shorter parking durations. Our estimates imply that even small reductions in street parking prices induce a strong increase in the stock of cars parked on-street. Our estimates also imply that a policy which contains a street premium (so street prices exceed garage prices) is welfare improving, because drivers with longer parking durations are induced to use parking locations that are, on average, farther away, so this policy reduces total walking time. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Distortionary company car taxation: deadweight losses through increased car ownership

We analyse the effects of distortionary company car taxation through increased household car consumption for the Netherlands. We use several identification strategies and demonstrate that for about 20 % of households company car possession increases car ownership. The annual welfare loss of distortionary company taxation through increased car ownership is generally rather small, maximally €120 per company car, and much less than the welfare loss through increased expenditure on the company car. However, for policies that exempt households from paying tax on their company car, the annual deadweight loss is likely higher. Our first-best tax policy recommendation is to increase company car tax rates. However, our current results suggest that a second-best policy, which keeps average company car taxation constant but which reduces the marginal tax on cheaper cars and increases the marginal tax on expensive cars, would be welfare improving as overconsumption of company cars will be reduced. © 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg