Study of empirical mechanisms for organizing interaction in a multi-level innovation environment with information asymmetry

In the modern world of dynamic innovative development, information asymmetry becomes a key factor influencing the behavior of subjects in an innovative environment. This article is devoted to the study of empirical mechanisms of interaction in a multi-level innovation environment, taking into account information asymmetry. The main aspects of the influence of asymmetry on the interaction of subjects and their strategies in conditions of innovative activity are analyzed, as well as the specifics of interaction between participants in this environment, highlighting the key factors influencing the processes of communication, coordination and information exchange . Based on the conducted research, various mechanisms used to eliminate information asymmetries and improve the efficiency of interaction in an innovative environment are presented and evaluated. The findings can be a valuable resource for organizations seeking to optimize processes within their innovation environment and increase levels of collective productivity

Theoretical and methodological foundations for the development and formal model of behavior of a subject of a multi-level innovation environment with information asymmetry

This article provides an overview of the theoretical and methodological foundations for creating formal models of behavior of subjects in a multi-level innovation environment, where information asymmetry plays an important role. In the context of modern trends in innovative development, understanding the impact of information inequality on decision-making and interaction of participants is a key aspect for the effective management of innovation processes. The article discusses various methods for modeling the interaction of actors in an innovation environment, including game theory, agent-based modeling, network analysis and statistical approaches. These methods make it possible to create formal models that reflect the dynamics of the behavior of subjects and their strategies in conditions of information asymmetry. Particular attention is paid to analyzing the impact of information asymmetry on modeling results and assessing the effectiveness of various strategies for managing asymmetry in an innovation environment. The results of the article highlight the importance of further research in the field of modeling innovation processes taking into account information asymmetry to develop effective risk management strategies and create an enabling environment for innovation and development

Direct incentive-compatible mechanism for innovator-investor bargain in an innovation investment system

The functioning of the system of innovation investment, where an objective evaluation of an investment project containing new knowledge is impossible both for the investor and the innovator, currently is a matter of great interest. While for traditional industries, the use of statistical data is a satisfactory approach to the problem of uncertainty, for innovation projects this method isn’t applicable due to the natural absence of a valid statistical base. The practice shows that the empirical mechanisms used for innovation projects are rarely used for investing in traditional industries and vice versa. In this connection, there arises the problem of development an effective mechanism for financing innovation projects. We developed such a mechanism for the innovator-investor system in the form of a Bayesian non-cooperative repeating game with recalculated payments. The equilibrium parameters for any period of the given game are obtained. It is shown that, depending on the a priori estimates of the type of project, four different equilibria are possible in any particular period of that game. Therefore, using the strategy of adjusting a priori estimates of the investor and innovator on the basis of the Regret Matching rule, equilibrium for this finite Bayesian game is obtained

Comparison of different land distribution mechanisms for a land-hungry region

This paper proposes an approach to the development an efficient land distribution mechanism for a particular land-hungry region. We separate budgetary and allocative efficiency and use general utility approach during evaluation of particular distribution mechanisms. We propose a model of potential land users, which allows quantifying the efficiency of a number of mechanisms of land distribution for land-hungry regions. Land users are represented as economic agents with bounded rationality and subjective utility functions. The model calculates allocation efficiency and budgetary efficiency as independent values and thus is more precise. It also has considerable flexibility and can be adjusted to specific agricultural technology and soil types. An analysis of the efficiency of various mechanisms for the test region showed that lottery mechanisms leads to losses of allocative efficiency compared with auction mechanisms. As for the budget revenues, the use of lottery mechanisms leads to much smaller losses of budgetary efficiency in comparison with simultaneous closed auctions of the first and second prices. But of all the mechanisms considered in the paper, the repetitive Vickrey auction leads to the smallest losses of budget efficiency in the model

Economic assessment of limited land resources in the mountainous territories

The purpose of the study is to improve the method of economic assessment of limited land resources in the mountainous territories of the North Caucasus Federal district. The article analyzes specific shortcomings of the methodology currently used in Russia, which does not have a sufficiently objective scientific basis. Our approach is based on the synthesis of modern achievements of agro-economic science. Attempts to systematize the economic assessment of land in the agricultural sector of the Russian Federation depending on the land quality did not lead to positive results. This is first aspect of the problem we are studying. The second aspect is that the problem is not developed from the economic point of view. A positive differential rent is automatically included in the market value of agricultural products. The third aspect is the formation of tax and rental rates for agricultural land in direct correlation with the cadastral value. As a result, there is a research problem of objective assessment of limited agricultural land in agriculture. The method of economic evaluation of agricultural lands of the state Committee for land use of the Russian Federation has been improved

Information disclosure in a local socio-economic system with tacit knowledge and information asymmetry

We study the effects of institutional information disclosure on the market equilibrium in a local market with knowledge asymmetry and scarce information. The purpose of our work is the analysis of long-term efficiency of a dedicated institutional mechanism of information disclosure for such a market. The paper presents the game-theoretic model of a local property rights market with an infrastructural institution disclosing non-personalized information in a system with a combination of market elements, administrative and shadow economy. For each object, there is some hidden non-transferrable information essential for assessment. Under such conditions, the influence of subjective biases on the market equilibrium can be described as a Bayesian probability model of adverse selection. In the elaborated model, the equilibrium parameters are theoretically analyzed. It is shown that information asymmetry in the modeled systems leads to an irrational allocation of investment resources. It is shown that the infrastructural institutions disclosing non-personalized information are not only unable to efficiently counteract adverse selection, but facilitate it

Efficient multi-period distribution mechanism for the innovation investment system under uncertainty

In this paper, we study the problem of a venture investor who distributes the budget between several innovation projects under conditions of uncertainty. A common method for solving this problem is through bilateral negotiations with the external evaluation of projects. However, the effectiveness almost entirely depends on the evaluation quality, but external evaluation seldom reduces the knowledge asymmetry for innovation projects. We propose an iterative revelation mechanism for this problem when the investor sequentially offers possible allocations of the limited budget in the form of threshold dividing questions. The binary choices of innovators serve as a signal of internal estimates of the project implementation costs. Under perfect information, such a mechanism, regardless of the method for determining budget allocations, always produces an effective allocation in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Under uncertainty, the method of offering distribution options matters – the optimal solution is found under the English auction class of mechanisms. In an efficient iterative allocation mechanism for innovation investment, the investor proposes a new allocation of the budget each round until an efficient allocation is achieved. The proposed mechanism does not necessarily need to identify the exact minimum budgets for each innovator. Another advantage of the proposed mechanism is the ability to use different processes for organizing rounds

Study of empirical mechanisms for organizing interaction in a multi-level innovation environment with information asymmetry

In the modern world of dynamic innovative development, information asymmetry becomes a key factor influencing the behavior of subjects in an innovative environment. This article is devoted to the study of empirical mechanisms of interaction in a multi-level innovation environment, taking into account information asymmetry. The main aspects of the influence of asymmetry on the interaction of subjects and their strategies in conditions of innovative activity are analyzed, as well as the specifics of interaction between participants in this environment, highlighting the key factors influencing the processes of communication, coordination and information exchange . Based on the conducted research, various mechanisms used to eliminate information asymmetries and improve the efficiency of interaction in an innovative environment are presented and evaluated. The findings can be a valuable resource for organizations seeking to optimize processes within their innovation environment and increase levels of collective productivity

Theoretical and methodological foundations for the development and formal model of behavior of a subject of a multi-level innovation environment with information asymmetry

This article provides an overview of the theoretical and methodological foundations for creating formal models of behavior of subjects in a multi-level innovation environment, where information asymmetry plays an important role. In the context of modern trends in innovative development, understanding the impact of information inequality on decision-making and interaction of participants is a key aspect for the effective management of innovation processes. The article discusses various methods for modeling the interaction of actors in an innovation environment, including game theory, agent-based modeling, network analysis and statistical approaches. These methods make it possible to create formal models that reflect the dynamics of the behavior of subjects and their strategies in conditions of information asymmetry. Particular attention is paid to analyzing the impact of information asymmetry on modeling results and assessing the effectiveness of various strategies for managing asymmetry in an innovation environment. The results of the article highlight the importance of further research in the field of modeling innovation processes taking into account information asymmetry to develop effective risk management strategies and create an enabling environment for innovation and development