74 research outputs found
International factor mobility, informal interest rate and capital market imperfection: a general equilibrium analysis
This paper makes a pioneering attempt to provide a theory of determination of interest rate in the informal credit market in a small open economy in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model. There are two informal sectors which obtain production loans from a monopolistic moneylender and employ labour from the informal labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector employs labour at an institutionally fixed wage rate and takes loans from the competitive formal credit market. We show that an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of labour raises (lowers) the informal (formal) interest rate while lowers the competitive wage rate in the informal labour market when the informal manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive vis-Ă -vis the agricultural informal sector. International factor mobility, therefore, increases the degrees of distortions in both the factor markets in this case.Informal credit, formal credit, moneylender, foreign capital, emigration, general equilibrium
CHILD LABOUR AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY
The paper analyzes the implications of trade liberalization on the incidence of child labour in a two-sector general equilibrium framework. The supply function of child labour has been derived from the utility maximizing behaviour of the working families. The paper finds that the effect of trade liberalization on the incidence of child labour crucially hinges on the relative factor intensities of the two sectors.Child labour, general equilibrium, trade liberalization
Human Capital Accumulation and Endogenous Growth in a Dual Economy
Human Capital, Dualism, Economic growth, Rural, Urban, Competitive Equilibrium, Steady-state growth, Planned Economy
Unionised labour market, efficiency wage and endogenous growth
In this paper, we analyse the effect of unionisation on the growth of the economy in the presence of âEfficiency Wage Hypothesisâ. We use both âEfficient Bargainingâ model and âRight to Manageâ model to solve the negotiation problem. Unionisation raises negotiated wage rate and the effort (efficiency) level of the worker. In the case of âefficient bargaining modelâ, unionisation reduces the negotiated number of workers but improves the effort level when the union is neutral in its orientation. As a result, effective employment is increased; and this leads to a rise in the growth rate and welfare level of the economy. However, in the âRight to manage modelâ of bargaining, unionisation in the labour market raises the effort level of worker but lowers the number of workers irrespective of the orientation of the labour union; and raises effective employment, balanced growth rate and welfare level if the wage elasticity of efficiency is greater than the unemployment rate
Unionised labour market, environment and endogenous growth
In this paper, a model of endogenous economic growth is developed with special focus on the interaction between unionized labour market and environmental pollution. We introduce a trade union; and use both âEfficient Bargainingâ model and âRight to Manageâ model to solve the negotiation problem. Environmental pollution is the result of production; and the labour union bargains not only for wage and employment but also for the protection of environment. We derive properties of optimum income tax policy while financing abatement expenditure; and also analyse the effects of unionization on the level of employment and on growth rate. It appears that the optimum rate of income tax varies inversely with the relative bargaining power of the labour union. An increase in the relative bargaining power of the labour union may enhance employment in âEfficient Bargainingâ model if the labour union is highly employment oriented. However, the union always forces the firm to raise the spending rate for environment protection. So, unionisation may raise the growth rate, even if the first effect is negative, but the second effect dominates the first effect
Union, efficiency of labour and endogenous growth
This paper develops an endogenous growth model with human capital formation and âEfficiency Wage Hypothesisâ to investigate the growth effect of unionisation and to analyse properties of optimum income tax rate in the presence of an unionised labour market and with taxation only on labour income. âEfficient Bargainingâ model as well as âRight to Manageâ model is used to solve the negotiation problem between the labour union and the employerâs association. In both type modelling framework, the growth effect of unionisation is independent of its employment effect; and it depends on its net effect on workerâs efficiency. The growth rate maximizing tax rate on labour income is different from the corresponding welfare maximizing tax rate; and the nature of the growth effect of unionisation is different from its welfare effect
Unionised labour market, environment and endogenous growth
In this paper, a model of endogenous economic growth is developed with special focus on the interaction between unionized labour market and environmental pollution. We introduce a trade union; and use both âEfficient Bargainingâ model and âRight to Manageâ model to solve the negotiation problem. Environmental pollution is the result of production; and the labour union bargains not only for wage and employment but also for the protection of environment. We derive properties of optimum income tax policy while financing abatement expenditure; and also analyse the effects of unionization on the level of employment and on growth rate. It appears that the optimum rate of income tax varies inversely with the relative bargaining power of the labour union. An increase in the relative bargaining power of the labour union may enhance employment in âEfficient Bargainingâ model if the labour union is highly employment oriented. However, the union always forces the firm to raise the spending rate for environment protection. So, unionisation may raise the growth rate, even if the first effect is negative, but the second effect dominates the first effect
Unionised Labour Market, Unemployment Allowances, Productive Public Expenditure and Endogenous Growth
This paper develops a model of endogenous economic growth with special focus on the role of unionized labour market and on the interaction between the tax financed productive public expenditure and unemployment benefit policy of the government. We incorporate a âManagerialâ labour union in an otherwise identical Barro (1990) model; and use both âEfficient Bargainingâ model and âRight to Manageâ model to solve the negotiation problem between a labour union and an employersâ association. Properties of growth rate maximizing income tax policy are derived in the steady state equilibrium; and the effects of unionization are analysed on the level of employment, growth rate, welfare and on tax rate respectively. This growth rate maximizing income tax rate appears to be higher than (equal to) the competitive output share of public input in the presence (absence) of unemployment benefit. Unionisation may be good or bad for the economy in the case of Efficient bargaining model; and the nature of the effect depends on the orientation of the labour union. However, this is always bad for both employment and growth in the case of a âRight to Manageâ model
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