Global Climate Change and the Funding of Adaptation

Mitigation and adaptation are the most important strategies in combating global climate change. It is expected that in a post Kyoto world industrialized countries have to engage in greenhouse gas abatement, and to support developing countries in adapting to climate change. Within the framework of a non-cooperative Nash game we analyze, whether funding adaptation is incentive compatible in the sense that it stipulates mitigation. In particular it is the aim of this paper to discuss: (1) How does foreign funding of adaptation affect mitigation and regional welfare? (2) Under which conditions is it economically rational to fund adaptation in developing regions? We find that, if strict complementarity between adaptation and mitigation exists, funding adaptation increases both global mitigation and the donors' welfare, but negatively affects the recipients' welfare. The later only benefit, if maladaptation or adaptation, which is neutral to mitigation, is funded, which, however, makes the donors worse off.Climate change; mitigation and adaptation; funding of private goods

Global Climate Change and the Equity-Efficiency Puzzle

There is a broad consensus that the costs of abatement of global climate change can be reduced efficiently through the assignment of quota rights, and through international trade in these rights. But there is no consensus on whether the initial assignment of emission permits can affect the Pareto-optimal global level of abatement. This paper provides some insight into the equity-efficiency puzzle. Qualitative results are obtained from a small-scale model, and then quantitative evidence of separability is obtained from MERGE, a multi-region integrated assessment model. It is shown that if all the costs of climate change can be expressed in terms of GDP losses, Pareto-efficient abatement strategies are independent of the initial allocation of emission rights. This is the case sometimes described as "market damages". If, however, different regions assign different values to non-market damages such as species losses, different sharing rules may affect the Pareto-optimal level of greenhouse gas abatement. Separability may then be demonstrated only in specific cases (e.g. identical welfare functions or quasi-linearity of preferences or small shares of wealth devoted to abatement)International climate policy; Global climate change

Does Distribution Matter? When Flexibility, Equity and Efficiency in Greenhouse Gas Abatement

This paper analyses banking and borrowing of carbon emission rights within the framework of a simple, integrated assessment model. Breaking the world economy in just two regions it will be shown: (1) Increasing when-flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement through banking and borrowing of carbon emission permits has a positive effect on welfare for regions with a poor endowment in carbon emission rights, but negatively affects rich-endowed regions. (2) Intergenerational fairness advocates intertemporal flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement, irrespectively of the initial allocation of carbon rights. (3) Optimal carbon accumulation is not independent of the initial allocation of carbon rights. Different initial sharing rules clearly influence the development of atmospheric carbon concentration.Carbon rights; climate policy; integrated assessment; banking and trade

Where-to-Abate and Where-to-Invest Flexibility: An Integrated Assessment Analysis of Climate Change

Within the framework of a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium model this pa-per analyses the impact of trade restrictions on regional rates of return on capital, mar-ginal costs of abatement and optimal climate policy. It will be shown that regional dif-ferences both in marginal costs of abatement and in the marginal productivity of capi-tal are driven by market imperfection. With restrictions on international trade, the in-dustrialized countries of the North exhibit higher marginal costs of abatement and a lower marginal productivity of capital than the developing nations of the South. Free trade not only in carbon emission rights but also in capital increases conventional wel-fare but stimulates carbon dioxide emissions which are not completely offset by effi-ciency gains in abatement. Nevertheless, depending upon the choice of the discount rate some kind of an invariance result is observed.Climate policy; carbon emission trade; rate-of-interest differential; marginal cost of abatement; capital mobility; international capital market imperfection

Banking and Trade of Carbon Emission Rights: A CGE Analysis

This paper analyses trading and banking of carbon emission rights. Within the framework of a modestly simple, integrated assessment model that brakes the world economy in just two re-gions, North and South, it can be shown: (1) There exists separability between environmental targets and the choice of instruments. Increasing the "when and where" flexibility in green-house gas abatement either through banking or trading of carbon emission permits or both positively affects global welfare. It has, however, almost no impact on global climate change. (2) Depending upon the choice of instruments there are significant distributional effects across regions. Both regions can improve welfare simultaneously, if carbon emission rights are traded on open international markets. But if it were feasible to bank or borrow carbon permits, then - independent of whether there is trading of carbon rights or not - the South suffers welfare losses compared to a no banking no trade situation.Carbon rights; climate policy; integrated assessment; banking and trade

Intensity Targeting or Emission CAPS: Non-Cooperative Climate Change Policies and Technological Change

This paper analyses costs and benefits of three different post-Kyoto policy options: On the one hand there is PARETO which is the nickname for the pareto-efficient internationalization of the external effects of global climate change through trading carbon emission rights on open global markets. And there is QCAP as well as ICAP on the other. Both are unilateral climate policies. QCAP denotes a scenario where regions aim for reducing domestic carbon emissions by a certain percentage annually. ICAP is a short cut for intensity targeting which is the US' most preferred climate policy option. In a world without uncertainty about future GDP and carbon dioxide emissions it refers to the same abatement policy, however by means of technological progress onlyClimate policy; intensity targeting; R&D investments; Integrated Assessment

Intergenerational Fairness and Climate Change Adaptation Policy: An Economic Analysis

Compared to existing needs, climate change adaptation policies are significantly deficient. Since many adaptation measures have the feature of a local public good, and since benefits accrue to later generations mainly, most environmental economists would argue that the public goods issue is the most plausible reason why incentives are often insufficient for achieving the optimal level of adaptation. Within a stylized overlapping generation model, we show that adaptation is subject to severe intergenerational consistency problems, if pure self-interest is a feature of the generation’s behavior. This explains among others why too little is invested into climate change adaptation. We also show that if the distribution of income between generations matters or if generations behave altruistic, this consistency conflict can be solved and offers possibilities for policy intervention

Circular Economy: Illusion or First Step towards a Sustainable Economy: A Physico-Economic Perspective

“A circular economy is one that is regenerative by design and aims to keep products, components, and materials at their highest utility and value at all times, distinguishing between technical and biological cycles. This new economic model seeks to ultimately decouple global economic development from finite resource consumption”, states the widely used definition of the Ellen MacArthur Foundation. This definition conveys two messages. First, it acknowledges that economic activities need natural inputs (energy and material) and generate outputs in the form of waste as well as emissions. Second, it embodies the promise that, through technological innovations, human ingenuity and the market, a full decoupling of the economy from nature can be reached. Obviously both messages are not consistent with each other. Analyzing these issues through the lens of a transdisciplinary approach, which combines insight from thermodynamics with conventional economic theory, is the purpose of this paper. By using such physico-economic perspective, it is argued that not any kind of a circular economy is sustainable. Therefore, indicators are required through which it can be assured that a particular fashion of a circular economy reduces both environmental and social harm

Terms-of-Trade and the funding of adaptation to climate change and variability: an empirical analysis

This paper analyses the interplay between international trade, regional adaptation and North-to-South transfers for funding adaptation within the framework of a dynamic computable gen-eral equilibrium model, where impacts of climate change depend on changes in precipitation and temperature. If all regions, even the least developed ones, own the necessary resources for adapting optimally to climate change and variability, by mid-century less than 10% of the regions’ GDP would be invested for avoiding almost 40% of climate change damages. This has measurable effects on the regions’ competitiveness as well as on the terms-of-trade. If, however, the developing world does not own sufficient resources for adapting optimally to climate change, as is to expected, funding of adaptation can make sense from an economic perspective. In particular the Hicks-Kaldor criterion is fulfilled as aggregated welfare gains at least compensate the costs of providing financial assistance for adaptation