Microgrids and Resilience to Climate-Driven Impacts on Public Health

“Resilience” has burst into the lexicons of several policy areas in recent years, owing in no small part to climate change’s amplification of extreme events that severely disrupt the operation of natural, social, and engineered systems. Fostering resilience means anticipating severe disruptions and planning, investing, and designing so that such disruptions, which are certain to occur, are made shallower in depth and shorter in duration. Thus a resilient system or community can continue functioning despite disruptive events, return more swiftly to routine function following disruption, and incorporate new information so as to improve operations in extremis and speed future restorations. As different policy communities apply the concept of resilience to their respective missions, they emphasize different objectives. This article examines how the definitions adopted by the public health and electricity communities can, but do not necessarily, converge in responses to electricity outages so severe that they affect the operation of critical infrastructure, such as wastewater treatment and drinking water facilities, hospitals, and cooling centers. Currently, such outages cause a form of handoff from utilities to their customers: grid power fails and a small constellation of backup generators maintained by atomized campuses, facilities, or individual structures switch on, or fail to switch on, or were never purchased and so leave the location dark and its equipment inoperative. This handoff is operational, but it reflects legal obligations—and their limits. Enter the microgrid, a specially designed segment of the electricity distribution grid’s mesh that can either operate seamlessly as part of the wider grid, or as an independent “island” that serves some or all of the electricity users within its boundary even when the wider grid fails. Microgrids can, but do not necessarily, mitigate the adverse public health implications of the handoff that accompanies widespread and severe grid failure. To encourage the convergence of public health and electricity policy priorities in decisions about microgrid siting, design, and operation, this article makes several recommendations. Some of these should ideally be taken up at the federal level, but the bulk of the work they recommend should take place at the state-level, and would necessarily be implemented at the state and local levels

To Negotiate a Carbon Tax: A Rough Map of Policy Interactions, Tradeoffs, and Risks

Sooner or later, the federal government will assign a price to carbon dioxide emissions via legislation. The contents of that legislation will reflect negotiated agreement—built on various political tradeoffs—over a host of policy issues, ranging from taxes to energy efficiency standards. These tradeoffs would implicate not only the scope and price assigned by the carbon pricing policy, but also the policies with which it would interact. This paper anticipates that price will take the form of a carbon tax and describes interactions between that tax and various existing and proposed policies relating to climate change, energy, and environmental protection. Specifically, it proposes a typology for those interactions and applies it to characterize particular policies. It also notes how trading off particular policies for a more robust carbon tax could undermine the climate change mitigation goal of such a tax

How Much Does the Existing Regulatory Patchwork Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions?

This paper offers an answer to the question, “What levels of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions reduction do the constituent programs in the U.S.’s existing regulatory patchwork achieve?” Its answer represents an attempt to measure the same effect from eight regulatory interventions: EPA’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration program, as it is expected to operate following the Supreme Court’s UARG v. EPA decision in 2014; EPA’s Clean Power Plan; EPA’s renewable fuel standard; the federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards for light, medium, and heavy duty vehicles; the renewable electricity generation Production Tax Credit and Investment Tax Credit; the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which encompasses 9 states in the mid-Atlantic and Northeast; California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Assembly Bill 32; and state renewable portfolio standards. Notably, though it seeks to measure the same effect of diverse policies, this paper does not purport to measure the aggregated net effects of those policies on GHG emissions. Most important among its conclusions are the following. First, federal CAFE standards, the Clean Power Plan, and state renewable portfolio standards will be crucial for achieving emissions reduction goals. Second, the reductions available from the renewable fuel standard are uncertain and highly contentious. And third—an important subtext—the effectiveness (and costeffectiveness) of this patchwork of programs is unwieldy even to measure, much less to ensure

The Status of Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review

Over the last decade, laws codifying national and international responses to climate change have grown in number, specificity, and importance. As these laws have recognized new rights and created new duties, litigation seeking to challenge either their facial validity or their particular application has followed. So too has litigation aimed at pressing legislators and policymakers to be more ambitious and thorough in their approaches to climate change. In addition, litigation seeking to fill the gaps left by legislative and regulatory inaction has also continued. As a result, courts are adjudicating a growing number of disputes over actions—or inaction—related to climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts

Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets: Federal and State Issues

Does the law permit the New York Independent Service Operator (NYISO) to incorporate, directly or indirectly, a carbon price into New York State’s wholesale electricity market? And, if so, what is the appropriate design of a carbon pricing scheme for the NYISO market? For example, at what level should a carbon price be set and when/how should it be adjusted? How should the revenues generated by such a price be used? What impact (if any) will it have on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and New York’s Clean Energy Standard? This working paper explores answers to those questions with due consideration for two contextual frames. The first is federal law, specifically the Federal Power Act, as interpreted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the courts The second is New York’s energy marketplace, meaning both the physical and economic arrangement of generation and transmission resources vis-à-vis load centers, and the state’s ongoing efforts to reconfigure and decarbonize its portion of the electric grid by encouraging greater uses of information technology, energy efficiency, and distributed energy resources. Importantly, features of this second frame are both flexible and responsive to steps NYISO might take — as the New York Public Service Commission said in its Order adopting the Clean Energy Standard in August 2016, “the Zero Emissions Credit mechanism [established as part of the Clean Energy Standard] shall be such that it can be modified or eliminated by the Commission if there is a national, NYISO, or other program instituted that pays for or internalizes the value of the zero-emissions attributes.” This paper is especially timely because NYISO’s Integrating Public Policy Project (IPPP) has begun to “investigate potential market impacts from the implementation of the New York Clean Energy Standard, and determine whether other wholesale products or alternatives for incorporating the cost of carbon into the wholesale market could improve market efficiency and address potential market impacts.” By exploring legal constraints and options, the authors intend to help inform that investigation’s progress

Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets: Federal and State Issues

Does the law permit the New York Independent Service Operator (NYISO) to incorporate, directly or indirectly, a carbon price into New York State’s wholesale electricity market? And, if so, what is the appropriate design of a carbon pricing scheme for the NYISO market? For example, at what level should a carbon price be set and when/how should it be adjusted? How should the revenues generated by such a price be used? What impact (if any) will it have on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and New York’s Clean Energy Standard? This working paper explores answers to those questions with due consideration for two contextual frames. The first is federal law, specifically the Federal Power Act, as interpreted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the courts The second is New York’s energy marketplace, meaning both the physical and economic arrangement of generation and transmission resources vis-à-vis load centers, and the state’s ongoing efforts to reconfigure and decarbonize its portion of the electric grid by encouraging greater uses of information technology, energy efficiency, and distributed energy resources. Importantly, features of this second frame are both flexible and responsive to steps NYISO might take — as the New York Public Service Commission said in its Order adopting the Clean Energy Standard in August 2016, “the Zero Emissions Credit mechanism [established as part of the Clean Energy Standard] shall be such that it can be modified or eliminated by the Commission if there is a national, NYISO, or other program instituted that pays for or internalizes the value of the zero-emissions attributes.” This paper is especially timely because NYISO’s Integrating Public Policy Project (IPPP) has begun to “investigate potential market impacts from the implementation of the New York Clean Energy Standard, and determine whether other wholesale products or alternatives for incorporating the cost of carbon into the wholesale market could improve market efficiency and address potential market impacts.” By exploring legal constraints and options, the authors intend to help inform that investigation’s progress

Climate Change Impacts on the Bulk Power System: Assessing Vulnerabilities and Planning for Resilience

As the scale, speed, and implications of climate change come into focus, stakeholders in the electricity sector are finding it increasingly difficult to turn a blind eye. However, many have opted to attend to climate impacts in a piecemeal fashion, often merely responding to particular extreme events—or types of extreme events, such as coastal storms or floods—and failing to consider the larger phenomenon. This is true of the bulk power system (BPS) in regions overseen by Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations (collectively, ISO/RTOs), none of which have comprehensively assessed their systems’ vulnerabilities to climate change. This paper collects recent research highlighting the implications of climate change for the BPS and explains how ISO/RTOs can assess and respond to them

Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets

Does the law permit the New York Independent Service Operator (NYISO) to incorporate, directly or indirectly, a carbon price into New York State’s wholesale electricity market? And, if so, what is the appropriate design of a carbon pricing scheme for the NYISO market? For example, at what level should a carbon price be set and when/how should it be adjusted? How should the revenues generated by such a price be used? What impact (if any) will it have on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and New York’s Clean Energy Standard? This working paper explores answers to those questions with due consideration for two contextual frames. The first is federal law, specifically the Federal Power Act, as interpreted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the courts The second is New York’s energy marketplace, meaning both the physical and economic arrangement of generation and transmission resources vis-à-vis load centers, and the state’s ongoing efforts to reconfigure and decarbonize its portion of the electric grid by encouraging greater uses of information technology, energy efficiency, and distributed energy resources. Importantly, features of this second frame are both flexible and responsive to steps NYISO might take — as the New York Public Service Commission said in its Order adopting the Clean Energy Standard in August 2016, “the Zero Emissions Credit mechanism [established as part of the Clean Energy Standard] shall be such that it can be modified or eliminated by the Commission if there is a national, NYISO, or other program instituted that pays for or internalizes the value of the zero-emissions attributes.” This paper is especially timely because NYISO’s Integrating Public Policy Project (IPPP) has begun to “investigate potential market impacts from the implementation of the New York Clean Energy Standard, and determine whether other wholesale products or alternatives for incorporating the cost of carbon into the wholesale market could improve market efficiency and address potential market impacts.” By exploring legal constraints and options, the authors intend to help inform that investigation’s progress

Distributed Energy Resource Participation in Wholesale Markets: Lessons from the California ISO

The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) aims to “support” and “facilitate” wholesale market participation by aggregations of distributed energy resources (DERs)—solar panels, batteries, and other energy technologies installed in small quantities at scattered locations. This reflect CAISO’s recognition that “[t]he number and diversity of these resources are growing and represent an increasingly important part of the future grid.” However, CAISO has also recognized that system operators can only draw on DERs if they perform reliably, their operation is predictable and transparent, and their contributions are large enough to be economical both to their owners and the grid as a whole. While the aggregation of multiple DERs can support each of these conditions, providing for such aggregation will require adjustments to existing wholesale market rules. CAISO is not alone in recognizing the potential contributions to market performance of aggregated DERs, but it was the first wholesale market operator to begin exploring how to make the adjustments necessary to enable their participation. Similar programs for the aggregation of demand response have existed in markets operated by CAISO and other independent system operators and regional transmission organizations (ISO/RTOs) for several years. Those programs do not, however, allow energy exports to the bulk power grid. To address this limitation, CAISO adopted a new program, which allows DERs to provide energy and ancillary services to the grid. At the time of writing, CAISO’s program had attracted just four participants—DER providers or “DERPs”—none of which had yet begun operating in the energy or ancillary services markets. Meanwhile, the other ISO/RTOs and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or the Commission) that oversees them are following CAISO into the fray. The FERC is considering requiring all ISO/RTOs to adopt their own programs for DER aggregation, which may be modeled on the one currently used by CAISO.4 Despite this, however, there has been no comprehensive review of how the CAISO program is operating and why it has attracted so few participants. This article is intended to fill that gap. This article examines CAISO’s DER program after its first year of operation. It draws on written comments submitted to CAISO in the course of program development and on interviews the authors conducted with stakeholders—including active and potential DERPs, investor-owned utilities, and customer groups—to identify “barriers” to program participation. Irrespective of whether these barriers are appropriate—e.g., to ensure continued wholesale system reliability as DER penetration increases—they have clearly prevented the DER program fulfilling CAISO’s stated goal. The barriers should, therefore, be considered by other ISO/RTOs in developing programs with similar goals. The authors identify six key lessons that other ISO/RTOs and regulatory authorities can learn from CAISO’s experience

How Existing Environmental Laws Respond to Climate Change and Its Mitigation

Existing environmental laws interact with public health priorities and with aspects of the changing climate in numerous and varied ways. This chapter does not attempt to catalogue those interactions, but instead focuses on two that are especially important and illustrative of the operation and limitations of existing environmental laws vis-à-vis climate change-driven challenges. The first interaction is between pollution levels boosted by climate change and pollution control laws that employ health-based standards to determine pollution limits. The second is between a wider array of existing laws and the effects of climate change mitigation measures on public health. Examining these interactions reveals the inadequacy of existing laws to the tasks of 1) tracking the public health impacts of—much less adapting to—climate change, and 2) ensuring that climate change mitigation efforts reflect a rational accounting of impacts on public health, whether from foregoing mitigation or undertaking it