The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success

In this article, my goal is to organize the divergent themes of black electoral success strategy within one conceptual framework in order to give the themes more cogency and attention. Having exposed the existence of a coherent theory, I then argue that the theory posits many of the correct goals but fails to provide a realistic mechanism for achieving them. The article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I develop the ideological and statutory roots of black electoral success theory. In Part II, I analyze the inadequacies of current voting rights litigation and its failure to realize the statute\u27s original goals. I conclude in Part II by arguing that contemporary preoccupation with black electoral success stifles rather than empowers black political participation for three reasons. In Part III, based on my critique of the black electoral success theory, I put forth suggestions for a different approach to voting rights reform. Relying on what I tentatively call proportionate interest representation for self-identified communities of interest, I propose to reconsider the ways in which representatives are elected and the rules under which legislative decisions are made

Democracy and Dis-Appointment

A Review of The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democrac

Preface to Responses: Dynamism, Not Just Diversity

Remaking institutions of higher education so that women succeed and lead is an example of the kind of aspiration that requires new thinking as well as motivation and hard work. Generated by the innovative scholarship of Susan Sturm, the articles in this collection offer intellectual resources for the requisite new thinking. Lack of diversity emerges as a valid point of critique, but, as the authors in this response issue demonstrate, the presence of diversity is not alone the solution. There is power for newcomers who become institutional players, but bringing people in without changing the institution can both reproduce and legitimate new forms of marginalization. We are most struck that these essays about rethinking organizational change to achieve gender equity converge around Sturm's metaphor of citizenship rather than equal treatment or opportunity. Real change, the authors indicate, is more likely to come and stick through participation by many people. Hence, the authors consider how change works through networks of people, not through the actions of one individual, and through alteration of ongoing operations, rather than the introduction of different actors playing the same roles. In this brief introduction, we seek to specify the dynamism within this new conception of citizenship. And yet, as several of the Workshop participants acknowledge, even when citizenship is tethered to durable motors for institutional change, the slipping back into familiar ways of thinking remains a real risk

Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements

This essay was influenced by a class on Law and Social Movements that Professors Guinier and Torres taught at the Yale Law School in 2011. This essay was also informed by numerous conversations with Bruce Ackerman regarding his book that is under review in this Symposium. While we are in fundamental agreement with Professor Ackerman’s project, as well as the claims he makes as to the new constitutional canon, we supplement his analysis with the overlooked impact of the lawmaking potential of social movements. In particular, we focus on those social movements that were critical to the legal changes that formed the core of Professor Ackerman’s book. The strong claim that we are making is that the social movements of the civil rights era were actually sources of law. The weaker claim is that these social movements deeply influenced the formal legal changes represented by the statutes and Supreme Court decisions that framed the constitutional moment so convincingly illustrated by Professor Ackerman. In order to make the stronger claim, we demonstrate how social movements made some legal conclusions not just more likely, but for all intents and purposes, inevitable. The way the Court interpreted existing racial justice jurisprudence and was responsive to the constitutional understanding represented by non-elite actors in the civil rights and social justice movements that had their high water mark in the 1950s and ’60s

Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements

This essay was influenced by a class on Law and Social Movements that Professors Guinier and Torres taught at the Yale Law School in 2011. This essay was also informed by numerous conversations with Bruce Ackerman regarding his book that is under review in this Symposium. While we are in fundamental agreement with Professor Ackerman’s project, as well as the claims he makes as to the new constitutional canon, we supplement his analysis with the overlooked impact of the lawmaking potential of social movements. In particular, we focus on those social movements that were critical to the legal changes that formed the core of Professor Ackerman’s book. The strong claim that we are making is that the social movements of the civil rights era were actually sources of law. The weaker claim is that these social movements deeply influenced the formal legal changes represented by the statutes and Supreme Court decisions that framed the constitutional moment so convincingly illustrated by Professor Ackerman. In order to make the stronger claim, we demonstrate how social movements made some legal conclusions not just more likely, but for all intents and purposes, inevitable. The way the Court interpreted existing racial justice jurisprudence and was responsive to the constitutional understanding represented by non-elite actors in the civil rights and social justice movements that had their high water mark in the 1950s and ’60s