Ownership Unbundling of Gas Transmission Networks - Empirical Evidence

The European Commission has intensively discussed the mandatory separation of natural gas transmission from production and services. However, economic theory is ambiguous on the price effects of vertical separation. In this paper, we empirically analyse the effect of ownership unbundling of gas transmission networks as the strongest form of vertical separation on the level of end-user prices. Therefore, we apply different dynamic estimators as system GMM and the bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable or LSDVC estimator on an unbalanced panel out of 18 EU countries over 19 years, allowing us to avoid the endogeneity problem and to estimate the long-run effects of regulation. We introduce a set of regulatory indicators as market entry regulation, ownership structure, vertical separation and market structure and account for structural and economic country specifics. Among these different estimators, we consistently find that ownership unbundling has no impact on natural gas end-user prices, while the more modest legal unbundling reduces them significantly. Furthermore, third-party access, market structure and privatisation show significant influence with the latter leading to higher price levels.Natural gas; Networks; Regulation; Ownership unbundling; Panel data

Testing for Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis

In this paper, we conduct a pan-European effciency analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realize economies of scope and, thus, produce railway services with a higher level of effciency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more effcient, we apply a Data Envelopment Analysis super-effciency bootstrapping model which relates the ef- ficiency for integrated production to a reference set consisting of separated firms which use a dierent production technology. We find that for a majority of European railways economies of scope exist.Efficiency, Vertical Integraton, Railway Industry

Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis

In the course of railway reforms in the end of the last century, national European governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway companies – companies owning a network and providing transport services – argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realise economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a higher level of efficiency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more efficient we apply a Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping model which relates the efficiency for integrated production to a virtual reference set consisting of the separated production technology. Our findings are that in a majority of European Railway companies exist economies of scope.efficiency, vertical integration, railway industry

Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis

In the course of railway reforms at the end of the last century, European na- tional governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway com- panies argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investi- gate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of scope associated with vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realize economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a higher level of efficiency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more efficient we apply an innovative Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping model which relates the efficiency for integrated production to a vir- tual reference set consisting of the separated production technology and which is applicable to other network industries as energy and telecommunication as well. Our findings are that for a majority of European Railway companies economies of scope exist.Efficiency, Vertical Integration, Railway Industry

Nations as Strategic Players in Global Commodity Markets: Evidence from World Coal Trade

We explore the hypothesis that export policies and trade patterns of national players in the steam coal market are consistent with non-competitive market behavior. We test this hypothesis by developing an equilibrium model which is able to model coal producing nations as strategic players. We explicitly account for integrated seaborne trade and domestic markets. The global steam coal market is simulated under several imperfect market structure setups. We find that trade and prices of a China - Indonesia duopoly fit the real market outcome best and that real Chinese export quotas in 2008 were consistent with simulated exports under a Cournot-Nash strategy.Strategic National Trade; Imperfect Competition; Steam Coal; China; Indonesia

Preventing Innovative Cooperations: The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect

In 2004, European competition law had been faced with considerable changes due to the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform on the agreements firms implement. In contrast to previous research we focus on the reform’s impact on especially welfare enhancing, namely innovative agreements. We show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached. However, by the same mechanism, also highly innovative cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended effect, we conclude that only fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased in order to deter illegal but not innovative agreements.competition policy, competition law enforcement, legal exemption system

Quality of Service, Efficiency, and Scale in Network Industries: An Analysis of European Electricity Distribution

Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries and is increasingly addressed in regulatory schemes. However, this important aspect is generally not reflected in efficiency analysis of these industries. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks using a sample of about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost and scale efficiency with and without incorporating quality of service. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly. In contrast to previous research, smaller utilities seem to indicate lower technical efficiency when incorporating quality. We also show that incorporating quality of service does not alter scale economy measures. Our results emphasise that quality of service should be an integrated part of efficiency analysis and incentive regulation regimes, as well as in the economic review of market concentration in regulated natural monopolies.efficiency, quality of service, scale economies, input distance function, stochastic frontier analysis

Efficiency effects of quality of service and environmental factors: experience from Norwegian electricity distribution

Since the 1990s, efficiency and benchmarking analysis has increasingly been used in network utilities research and regulation. A recurrent concern is the effect of environmental factors that are beyond the influence of firms (observable heterogeneity) and factors that are not identifiable (unobserved heterogeneity) on measured cost and quality performance of firms. This paper analyses the effect of geographic and weather factors and unobserved heterogeneity on a set of 128 Norwegian electricity distribution utilities for the 2001-2004 period. We utilize data on almost 100 geographic and weather variables to identify real economic inefficiency while controlling for observable and unobserved heterogeneity. We use the factor analysis technique to reduce the number of environmental factors into few composite variables and to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. We then estimate the established stochastic frontier models of Battese and Coelli (1992; 1995) and the recent true fixed effects models of Greene (2004; 2005) without and with environmental variables. In the former models some composite environmental variables have a significant effect on the performance of utilities. These effects vanish in the true fixed effects models. However, the latter models capture the entire unobserved heterogeneity and therefore show significantly higher average efficiency scores.Efficiency; Quality of service; Input distance function; Stochastic frontier analysis

Electricity spot trading in Germany: Price formation and convergence

This paper analyses the price developments between the European Energy Exchange EEX and OTC wholesale spot markets in Germany using a linear state space model based on Kalman filter analysis. Our results suggest increasingly integrated German wholesale spot markets for electricity. The results remain the same when correcting for the influence of the introduction of the emissions allowance trading