Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War

See also 1994 update.The proliferation of ballistic missiles has in recent years become a major international security concern. This increased concern is in part due to the highly visible role played by Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. However, it is also due to the widespread -- but incorrect -- perception that even conventionally-armed ballistic missiles are tremendously destructive. This perception that ballistic missiles are inherently weapons of great destructive capability may have played a key role in the politics of the Gulf War. Iraq fired more than 80 modified Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, causing 31 deaths, numerous injuries, and substantial property damage. However, with the exception of the Scud that hit a barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and killed 28 U.S. soldiers, the number of casualties caused by these Scuds was much lower than was generally anticipated.The Defense and Arms Control Studies Program is a graduate-level, research and training program based at the MIT Center for International Studies. It is supported by grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the DACS Corporate Consortium

Response to Uzi Rubin’s “Comments on the UCS Report on Countermeasures”

We recently received—via a third party—a critique of our report, Countermeasures. The critique, written by Uzi Rubin and titled “Comments on the UCS Report on Countermeasures,” is dated 18 July 2000. Rubin states that his study was “considerably less exhaustive” than the countermeasures report and was done by “a small team of experienced missile engineers.” Rubin’s critique has not been published, but instead has been distributed informally in the United States. Here we respond to Rubin’s points in the order that he makes them. As we will make clear, Rubin’s criticisms are either technically invalid or based on incorrect characterizations of the assumptions that underlay our work

Toward True Security: A U.S. Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade

This report proposes a nuclear weapons policy for the United States for the next decade that reflects today’s political and strategic realities. By contrast, the official policies and doctrines of both the United States and Russia are mired in Cold War patterns of thought. Eleven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, both countries still maintain massive nuclear arsenals ready for nearly instant use. Although nuclear war plans differ in size and detail from those drawn up 20 or more years ago, their basic structure remains unchanged. The US nuclear arsenal and doctrine were designed to deter a deliberate large-scale Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and a massive Soviet conventional attack on US European allies, as well as to preserve the option of a disarming first strike against Soviet nuclear forces. This force structure and doctrine are obsolete and jeopardize American national security.Federation of American Scientists, Natural Resources Defense Council, Union of Concerned Scientist