Clubs within clubs: The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Benelux as Macro-regions within the EU

This paper deals with two examples of macro-regions in the EU: the Benelux and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). Building on the distinction between “old” and “new” regionalism, it discusses some characteristics of regions in general, and of sub-integration schemes within the EU in particular. These characteristics are applied to the two regions at hand. From this application it follows that the CBSS can be regarded as a “new” region, whereas the Benelux is an “old” region with some elements from new regionalism.\ud The paper subsequently discusses some explanations for the emergence of macro-regions in the EU as well as the implications of this phenomenon for research on European integration

EU and OECD benchmarking and peer review compared

Benchmarking and peer review are essential elements of the so-called EU open method of coordination (OMC) which has been contested in the literature for lack of effectiveness. In this paper we compare benchmarking and peer review procedures as used by the EU with those used by the OECD. Different types of benchmarking and peer review are distinguished and pitfalls for (international) benchmarking are discussed. We find that the OECD has a clear single objective for its benchmarking and peer review activities (i.e. horizontal policy transfers) whereas the EU suffers from a mix of objectives (a. horizontal policy learning; b. EU wide vertical policy coordination and c. multilateral monitoring and surveillance under the shadow of hierarchy). Whereas the OECD is able to skirt around most of the benchmarking pitfalls, this is not the case for the EU. It is argued that, rather than continue working with the panacea OMC benchmarking and peer review currently represents, EU benchmarking should take a number of more distinct shapes in order to improve effectiveness. Moreover, in some areas benchmarking and peer review are not sufficient coordination tools, and are at best additional to those means of coordination that include enforceable sanctions

A principal-agent model of corruption

One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, of which the principal-agent theory is a part. In this article a principal-agent model of corruption is presented, in which there are two principals (one of which is corrupting), and one agent (who is corrupted). The behaviour of these principals and agent is analysed in terms of the costs and benefits associated with different actions. The model is applied to political corruption in representative democracies, showing that, contrary to common belief, the use of principal-agent models is not limited to bureaucratic corruption

Enhanced Cooperation under the Lisbon Treaty

Enhanced cooperation is often regarded as being a way out of EU decision-making deadlock and as a major possibility of proceeding with European integration in selected areas. Although the mechanism has been in place since the Treaty of Amsterdam, enhanced cooperation has only recently become a reality, in two policy fields: divorce law and the single EU patent. Using these two cases, in this paper the pros and cons of enhanced cooperation (as compared to unitary integration and alternative integration) are analyzed. The paper concludes by pointing out some possible weaknesses of the enhanced cooperation mechanism

Tax co-ordination and the enlargement of the European Union

In this paper the concept of tax co-ordination within the European Union (EU) is discussed, in view of the coming enlargement of the EU. The tax externalities that possibly arise in a single market are analysed, as well as the ways these externalities can be prevented or internalised. These theoretical reflections are placed alongside the actual system of tax co-ordination within the EU. Focusing on VAT and corporate taxation, the implications of enlargement of the EU for the tax co-ordination issue are discussed

Jessica: Liefde op het eerste gezicht of winkeldochter-in-wording?

Een van de nieuwe instrumenten in het EU cohesiebeleid 2007-2013 is JESSICA. Dit instrument behelst de oprichting van revolverende fondsen voor stedelijke\ud (her)ontwikkelingsprojecten. JESSICA is tot op heden niet echt populair. De oorzaken daarvoor liggen in de complexiteit van het instrument en in de beschikbaarheid van goede alternatieven. Bovendien is het financieringsvraagstuk – in enge zin –, waar JESSICA zich op richt, bij stedelijke (her)ontwikkeling wellicht van ondergeschikt belang voor succes of falen. Ook het ontbreken van een gedegen analyse vooraf van de behoeften in lidstaten aan fi nanciële faciliteiten voor stedelijke vernieuwing speelt\ud JESSICA parte