350 Micron Observations of Ultraluminous Infrared Galaxies at Intermediate Redshifts

We present 350micron observations of 36 ultraluminous infrared galaxies (ULIRGs) at intermediate redshifts (0.089 <= z <= 0.926) using the Submillimeter High Angular Resolution Camera II (SHARC-II) on the Caltech Submillimeter Observatory (CSO). In total, 28 sources are detected at S/N >= 3, providing the first flux measurements longward of 100micron for a statistically significant sample of ULIRGs in the redshift range of 0.1 < z < 1.0. Combining our 350micron flux measurements with the existing IRAS 60 and 100micron data, we fit a single-temperature model to the spectral energy distribution (SED), and thereby estimate dust temperatures and far-IR luminosities. Assuming an emissivity index of beta = 1.5, we find a median dust temperature and far-IR luminosity of Td = 42.8+-7.1K and log(Lfir/Lsolar) = 12.2+-0.5, respectively. The far-IR/radio correlation observed in local star-forming galaxies is found to hold for ULIRGs in the redshift range 0.1 < z < 0.5, suggesting that the dust in these sources is predominantly heated by starbursts. We compare the far-IR luminosities and dust temperatures derived for dusty galaxy samples at low and high redshifts with our sample of ULIRGs at intermediate redshift. A general Lfir-Td relation is observed, albeit with significant scatter, due to differing selection effects and variations in dust mass and grain properties. The relatively high dust temperatures observed for our sample compared to that of high-z submillimeter-selected starbursts with similar far-IR luminosities suggest that the dominant star formation in ULIRGs at moderate redshifts takes place on smaller spatial scales than at higher redshifts.Comment: (24 pages in preprint format, 1 table, 7 figures, accepted for publication in ApJ

Determining the optimal length of regulatory guarantee: A Length-of-Contract Auction

One of the biggest challenges in the area of infrastructure investment is the provision of funding to finance activities. This paper presents an auction design which can reduce the financing cost of infrastructure investments by allowing the length of the regulatory funding period to be determined via an auction. The auction allows bidders to submit bids against a payment for periods of varying length. Thus instead of, for example, a fixed 20-year contract period, some bidders might want to bid for financing over a longer period, say 25 or 30 years. This can be desirable in terms of securing more favourable terms in the financial markets. Our auction design can secure efficiency and lower financing costs. Our auction is motivated by the auctions currently being undertaken by the UK energy regulator (Ofgem) for financing offshore transmission assets. Although the auction was designed with electricity transmission in mind, the auction could be used in other areas of infrastructure investment

The Strategic Robustness of Mark-up Equilibria

This paper is an extension of the paper 'The Robustness of Agent-Based Models of Electricity Wholesale Markets', EPRG1213 which was motivated by the problem of analysing market power in liberalised electricity markets. That paper examined two particular forms of agent-based models commonly used in electricity market modelling, and showed that while these mark-up equilibria are robust against Nash deviations. This paper extends the earlier results to explain why these equilibria are robust to single firm Nash Cournot deviations but shows they are vulnerable to more sophisticated deviations

Designing electiricty transmission auctions: an introduction to the relevant literature

The UK has ambitious plans for exploiting offshore wind for electricity production in order to meet its challenging target under the EU Renewable Energy Directive. This could involve investing up to £20bn in transmission assets to bring electricity ashore. An investment of this magnitude calls for an efficient mechanism to determine which projects get financed and ensuring that only those projects that are selected can be delivered at least costs to consumers. The electricity regulator’s ongoing tender auctions are likely to work well for point-to-point transmission and for networks already built. However, it is still unclear what kinds of models could be considered for complex meshed offshore (and onshore) networks where licences are granted not only to own and operate, but also to build a transmission network. This paper provides an extensive survey on the current theory and experience of auctions. The main objective is to discuss the design of auctions for transmission assets in which bidding for packages of transmission assets is a possibility

Determining the optimal length of regulatory guarantee: A Length-of-Contract Auction

One of the biggest challenges in the area of infrastructure investment is the provision of funding to finance activities. This paper presents an auction design which can reduce the financing cost of infrastructure investments by allowing the length of the regulatory funding period to be determined via an auction. The auction allows bidders to submit bids against a payment for periods of varying length. Thus instead of, for example, a fixed 20-year contract period, some bidders might want to bid for financing over a longer period, say 25 or 30 years. This can be desirable in terms of securing more favourable terms in the financial markets. Our auction design can secure efficiency and lower financing costs. Our auction is motivated by the auctions currently being undertaken by the UK energy regulator (Ofgem) for financing offshore transmission assets. Although the auction was designed with electricity transmission in mind, the auction could be used in other areas of infrastructure investment

A VCG Auction for Electricity Storage

Energy storage seems set to play a key role in managing and balancing the future electricity system. Storage can act as a generator and as a load, providing both energy and ancillary services such as fast frequency response and operating reserve. Therefore, it can provide the desired flexibility for the network. Current mechanism designs do not take advantage of the full potential of a given storage facility and the auctions used to buy and sell potential storage products have design flaws. This paper gives an overview of how storage products are bought and sold today and the problems of the current designs. It then presents a new mechanism design to integrate storage in the most efficient way, based on social welfare

Network Procurement Auctions

In most network asset procurement exercises, network configurations are predefined by the auctioneers. Bidders can neither propose different network configurations nor can they submit bids on a group of network links. We believe the market itself can be designed better. We present a lot structure and an auction design where bidders might propose and build different network configurations and where bidding for packages is a possibility. We demonstrate why the auction design in this paper should be considered for future network procurement exercises through an example, inspired by UK offshore electricity transmission assets, to illustrate our idea

The robustness of industrial commodity oligopoly pricing strategies

Industrial commodity markets are typically oligopolies in which firms set prices but need to make sunk and durable investment decisions, requiring them to make predictions of future prices. Mark-up pricing models are attractive both for setting prices and predicting future prices for investment analysis. Simple algorithms can find Nash equilibria, but these equilibria are not necessarily robust. This paper examines fixed and proportional mark-up models and demonstrates that they are robust to single firm Nash Cournot deviations but not against more sophisticated deviations in the deterministic case. Cournot equilibria are not robust under demand uncertainty, where proportional mark-up models emerge as the most robust when marginal costs are increasing

Safety of the SQ tree sublingual immunotherapy tablet: Pooled safety analysis of clinical trials

Background The standardized quality (SQ) tree sublingual immunotherapy (SLIT)-tablet has recently been approved for treatment of tree pollen allergy. Healthcare workers should be provided with detailed safety data for clinical use. Objective To assess the tolerability and safety of the SQ tree SLIT-tablet (12 SQ-Bet) in adults and adolescents. Methods Safety data were pooled from three double-blinded, randomized, placebo-controlled trials (2 phase-II/1 phase-III) including adults and adolescents 12-65 years with allergic rhinitis and/or conjunctivitis treated before and during one pollen season once-daily with 12 SQ-Bet (n = 471) or placebo (n = 458): EudraCT no: 2012-000031-59; NCT02481856; EudraCT 2015-004821-15. Results The most frequently reported investigational medicinal product (IMP)-related AEs with 12 SQ-Bet were oral pruritis (39% of subjects) and throat irritation (29%). IMP-related AEs were mainly mild or moderate in severity, and the majority resolved without treatment and did not lead to treatment interruption/discontinuation. With 12 SQ-Bet, oral pruritus was more frequent among subjects with pollen food syndrome (PFS) (45%) than without PFS (29%). The 12 SQ-Bet did not seem to induce an increased risk of asthma: 7 events were reported in 7 subjects with 12 SQ-Bet and 11 in 10 subjects with placebo. No differences were seen in the risk of moderate-to-severe IMP-related AEs regardless of age, PFS status and asthma medical history. Conclusions The 12 SQ tree SLIT-tablet was well tolerated in tree pollen allergic subjects with no major safety concerns detected. This safety profile supports daily at-home sublingual administration once the first dose is tolerated when administered under medical supervision.Peer reviewe