Inter-individual differences in attitude content:Cognition, affect, and attitudes

In this chapter, we describe and integrate advances in the study of inter-individual differences in attitude content. Research within this area has addressed how people differ in the extent to which their attitudes are primarily guided by the favorability of their cognitive and affective responses. We begin by describing work that prompted researchers to address this topic and how these individual differences have been measured. We then highlight the implications of individual differences in cognitive and affective content in relation to attitude formation, attitude change, attitude strength, and how individuals perceive and evaluate people, groups, and other attitude objects. Taken together, these lines of research lend support to the argument that people differ in their use of cognitive and affective information as bases for attitudes. We conclude the chapter by addressing new questions that we believe will stimulate further interest in the topic.</p

Changing, priming, and acting on values: Effects via motivational relations in a circular model

Circular models of values and goals suggest that some motivational aims are consistent with each other, some oppose each other, and others are orthogonal to each other. The present experiments tested this idea explicitly by examining how value confrontation and priming methods influence values and value-consistent behaviors throughout the entire value system. Experiment 1 revealed that change in 1 set of social values causes motivationally compatible values to increase in importance, whereas motivationally incompatible values decrease in importance and orthogonal values remain the same. Experiment 2 found that priming security values reduced the better-than-average effect, but priming stimulation values increased it. Similarly, Experiments 3 and 4 found that priming security values increased cleanliness and decreased curiosity behaviors, whereas priming self-direction values decreased cleanliness and increased curiosity behaviors. Experiment 5 found that priming achievement values increased success at puzzle completion and decreased helpfulness to an experimenter, whereas priming with benevolence values decreased success and increased helpfulness. These results highlight the importance of circular models describing motivational interconnections between values and personal goals

Effects of promotion and compunction interventions on real intergroup interactions: promotion helps but high compunction hurts

We show the promotion intervention has positive effects during intergroup contact, but that high levels of compunction can have negative effects. Intergroup contact is probably the longest standing and most comprehensively researched intervention to reduce discrimination. It is also part of ordinary social experience, and a key context in which discrimination is played out. In this paper, we explore two additional interventions which are also designed to reduce discrimination, but which have not yet been applied to real intergroup interactions. The promotion intervention encourages participants to relax and enjoy an interaction, while the compunction intervention motivates participants to avoid discrimination. Across two studies, we tested the separate effects of promotion (Study 1) and then compunction (Study 2) on participants' interactions with a confederate whom they believed to have a history of schizophrenia. In Study 1, participants received either a promotion intervention to “relax and have an enjoyable dialogue” or no intervention (control; n = 67). In Study 2, participants completed a Single-Category Implicit Attitude Test before being told that they were high in prejudice (high compunction condition) or low in prejudice (low compunction condition; n = 62). Results indicated that promotion was associated with broadly positive effects: participants reported more positive experience of the interaction (enjoyment and interest in a future interaction), and more positive evaluations of their contact partner (increased friendliness and reduced stereotyping). There were no effects on participants' reported intergroup anxiety. In contrast, high compunction had broadly negative effects: participants reported more negative experiences of the interaction and more negative evaluations of their contact partner (using the same dependent measures outlined above). In addition, participants in the high compunction condition reported increased intergroup anxiety and increased self-anxiety (anxiety around thinking or doing something that is prejudiced). Participants in the high compunction condition also reported reduced expectancies of self-efficacy (i.e., they were less confident that they would be able to make a good impression)

Anti-immigrant prejudice: understanding the roles of (perceived) values and value dissimilarity

Although human values and value dissimilarity play pivotal roles in the prejudice literature, there remain important gaps in our understanding. To address these gaps, we recruited three British samples (N = 350) and presented Muslim immigrants, refugees, and economic migrants as target groups. Using polynomial regression analyses, we simultaneously tested effects of individuals’ own values, their perceptions of immigrant values, and self-immigrant value dissimilarities on prejudice. Results indicated that favorability toward immigrants is higher when individuals hold higher self-transcendence values (e.g., equality) and lower self-enhancement values (e.g., power), and when they perceive immigrants to hold higher self-transcendence values and lower self-enhancement values. In addition, prejudice toward immigrants is higher when individuals who hold higher conservation values (e.g., security) perceive immigrants to value openness (e.g., freedom) more, suggesting a value dissimilarity effect. No value dissimilarity effects emerged when immigrants were perceived to be higher in conservation, self-transcendence, or self-enhancement values. Overall, these results showed that effects of values and value dissimilarity differ depending on which value dimension is considered. Additionally, the results revealed support for a novel mechanism with the motivation to be nonprejudiced underpinning the links between individuals’ values and prejudice. Our discussion highlights the multifaceted manner in which values are linked to prejudic

The role of Need for Affect and Need for Cognition in self-evaluation

The primary aim of this study was to investigate whether individual differences in affective and cognitive orientation predict the relative importance of warmth-related and competence-related traits in self-evaluation. 99 participants (85 females) completed the Need for Affect and Need for Cognition scales. Later, participants rated the extent to which warmth- and competence-related traits described their own personality. In line with our hypotheses, affective people expressed more positive evaluations of warmth traits and more negative evaluations of cold traits relative to cognitive people, who expressed more positive evaluations of competence traits and more negative evaluations of incompetence traits. This differentiation has implications for self-evaluation processes and individual differences in affective and cognitive orientation

Neural coding of human values is underpinned by brain areas representing the core self in the cortical midline region

The impact of human values on our choices depends on their nature. Self-Transcendence values motivate us to act for the benefit of others and care for the environment. Self-Enhancement values motivate us to act for our benefit. The present study examines differences in the neural processes underlying these two value domains. Extending our previous research, we used fMRI to explore first of all neural correlates of Self-Transcendence vs Self-Enhancement values, with a particular focus on the putative role of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), which has been linked to a self-transcendent mind-set. Additionally, we investigated the neural basis of Openness to Change vs Conservation values. We asked participants to reflect on and rate values as guiding principles in their lives while undergoing fMRI. Mental processing of Self-Transcendence values was associated with higher brain activity in the dorsomedial (BA9, BA8) and ventromedial (BA10) prefrontal cortices, as compared to Self-Enhancement values. The former involved activation and the latter deactivation of those regions. We did not detect differences in brain activation between Openness to Change vs Conservation values. Self-Transcendence values thus shared brain regions with social processes that have previously been linked to a self-transcendent mind-set, and the “core self” representation.</p

The source attribution effect: Demonstrating pernicious disagreement between ideological groups on non-divisive aphorisms

We tested whether mere source attribution is sufficient to cause polarization between groups, even on consensual non-divisive positions. Across four studies (N = 2182), using samples from Germany, the UK, and the USA, agreement with aphorisms was high in the absence of source attribution. In contrast, atheists agreed less with brief aphorisms when they were presented as Bible verses (Studies 1 and 2), whereas Christians agreed more (Study 2). Democrats and Republicans (USA) and Labour supporters and Conservative supporters (UK) agreed more with politically non-divisive aphorisms that were presented as originating from a politician belonging to their own party (e.g., Clinton, Trump, Corbyn) than with the same aphorisms when they were presented as originating from a politician belonging to the rival party (Studies 3 and 4). This source attribution effect was not moderated by education, amount of thinking about the aphorisms, identification with the ingroup, trust, dissonance, fear of reproach, or attitude strength. We conclude that source attribution fundamentally interferes with epistemic progress in debate because of the way in which attributions of statements to sources powerfully affects reasoning about their arguments

Exploring the Roles of Human Values and Self-Discrepancies in Postnatal Depression in First-Time Mothers

Objectives Postnatal depression is the most prevalent psychopathology experienced within the perinatal period and has been associated with a range of adverse outcomes for both mother and infant. In the present research, we combine two influential theories, Schwartz's theory of human values and Higgins' self-discrepancy theory (SDT), to test new hypotheses about postnatal depression. Methods We recruited 80 first-time mothers who had given birth within the last 6 months and who self-reported experiencing low mood or postnatal depression. Participants anonymously completed measures of postnatal depression, value importance, self-discrepancies, and subjective value fulfillment. Results Contrary to our hypotheses, actual-ought self-discrepancies, but not actual-ideal self-discrepancies, predicted postnatal depression. Interestingly however, self-discrepancies were negatively correlated with value fulfillment. The findings within this study diverge from the relation predicted within SDT and highlight how motherhood may represent a unique circumstance, in which the “ideal self” has evolved to become a self that one feels morally obligated to embody. Further exploratory analyses revealed that depression was predicted by the difference between value fulfillment and value importance in conservation values, but not by differences between value fulfillment and value importance regarding any of the other value types. Discussion We discuss potential impact on discourses around motherhood, alongside clinical implications for practitioners who work with mothers during the perinatal period

Attitudes and Values

Attitudes are our likes and dislikes towards anything and anyone that can be evaluated. This can be something as concrete as a mosquito that is tormenting you during the night or abstract and broad as capitalism or communism. In contrast, human values have been defined as abstract ideals and guiding principles in our life, and are considered as abstract as well as trans-situational. Thus, while both attitudes and values are important constructs in psychology that are necessarily related, there are also a range of differences between the two. Attitudes are specific judgements towards an object, values are abstract and trans-situational; attitudes can be positive and negative, values are mainly positive; and attitudes are less relevant for our self-concept than values. A range of studies have investigated how values and attitudes towards specific topics are associated. The rationale for most studies is that people’s values guide whether they like certain people, an object, or an idea. For example, the more people value universalism (e.g., equality, broad-mindedness), the more they support equal rights for groups that are typically disadvantaged. However, these associations can also be complex. If people do not consider an attitude to be a relevant expression of a value, it is less likely that the value predicts this attitude. Further, it can also matter for our attitudes whether our values match those of the people in our country, are similar to other social groups (e.g., immigrants), and whether we think our own groups’ values are similar or dissimilar to the values of other groups. In sum, the literature shows that the links between values and attitudes are both entrenched and malleable and that these interrelations have many important consequences for understanding social-political divisions and well-being

A new way to look at the data: Similarities between groups of people are large and important.

Most published research focuses on describing differences, while neglecting similarities that are arguably at least as interesting and important. In Study 1, we modified and extended prior procedures for describing similarities and demonstrate the importance of this exercise by examining similarities between groups on 22 social variables (e.g., moral attitudes, human values, and trust) within 6 commonly used social categories: gender, age, education, income, nation of residence, and religious denomination (N = 86,272). On average, the amount of similarity between 2 groups (e.g., high vs. low educated or different countries) was greater than 90%. Even large effect sizes revealed more similarities than differences between groups. Studies 2–5 demonstrated the importance of presenting information about similarity in research reports. Compared with the typical presentation of differences (e.g., barplots with confidence intervals), similarity information led to more accurate lay perceptions and to more positive attitudes toward an outgroup. Barplots with a restricted y-axis led to a gross underestimation of similarities (i.e., a gross overestimation of the differences), and information about similarities was rated as more comprehensible. Overall, the presentation of similarity information achieves more balanced scientific communication and may help address the file drawer problem