Payments for Ecosystem Services: Mechanisms to Achieve Desired Landscape Patterns

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of five payment for ecosystem service (PES) schemes at meeting conservation objectives when the spatial configuration is important in meeting desired landscape patterns. The five PES schemes are: 1) fee-simple acquisition; 2) subsidies; 3) tradable development rights (TDR) with zoning; 4) mitigation banking; and 5) purchased development rights (PDR) easements. Findings are that tradeoffs exist between PES schemes for meeting spatial conservation objectives. The appropriate PES scheme incentive mechanism for a given region will depend upon economic demand as well as the landowner and landscape characteristics of the conservation region.Landscape, Spatial conservation, payment for ecosystem services, PES

Evaluating incentive mechanisms for conserving habitat

Private lands have an important role in the success of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The current command-andcontrol approach to protecting species on private land has resulted in disincentives to the landowner, which have decreased the ability of the ESA to protect many of our endangered and threatened species. Herein we define and evaluate, from an economic perspective, eight incentive mechanisms, including the status quo, for protecting species on private land. We highlight the strengths and weaknesses and compare and contrast the incentive mechanisms according to a distinct set of biological, landowner, and government criteria. Our discussion indicates that market instruments, such as tradable permits or taxes, which have been successful in controlling air pollution, are not as effective for habitat protection. Alternatively, voluntary incentive mechanisms can be designed such that landowners view habitat as an asset and are willing participants in protecting habitat. The incentive mechanism best suited for conserving habitat in a given region depends on many factors, including government funding, land values, quantity and quality of habitat, and the region's developmental pressure.Incentives, Conservation, TDRs, Subsidies, Zoning, conservation Easements, mitigation banking, impact fees

Consistency of Consumer Valuation Under Different Information Sets: An Experimental Auction with Sweet Potatoes

We used a controlled, uniform 5th-price auction to elicit values for sweet potatoes—both when location is known and unknown, and before and after tasting and providing health information. Significant differences were found between pre- and post-consumption valuations and also found that there were significant effects for location of origin and health information. Interestingly, we also find that location of origin not only affects the level of bids, but also the marginal differences in bids between different potatoes. Overall, however, these results suggest little consistency in bid values across information sets, suggesting that attempting to elicit values of attributes in isolation may lead to erroneous results.Consumer/Household Economics, Demand and Price Analysis,

The Impacts of Taste, Location of Origin, and Health Information on Market Demand for Sweet Potatoes

Location of product origin is an often-used marketing device by retailers. This approach is based on the assumption that location of origin signals something to consumers about the underlying quality (or other attributes) of the product. This can be an effective strategy if the signal matches the consumer valuation of the product after consumption. In the same vein, health advertising is used to increase demand for a product that exhibits "healthy" dietary attributes. While there have been numerous studies examining the potential impacts of these attributes on demand, there have been few rigorous studies that examine the consistency of consumer valuations of location of origin before and after they have actually consumed the product (or before and after health advertising). Results show that knowledge of location of origin of sweet potatoes does have an impact on consumer valuation. It was also found that both the information from the taste attribute (experience) and the health attribute (credence) played a significant role in participant valuation.Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

CREDENCE ATTRIBUTES, CONSUMER VALUATION, AND ENDOWMNET EFFECTS IN AUCTIONS: THE CASE OF SWEET POTATOES

There have been few studies that examine valuations of location of origin before and after consumers have consumed the product (or health advertising). Results of non-hypothetical experiments show that knowledge of origin does have an impact on valuation as well as the taste attribute (experience) and the health attribute (credence).Consumer/Household Economics,

Tradable Set-Aside Requirements (TSARs): Conserving Spatially Dependent Environmental Amenities

In the lab, we examine the effectiveness of two land use conservation policies: a tradable set aside requirements (TSARs), and the TSARs combined with an agglomeration bonus. Evaluated by bioeconomic efficiency, our experimental results suggest: 1) TSARs is a cost-effective land conservation tool; and 2) combining TSARS with the agglomeration bonus increases habitat connectivity but at a price—lower economic efficiency.Conservation, tradable development rights, spatial conservation, market instruments

Experimental Economics and the Environment: Eliciting Values for Controversial Goods

We illustrate the experimental method by examining bidding behavior for controversial goods, i.e., goods in which bidders have positive and negative values. Our results suggest that bidding behavior differs across auction type. Bidders with positive induced values bid sincerely in a WTP auction. Bidders bid conservatively, however, in the WTA auction, foregoing profitable opportunities. Informing bidders of their optimal strategy serves to attenuate bidding discrepancies but does not eliminate them. Treating the WTP and WTA auctions as equivalent given positive and negative values could lead one to overstate the costs relative to the benefits of the controversial good.experiments, willingness to pay, willingness to accept, positive and negative induced values, Crop Production/Industries, Institutional and Behavioral Economics,

The Value of Hunting Package Attributes

Economic impacts of hunting activities reveals opportunities for landowners to capitalize on apparent market demand for fee-access hunting. This paper discusses the marginal values of hunting package attributes. The results will provide landowners the information needed to make optimal management decision.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

The Impact of Hunting Package Attributes on Hunting Package Prices in Mississippi

Potential economic impacts of hunting activities suggested opportunities for non-industrial private landowners in Mississippi to capitalize on apparent market demand for fee-access hunting. Data were collected from outfitting individuals/firms operating within Mississippi to analyze the impact of hunting package attributes on package prices. Generally, package prices were directly related to the length of the package in days, with the increase in price decreasing with each additional day. Provision of other amenities such as lodging as well as joint activities such as fishing also increased package prices. Finally, there were differences in package prices depending on species being hunted. These results provide landowners with added information about the potential values of hunting package prices, which, when combined with costs of providing the packages, can assist in making optimal enterprise management decisions.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Payments for Ecosystem Services: Mechanisms to Achieve Desired Landscape Patterns

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of five payment for ecosystem service (PES) schemes at meeting conservation objectives when the spatial configuration is important in meeting desired landscape patterns. The five PES schemes are: 1) fee-simple acquisition; 2) subsidies; 3) tradable development rights (TDR) with zoning; 4) mitigation banking; and 5) purchased development rights (PDR) easements. Findings are that tradeoffs exist between PES schemes for meeting spatial conservation objectives. The appropriate PES scheme incentive mechanism for a given region will depend upon economic demand as well as the landowner and landscape characteristics of the conservation region