Local Broadband Access: Primum Non Nocere or Primum Processi - A Property Rights Approach

High-speed or "broadband" Internet access currently is provided, at the local level, chiefly by cable television and telephone companies, often in competition with each other. Wireless and satellite providers have a small but growing share of this business. An influential coalition of economic interests and academics have proposed that local broadband Internet access providers be prohibited from restricting access to their systems by upstream suppliers of Internet services. A recent term for this proposal is "net neutrality." We examine the potential costs and benefits of such a policy from an economic welfare perspective. Using a property rights approach, we ask whether transactions costs in the market for access rights are likely to be significant, and if so, whether owners of physical local broadband platforms are likely to be more or less efficient holders of access rights than Internet content providers. We conclude that transactions costs are likely to be lower if access rights are assigned initially to platform owners rather than content providers. In addition, platform hardware owners are likely to be more efficient holders of these rights because they can internalize demand-side interactions among content products. Further, failure to permit platform owners to control access threatens to result in inadequate incentives to invest in, to maintain, and to upgrade local broadband platforms. Inefficiently denying platform owners the ability to own access rights implies a need for price regulation; otherwise, there will be incentives to use pricing to circumvent the constraint on rights ownership. Price regulation is itself known to induce welfare losses through adaptive behavior of the constrained firm. The impact on welfare might produce a worse result than the initial problem, assuming one existed. Much of the academic interest in net neutrality arises from the belief that the open architecture of the Internet under current standards has been responsible for its remarkable success, and a wish to preserve this openness. We point out that the openness of the Internet was an unintended consequence of its military origins, and that other, less open, architectures might have been even more successful. A policy of denying platform owners the ability to own access rights could freeze the architecture of the Internet, preventing it from adapting to future technological and economic developments. Finally, we examine the net neutrality issue from the perspective of the "essential facility doctrine," a tool of the common law of antitrust. The doctrine establishes conditions under which federal courts will mandate access by competitors to the monopoly platform of a vertically-integrated firm. Because local broadband Internet access is not today a bottleneck monopoly (there are several competitors and the market is at an early stage of development), the essential facilities doctrine would not permit reassignment of access rights from platform owners to competitors. We conclude that "net neutrality" is a welfare-reducing policy proposal.Technology and Industry, Regulatory Reform

Frustrated order on extrinsic geometries

We study, analytically and theoretically, defects in a nematically-ordered surface that couple to the extrinsic geometry of a surface. Though the intrinsic geometry tends to confine topological defects to regions of large Gaussian curvature, extrinsic couplings tend to orient the nematic in the local direction of maximum or minimum bending. This additional frustration is unavoidable and most important on surfaces of negative Gaussian curvature, where it leads to a complex ground state thermodynamics. We show, in contradistinction to the well-known effects of intrinsic geometry, that extrinsic curvature expels disclinations from the region of maximum curvature above a critical coupling threshold. On catenoids lacking an "inside-outside" symmetry, defects are expelled altogether.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figure

Voluntary Funding for Generic Advertising Using a Provision Point Mechanism: An Experimental Analysis of Option Assurance

The mandatory nature of generic advertising funding remains a contentious issue. Theoretically and in laboratory environments, a provision point mechanism with a money-back guarantee offers an attractive voluntary alternative to the standard voluntary contribution mechanisms, yet in practice, few examples of multiple-round provision point mechanisms exist. A practical concern with applying these mechanisms is that even a slight shortfall in contributions relative to the designated funding threshold in one period would engender an irreversible shutdown of administrative capacity with negative consequences for subsequent periods. This paper uses experimental economics to test new two-threshold provision point mechanisms in the context of check-off programs for funding commodity marketing programs that would separately fund the minimum administrative capacity and the more costly full marketing program. In these mechanisms, even if a funding shortfall occurs for the full marketing program, the low threshold can maintain the administrative capacity and retain the option for future funding of advertising. We demonstrate that providing such "option assurance" does not lead to a decrease in overall contributions and, in some settings, can increase producer surplus.Marketing,

Thin and lumpy: an experimental investigation of water quality trading

Water quality trading schemes in the United States can predominantly be characterized by low trading volumes. In this paper we utilize laboratory economics experiments to explore the extent to which the technology through which pollution abatement is achieved influences market outcomes. Mirroring the majority of water quality trading markets, the sessions utilize small trading groups composed of six participants. To understand the extent to which abatement technology influences trading behavior, the experimental treatments vary the degree of heterogeneity in initial abatement costs and the potential for long-lived investments in cost-reducing abatement technology.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Household Demand for Broadband Internet Service

As part of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) National Broadband Report to Congress, we have been asked to conduct a survey to help determine consumer valuations of different aspects of broadband Internet service. This report details our methodology, sample and preliminary results. We do not provide policy recommendations. This draft report uses data obtained from a nationwide survey during late December 2009 and early January 2010 to estimate household demand for broadband Internet service. The report combines household data, obtained from choices in a real market and an experimental setting, with a discrete-choice model to estimate the marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP) for improvements in eight Internet service characteristics.