The Effect of Antitrust Policy on Consumer Welfare: What Crandall and Winston Overlook

For related information, please see: Brief How to Block Cartel Formation and Price-Fixing Robert W. Crandall and Clifford Winston Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare - Assessing the Evidence Jonathan B. Baker The Case for Antitrust Enforcement

Market Delineation under the NAAG Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Realities or Illusions

The Reagan Administration expressed its enforcement policy for horizontal mergers in Merger Guidelines issued in 1982 and 1984 ( DOJ Guidelines ), implemented its policy through its specific enforcement actions pursuant to section 7 of the Clayton Act, and proposed to codify its policy in amendments to section 7. The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) now has gone beyond mere criticism. It has announced the intention of state attorneys general to challenge mergers they believe to be anticompetitive and has issued its own enforcement guidelines for horizontal mergers ( NAAG Guidelines ). The purpose of this Article is to show that the NAAG Guidelines, not the DOJ Guidelines, produce systematic errors in market delineation. The NAAG Guidelines understate the scope of markets. Although the NAAG Guidelines proclaim their reliance on the actual workings of the marketplace and on market realities , their quarrel with the DOJ Guidelines on market delineation reveals a pronounced blind spot and a baseless fear that the Justice Department is intent on sabotaging merger enforcement. Section I outlines the approach to market delineation in the DOJ Guidelines, reviews how the Justice Department has applied them in cases with court decisions on the merits, and analyzes the NAAG Guidelines\u27 criticisms of the DOJ Guidelines\u27 approach to market delineation. Section II outlines the approach to market delineation of the NAAG Guidelines, notes many vagaries in this approach, and explains how it yields markets that are overly narrow. Finally, Section III summarizes the arguments and provides concluding remarks

Market Delineation under the NAAG Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Realities or Illusions

The Reagan Administration expressed its enforcement policy for horizontal mergers in Merger Guidelines issued in 1982 and 1984 ( DOJ Guidelines ), implemented its policy through its specific enforcement actions pursuant to section 7 of the Clayton Act, and proposed to codify its policy in amendments to section 7. The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) now has gone beyond mere criticism. It has announced the intention of state attorneys general to challenge mergers they believe to be anticompetitive and has issued its own enforcement guidelines for horizontal mergers ( NAAG Guidelines ). The purpose of this Article is to show that the NAAG Guidelines, not the DOJ Guidelines, produce systematic errors in market delineation. The NAAG Guidelines understate the scope of markets. Although the NAAG Guidelines proclaim their reliance on the actual workings of the marketplace and on market realities , their quarrel with the DOJ Guidelines on market delineation reveals a pronounced blind spot and a baseless fear that the Justice Department is intent on sabotaging merger enforcement. Section I outlines the approach to market delineation in the DOJ Guidelines, reviews how the Justice Department has applied them in cases with court decisions on the merits, and analyzes the NAAG Guidelines\u27 criticisms of the DOJ Guidelines\u27 approach to market delineation. Section II outlines the approach to market delineation of the NAAG Guidelines, notes many vagaries in this approach, and explains how it yields markets that are overly narrow. Finally, Section III summarizes the arguments and provides concluding remarks

Establishment of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice

(Excerpt) To fill in the knowledge gaps, this Article proceeds largely in reverse chronological order. First, it reviews Order No. 2507 and related circumstances, finding clear and convincing evidence that the Order did not create the Antitrust Division. Next, the Article examines the prior tenure of AG Cummings, finding clear and convincing evidence that the Antitrust Division existed before Roosevelt became President and Cummings became AG, and that Cummings lowered the standing of the Antitrust Division within the DOJ prior to issuing Order No. 2507. Finally, the Article scours the prior history of the DOJ and determines that the Antitrust Division actually was established in 1919 by Republican AG A. Mitchell Palmer

Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, and Economics

The legality of a horizontal merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act turns on a reckoning of its social costs and benefits. This paper reviews what economics has to say about that reckoning and explores the relationship between economic learning and merger law and policy

Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, and Economics

The legality of a horizontal merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act turns on a reckoning of its social costs and benefits. This paper reviews what economics has to say about that reckoning and explores the relationship between economic learning and merger law and policy