17 research outputs found

    Masters Thesis- Criticality Alarm System Design Guide with Accompanying Alarm System Development for the Radioisotope Production Laboratory in Richland, Washington

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    A detailed instructional manual was created to guide criticality safety engineers through the process of designing a criticality alarm system (CAS) for Department of Energy (DOE) hazard class 1 and 2 facilities. Regulatory and technical requirements were both addressed. A list of design tasks and technical subtasks are thoroughly analyzed to provide concise direction for how to complete the analysis. An example of the application of the design methodology, the Criticality Alarm System developed for the Radioisotope Production Laboratory (RPL) of Richland, Washington is also included. The analysis for RPL utilizes the Monte Carlo code MCNP5 for establishing detector coverage in the facility. Significant improvements to the existing CAS were made that increase the reliability, transparency, and coverage of the system

    Source Recertification, Refurbishment, and Transfer Logistics

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    The 2012 Gap Analysis of Department of Energy Radiological Sealed Sources, Standards, and Materials for Safeguards Technology Development [1] report, and the subsequent Reconciliation of Source Needs and Surpluses across the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory Complex [2] report, resulted in the identification of 33 requests for nuclear or radiological sealed sources for which there was potentially available, suitable material from within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex to fill the source need. Available, suitable material was defined by DOE laboratories as material slated for excess, or that required recertification or refurbishment before being used for safeguards technology development. This report begins by outlining the logistical considerations required for the shipment of nuclear and radiological materials between DOE laboratories. Then, because of the limited need for transfer of matching sources, the report also offers considerations for an alternative approach – the shipment of safeguards equipment between DOE laboratories or technology testing centers. Finally, this report addresses repackaging needs for the two source requests for which there was available, suitable material within the DOE complex
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