The WTO Special Safeguard Mechanism: A Case Study of Wheat

A special safeguard mechanism is an attractive policy tool for low income importing countries because it is automatic and does not require an injury test. Exporters might accept a safeguard for low income countries if it results in larger tariff cuts than in its absence. Using wheat as a case study the effects of a special safeguard mechanism on market stability and welfare are evaluated. The results show that a safeguard mechanism is not very trade distorting and costs less than 20 percent of the world welfare gain that would be realized if developing countries were not granted a safeguard.International Relations/Trade,

Regionalism in World Agricultural Trade: Lessons from Gravity Model Estimation

Relative to trade in non-agricultural goods, progress in achieving agricultural trade liberalization under the GATT/WTO has been slow. Agricultural trade is characterized by persistently high levels of protection on a scale that is uncommon in non-agricultural trade. Article XXIV of the GATT, 1994 permits a group of countries to form a trade union whereby trade barriers are reduced or removed on all sectors of trade. Within regional trade agreements however, agricultural trade often receives special treatment, and in some cases, agriculture is completely exempt. Typically, debates over the effects of regional trade agreements have focused on welfare. In this study we seek to answer a more fundamental question of what effect these agreements have had on agricultural trade.International Relations/Trade,

HAS THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION PROMOTED SUCCESSFUL REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS?

This study uses econometric gravity equations to test whether the WTO has promoted successful regional trade agreements (RTA). Two important findings emerge. First, we find that two countries that are members of the GATT/WTO and enter into a regional trade agreement stimulate trade. However, the effect on trade is not nearly as large as that between two RTA members that belong to the GATT/WTO. Contrary to the findings in Rose (2004), this result tends to support the fact that the GATT/WTO has liberalized multilateral trade, outside of RTAs. In other words, the effect of an RTA on countries’ trade who are not party to the GATT/WTO should generate a large RTA trade response due to relatively large pre-existing trade distortions. Second, we show that the GATT/WTO has not promoted successful RTAs using explicit RTA variables that controls for the notification status (to the GATT/WTO) of an RTA. Interestingly, non-notified RTAs trade significantly more than their notified counterparts.International Relations/Trade,

Triggers, Remedies and Tariff Cuts: Assessing the Impact of a Special Safeguard Mechanism for Developing Countries

On July 30, 2008, the WTO negotiations broke down because Members could not bridge their differences on the operation of a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for low-income countries. This study evaluates two scenarios concerning the recent July (2008) SSM proposal – one in which low-income countries are allowed to breach their pre-Doha bound tariffs and one in which they are not -- using a global, stochastic, partial equilibrium model of world wheat markets. We find that the July (2008) SSM proposal is not very trade distorting despite leading to sizeable SSM duties. Moreover, the question of whether developing countries should be allowed to exceed their pre-Doha bound tariffs depends heavily on the product under consideration, the extent of tariff cuts to bound rates, and the gap between a Members bound and applied tariffs, particularly when the volume-based SSM remedies are usedWTO, SSM, special safeguard mechanism, Doha, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade,

Agriculture and the World Trade Organization: Does Membership Make a Difference?

Recent empirical studies have estimated the trade flow effect of membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). One important, although largely untested, conclusion from this literature is that the GATT/WTO has worked well if we ignore trade in agriculture – one of the institution’s seemingly apparent failures. This article investigates this conclusion using a large panel of agricultural and non-agricultural trade flows, the latter of which serves as our benchmark. The results are impressive: the multilateral institution has delivered significant positive effects on members’ agricultural trade relative to trade between non-members. Further, despite their special and differential treatment, membership has provided important trade flow benefits for developing and least-developed country agricultural exports. These findings are robust across a large number of specifications and slices of the data. Although there are few sectors as politically sensitive, participation in the GATT/WTO appears to be a significant determinant of agricultural trade flows.WTO, membership, trade, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Development, International Relations/Trade, Political Economy,

ISO 14000 STANDARDS: VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AS A TRADE FACILITATION STRATEGY?

Environmental Economics and Policy,

ISO 9000 Standards: Implicit Barrier or Trade Facilitation Strategy?

International Relations/Trade,

Triggers, Remedies, and Tariff Cuts: Assessing the Impact of a Special Safeguard Mechanism for Developing Countries

The WTO negotiations broke down on July 30th, 2008 because members could not bridge their differences over the operation of a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). This article evaluates the latest SSM proposal using the world wheat market as our case study. Whether low-income WTO members should be allowed to breach their pre-Doha bound tariffs is a key element of our analysis. The SSM leads to sizeable additional duties but is not very trade distorting, even when pre-Doha bound rates are breached. Moreover, the extent to which low-income countries should be allowed to exceed pre-Doha bound rates depends heavily on the product under consideration, the ambition of the tariff cutting exercise, and the gap between members’ bound and applied tariffs.agriculture, Doha Development Agenda, July Package, Special Safeguard Mechanism, World Trade Organization, International Relations/Trade,

IMPORT SAFEGUARDS: PROTECTIONIST MEASURES OR A LIBERALIZATION STRATEGY?

The Doha Trade Round maintains that a considerable effort will be given to take into account better the particular needs of developing nations. Many low-income countries argue that the flexibility to invoke a special safeguard mechanism when faced with volatile commodity markets is a necessary condition for further market access reform. The implications of a safeguard for developing agriculture as a trade-off for lowering their tariff rates, is an important empirical question. Two stochastic simulation experiments are developed using wheat as a case study to estimate the marginal effects of a safeguard in terms of domestic market stability and on developed exporting nations. The results reveal that a safeguard for developing agriculture is minimally trade distorting and in general, costs less than one percent of total world welfare that would be realized if low-income countries were not granted a safeguard. Furthermore, safeguards are an attractive policy tool because they are transparent, easy to use and are an automatic mechanism.International Relations/Trade,

Does the World Trade Organization Promote Trade? An Empirical Assessment of Agricultural and Non‐Agricultural Trade Flows

In this paper we ask whether the GATT/WTO has actually failed to increase members’ agricultural trade. Surprisingly, there is very little empirical econometric support to shed light on this question despite the fact that agricultural trade is often at the forefront of multilateral negotiations. We address this issue by considering GATT/WTO effects across agricultural and non‐agricultural sectors. Despite much ‘hoopla and hype’ that the GATT/WTO has done nothing to boost members’ agricultural trade, our results suggest that the multilateral institution has delivered significant positive effects on agricultural trade over the period 1980‐2004. Moreover, in many cases the trade flow effect of membership in the GATT/WTO exceeds that of non‐agriculture, merchandise trade. The results have important policy implications when one considers the growing body of literature that often presumes that the GATT/WTO has done nothing to stimulate members' agricultural trade.International Relations/Trade,