Entanglement Conservation, ER=EPR, and a New Classical Area Theorem for Wormholes

We consider the question of entanglement conservation in the context of the ER=EPR correspondence equating quantum entanglement with wormholes. In quantum mechanics, the entanglement between a system and its complement is conserved under unitary operations that act independently on each; ER=EPR suggests that an analogous statement should hold for wormholes. We accordingly prove a new area theorem in general relativity: for a collection of dynamical wormholes and black holes in a spacetime satisfying the null curvature condition, the maximin area for a subset of the horizons (giving the largest area attained by the minimal cross section of the multi-wormhole throat separating the subset from its complement) is invariant under classical time evolution along the outermost apparent horizons. The evolution can be completely general, including horizon mergers and the addition of classical matter satisfying the null energy condition. This theorem is the gravitational dual of entanglement conservation and thus constitutes an explicit characterization of the ER=EPR duality in the classical limit.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figure

Splitting Spacetime and Cloning Qubits: Linking No-Go Theorems across the ER=EPR Duality

We analyze the no-cloning theorem in quantum mechanics through the lens of the proposed ER=EPR (Einstein-Rosen = Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) duality between entanglement and wormholes. In particular, we find that the no-cloning theorem is dual on the gravity side to the no-go theorem for topology change, violating the axioms of which allows for wormhole stabilization and causality violation. Such a duality between important no-go theorems elucidates the proposed connection between spacetime geometry and quantum entanglement.Comment: 6 pages, 2 figure

The WTO Special Safeguard Mechanism: A Case Study of Wheat

A special safeguard mechanism is an attractive policy tool for low income importing countries because it is automatic and does not require an injury test. Exporters might accept a safeguard for low income countries if it results in larger tariff cuts than in its absence. Using wheat as a case study the effects of a special safeguard mechanism on market stability and welfare are evaluated. The results show that a safeguard mechanism is not very trade distorting and costs less than 20 percent of the world welfare gain that would be realized if developing countries were not granted a safeguard.International Relations/Trade,

Regionalism in World Agricultural Trade: Lessons from Gravity Model Estimation

Relative to trade in non-agricultural goods, progress in achieving agricultural trade liberalization under the GATT/WTO has been slow. Agricultural trade is characterized by persistently high levels of protection on a scale that is uncommon in non-agricultural trade. Article XXIV of the GATT, 1994 permits a group of countries to form a trade union whereby trade barriers are reduced or removed on all sectors of trade. Within regional trade agreements however, agricultural trade often receives special treatment, and in some cases, agriculture is completely exempt. Typically, debates over the effects of regional trade agreements have focused on welfare. In this study we seek to answer a more fundamental question of what effect these agreements have had on agricultural trade.International Relations/Trade,

HAS THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION PROMOTED SUCCESSFUL REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS?

This study uses econometric gravity equations to test whether the WTO has promoted successful regional trade agreements (RTA). Two important findings emerge. First, we find that two countries that are members of the GATT/WTO and enter into a regional trade agreement stimulate trade. However, the effect on trade is not nearly as large as that between two RTA members that belong to the GATT/WTO. Contrary to the findings in Rose (2004), this result tends to support the fact that the GATT/WTO has liberalized multilateral trade, outside of RTAs. In other words, the effect of an RTA on countries’ trade who are not party to the GATT/WTO should generate a large RTA trade response due to relatively large pre-existing trade distortions. Second, we show that the GATT/WTO has not promoted successful RTAs using explicit RTA variables that controls for the notification status (to the GATT/WTO) of an RTA. Interestingly, non-notified RTAs trade significantly more than their notified counterparts.International Relations/Trade,

Agriculture and the World Trade Organization: Does Membership Make a Difference?

Recent empirical studies have estimated the trade flow effect of membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). One important, although largely untested, conclusion from this literature is that the GATT/WTO has worked well if we ignore trade in agriculture – one of the institution’s seemingly apparent failures. This article investigates this conclusion using a large panel of agricultural and non-agricultural trade flows, the latter of which serves as our benchmark. The results are impressive: the multilateral institution has delivered significant positive effects on members’ agricultural trade relative to trade between non-members. Further, despite their special and differential treatment, membership has provided important trade flow benefits for developing and least-developed country agricultural exports. These findings are robust across a large number of specifications and slices of the data. Although there are few sectors as politically sensitive, participation in the GATT/WTO appears to be a significant determinant of agricultural trade flows.WTO, membership, trade, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Development, International Relations/Trade, Political Economy,

Triggers, Remedies and Tariff Cuts: Assessing the Impact of a Special Safeguard Mechanism for Developing Countries

On July 30, 2008, the WTO negotiations broke down because Members could not bridge their differences on the operation of a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for low-income countries. This study evaluates two scenarios concerning the recent July (2008) SSM proposal – one in which low-income countries are allowed to breach their pre-Doha bound tariffs and one in which they are not -- using a global, stochastic, partial equilibrium model of world wheat markets. We find that the July (2008) SSM proposal is not very trade distorting despite leading to sizeable SSM duties. Moreover, the question of whether developing countries should be allowed to exceed their pre-Doha bound tariffs depends heavily on the product under consideration, the extent of tariff cuts to bound rates, and the gap between a Members bound and applied tariffs, particularly when the volume-based SSM remedies are usedWTO, SSM, special safeguard mechanism, Doha, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade,

ISO 14000 STANDARDS: VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AS A TRADE FACILITATION STRATEGY?

Environmental Economics and Policy,

ISO 9000 Standards: Implicit Barrier or Trade Facilitation Strategy?

International Relations/Trade,