Investigating Risk Disclosure Practices in the European Insurance Industry

In light of the upcoming Solvency II Pillar 3 disclosure regulation for the insurance industry, this paper explores the risk disclosure practices in annual reports of European primary insurers in the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Insurance Index between 2005 and 2009. On the basis of a self-constructed risk disclosure index, the study examines the relation between the extent of risk disclosure and insurance companies’ characteristics such as size, risk, profitability, ownership dispersion, cross-listing, home country and type of insurance sold, to draw inferences regarding motives for enhanced risk disclosure based on positive accounting theory.

Stochastic Mortality, Macroeconomic Risks and Life Insurer Solvency

Motivated by a recent demographic study establishing a link between macroeconomic fluctuations and the mortality index kt in the Lee–Carter model, we develop a dynamic asset-liability model to assess the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on the solvency of a life insurance company. Liabilities in this stochastic simulation framework are driven by a GDP-linked variant of the Lee–Carter mortality model. Furthermore, interest rates and stock prices react to changes in GDP, which itself is modelled as a stochastic process. Our simulation results show that insolvency probabilities are significantly higher when the reaction of mortality rates to changes in GDP is incorporated.

Who Benefits from Building Insurance Groups? A Welfare Analysis Based on Optimal Group Risk Management

This paper compares the shareholder-value-maximizing capital structure and pricing policy of insurance groups against that of stand-alone insurers. Groups can utilise intra-group risk diversification by means of capital and risk transfer instruments. We show that using these instruments enables the group to offer insurance with less default risk and at lower premiums than is optimal for standalone insurers. We also take into account that shareholders of groups could find it more difficult to prevent inefficient overinvestment or cross-subsidisation, which we model by higher dead-weight costs of carrying capital. The tradeoff between risk diversification on the one hand and higher dead-weight costs on the other can result in group building being beneficial for shareholders but detrimental for policyholders