The Arab Spring: The Role of Quality Education and the Consequences of its Lack

The lack of quality education plays a major role in explaining the Arab Spring: As a result of past shortfalls in education, large shares of the working-age population in the Arab-Spring countries do not have the right qualifications for entering the labour market. This not only leads to high levels of unemployment but also entails poverty and social distress. At the macro level, it triggers a vicious cycle of underdevelopment by hampering an upgrade to economies driven by knowledge and innovation despite the substantial numbers of higher educated citizens of working age in these countries. This holds particularly true for Egypt. Remedying the current lack of quality education should be a top priority in the countries of North Africa, because it is the source of many deficiencies plaguing this region. In the Arab-Spring countries, the European Union's sectoral aid given for education has focused on quantity (e.g. raising enrolment by supporting the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals for Education) rather than on quality, where interventions usually target higher education (mostly through individual sponsorship programmes), although there are challenges at all levels, starting with basic education. The European Union's main priority should be to guide and assist these countries in developing training programmes for teachers as the driving force behind the entire system reform

Is progress in education sustainable?

Projections of educational attainment are complementary to projections of enrolment. They give somehow the translation of projections of enrolment rates into educational levels of attainment. Population projections by level of education allow us to have a precise knowledge not only about the combined momentum of population growth and education spread but also on the actual number of in-school or potentially in-school population by levels of education and this according to some interesting scenarios. This paper shows an application of educational attainment projections at the level of thirteen world regions. It shows the challenges that will face governments and international organizations because of increasing school-age population and increases in enrollment rates. On the contrary, for those regions that are already very advanced in the demographic transition and education levels, the task of maintaining enrolment rates ore even increasing them will not be so daunting

The end of secularization in Europe? A socio-demographic perspective

Much of the current debate over secularization in Europe focuses only on the direction of religious change, and pays exclusive attention to social causes. Scholars have been less attentive to shifts in the rate of religious decline, and to the role of demography – notably fertility and immigration. This article addresses both phenomena. It uses data from the European Values Surveys and European Social Survey for the period 1981-2008 to establish basic trends in religious attendance and belief across the ten countries that have been consistently surveyed. These show that religious decline is mainly occurring in Catholic European countries and has effectively ceased among post-1945 birth cohorts in six northwestern European societies where secularization began early. It also provides a cohort component projection of religious affiliation for two European countries using fertility, migration, switching and age and sex-structure parameters derived from census and immigration data. These suggest that western Europe may be more religious at the end of our century than at its beginning

The Future Fertility of High Fertility Countries: A Model Incorporating Expert Arguments

This paper presents and justifies a set of assumptions regarding the future of fertility in high-fertility countries based on an overview of fertility experiences in these countries, a review of factors influencing fertility change, a global survey of experts, and a final experts' meeting. Future fertility trends in high fertility countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia will be the main determinants of global population growth over the rest of this century. Accordingly, this paper describes the diversity of experiences of the countries with currently high fertility, from those well advanced in the fertility transition to countries that have barely started. The expert survey emphasizes the importance of female education, urbanization and access to family planning in fertility declines. The literature review confirms these judgements. The paper ends with a technical description of the procedure for deriving the assumptions for projecting fertility in high fertility countries until 2100

The Importance of Education in Future Population. Global Trends and Case Studies on Cape Verde, Sudan, and Tunisia

Education is a central issue in the complex process of development, for it has been found to be related to fertility and hence population growth, to the status of women, to labor force skills, as well as to cultural and infrastructural development in general. This paper consists of two main parts. The first examines the role of education and reviews school enrollment patterns in the world during the last 30 years. We deduce from this review some general patterns of enrollment increase and gender differential. The second part presents multi-state population projections by educational level and the resulting adult educational attainment, fertility levels and population growth. This is done through three case studies on the countries of Cape Verde, Sudan and Tunisia. The projection exercise shows some important dynamics of education and fertility change. The benefits to countries who have taken great strides to increase enrollment with superficially disappointing results to date will become obvious in the future. This may lead to some unexpected fertility declines and other changes associated with higher education. Adult levels of education have a long momentum and education increases in the adult population are non-linear. This is an important aspect when defining scenarios for future population growth

Past and Future of Human Capital in Southeast Asia: From 1970 to 2030

This paper examines levels of educational attainment in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam for the period 1970-2030 through the reconstruction and projection of levels of educational attainment. While the study of the past shows that the determination to invest in education has been strong in the six countries, the investments were implemented at different pace and intensity, the projections show the legacy of past investments. In Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, there will be tangible increases in the proportion of the working age population with a tertiary education. The Philippines will have a dichotomous society where large proportions will either have a tertiary education or only a primary education. In Indonesia, the bulk of the working age population will shift from primary in 2000 to secondary by 2030. The projection horizon and the trend type of scenario do not allow Vietnam to catch up with the other countries

The future of the Protestant Church: Estimates for Austria and for the Provinces of Burgenland, Carinthia and Vienna

Secularization and migration have substantially affected the place of the Protestant Church in the Austrian society in the last decades. The number of members has been shrinking markedly from 447 thousand members in 1971 to 278 thousand in 2018. The trend is visible across all provinces, although the magnitude is stronger in Vienna where both disaffiliation and international migration are stronger: In the capital city, the Protestant population diminished from 126 thousand to 47 thousand over the 1971-2018 period. Using population projections of membership to the Protestant Church, we look at the potential future of affiliation to the Protestant Church in Austria, and in three provinces: Burgenland, Carinthia, and Vienna from 2018 to 2048, considering different paths of fertility and disaffiliation. We also look at the impact of different scenarios regarding the composition of international migration flows on affiliation to the Protestant Church. Our findings suggest that in the absence of compensatory flows, the Protestant Church will keep shrinking unless it manages to stop disaffiliation. The projections also show that migrants, especially within mobile Europe, are a potential source of members that is at present not properly contributing to membership in Austria. According to the TREND EUROPE scenario, which is – seen from today – the most likely scenario with a continuation of declining entries and increased exits, the Protestant population in Austria would still decline from 283 thousand in 2018 to 144 thousand in 2048 (-49%). At the level of the three provinces, the decline would be faster in Vienna (-42%, from 47 to 27 thousand) than in Burgenland (-26%, from 32 to 24 thousand) and Carinthia (-37%, from 48 to 30 thousand). According to this scenario, by 2048 the Protestant population would correspond to 1.5% of the total population of Austria(1.3% in Vienna, 7.3% in Burgenland and 5.4% in Carinthia). Other scenarios reflect the potential impact of different religious composition of future migrant flows, as well as changing disaffiliation patterns. Only under the LIFT scenario, which assumes a reduction in exits by 50% and more migrants enrolling to the Protestant Church, we see an end of the haemorrhage and even an increase in the number of Protestants in Vienna