New policies are needed to reconcile climate mitigation and social equity in the UK

Ian Gough argues that current climate mitigation policies are highly regressive because they bear much more heavily on lower income households. To achieve both equity and carbon reduction will require imaginative and radical new ‘ecosocial’ policies

Fiscal costs of climate mitigation programmes in the UK: A challenge for social policy?

This paper asks whether the policies and programmes enacted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the UK will compete with other goals of public policy, in particular social policy goals. The Climate Change Act 2008 has set the UK some of the most demanding targets in the world: to reduce GHG emissions (compared with 1990) by at least 80% by 2050 and by at least 34% by 2020 - just nine years away. A wide array of climate change mitigation policies (CCMPs) have been put in place to bring this about. Will these compete fiscally with the large public expenditures on the welfare state? We address this question by surveying and costing all UK government policies that have a climate change mitigation objective and which are expressed through taxation, government expenditures and government-mandated expenditures by energy suppliers and other businesses and which are directed toward the household sector. Our conclusion is that expenditures on CCMPs are tiny - around one quarter of one per cent of GDP - and will not rise significantly. Within this the share of direct spending by government will fall and that obligated on utility companies will rise. Green taxes are also planned to fall as a share of GDP. There is no evidence here of fiscal competition between the welfare state and the environmental state. However, the use of mandated electricity and gas markets will impose rising costs on the household sector, which will bear more heavily on lower income households and will increase 'fuel poverty'. Thus demands on traditional social policies are likely to rise. More radical policy reforms will be needed to integrate climate change and social policy goals.carbon mitigation policy, social policy, fiscal competition

Theories of the welfare state: a critique

The article considers three major non-Marxist explanations of the modern welfare state: functionalist sociological theories, economic theories of government policy, and pluralist theories of democracy. Each is subjected to a critique and all are found wanting, in that none can satisfactorily explain the observable similarities and differences in state welfare intervention within advanced capitalist countries. Functionalist theories can explain the dominant trends at work within all countries, but not the immense diversity in state policies which still persists. Economic and pluralist theories can explain the diversity but not the determinant trends. This failing is related to the separation of objective and subjective aspects in historical explanation: the first school objectifies history, the second subjectifies it. The article concludes by asserting, but not arguing, that a Marxist approach offers a more fruitful way of understanding the welfare state, insofar as it rejects this separation

Climate change and sustainable welfare: the centrality of human needs

Since climate change threatens human well-being across the globe and into the future, we require a concept of well-being that encompasses an equivalent ambit. This article argues that only a concept of human need can do the work required. It compares need theory with three alternative approaches. Preference satisfaction theory is criticised on the grounds of subjectivity, epistemic irrationality, endogenous and adaptive preferences, the limitlessness of wants, the absence of moral evaluation and the non-specificity of future preferences. The happiness approach is found equally wanting. The main section shows how these deficiencies can be addressed by a coherent theory of need. Human needs are necessary pre-conditions to avoid serious harm and are universalisable, objective, empirically grounded, non-substitutable and satiable. They are broader than ‘material’ needs since a need for personal autonomy figures in all theoretical accounts. Whilst needs are universal, need satisfiers are most often contextual and relative to institutions and cultures. The satiability and non-substitutability of needs is critical for understanding sustainability. Finally, it is argued that human needs provide an indispensable foundation for many current ethical arguments for global and inter-generational justice in the face of threats from climate change. An appendix compares this theory with the capability approaches of Sen and Nussbaum and argues it to be more fundamental

Climate change and sustainable welfare: an argument for the centrality of human needs

Since climate change threatens human wellbeing across the globe and into the future, we require a concept of wellbeing that encompasses an equivalent ambit. This paper argues that only a concept of human need can do the work required. It compares need theory with three alternative approaches. Preference satisfaction theory is criticised on the grounds of subjectivity, epistemic irrationality, endogenous and adaptive preferences, the limitlessness of wants, the absence of moral evaluation, and the non-specificity of future preferences. The happiness approach is found equally wanting. The main section shows how these deficiencies can be addressed by a coherent theory of need. Human needs are necessary preconditions to avoid serious harm, are universalisable, objective, empirically grounded, non-substitutable and satiable. They are broader than ‘material’ needs since a need for personal autonomy figures in all theoretical accounts. While needs are universal, need satisfiers are most often contextual and relative to institutions and cultures. The satiability and non-substitutability of needs is critical for understanding sustainability. The capability approaches of Sen and Nussbaum are compared but argued to be less fundamental. Finally, human needs provide the only concept that can ground moral obligations across global space and intergenerational time and thus operationalise ‘sustainable welfare’

Welfare states and environmental states: a comparative analysis

A framework is presented for thinking about state intervention in developed capitalist economies in two domains: social policy and environmental policy (and, within that, climate-change policy). Five drivers of welfare state development are identified, the ‘five Is’ of Industrialisation: Interests, Institutions, Ideas/Ideologies, and International Influences. Research applying this framework to the postwar development of welfare states in the OECD is summarised, distinguishing two periods: up to 1980, and from 1980 to 2008. How far this framework can contribute to understanding the rise and differential patterns of environmental governance and intervention across advanced capitalist states since 1970 is explored, before briefly comparing and contrasting the determinants of welfare states and environmental states, identifying common drivers in both domains and regime-specific drivers in each. The same framework is then applied to developments since 2008 and into the near future, sketching two potential configurations and speculating on the conditions for closer, more integrated ‘eco-welfare states’

Macroeconomics, climate change and 'recomposition' of consumption

Macroeconomic policy should be evaluated, he says, and devised according to sustainability criteria alongside economic and social criteria. Economic goals whether growth of GDP productivity or competitiveness, should not trump equity/justice or sustainability. But nor should environmental goals trump social goals. The urgent challenge addressed in this PRIME e-publication is to develop a macroeconomic framework that supports ‘eco-social’ policies to pursue both goals simultaneously. Just and sustainable macroeconomic planning should take into account two policy dimensions: the emissions intensity of different items of consumption, and the necessitousness of these items. Ways of measuring both of these are proposed. When personal consumption in the UK is analysed in this way, an awkward policy dilemma immediately appears: almost all necessities are high carbon, while most ‘luxuries’ emit lower than average GHGs. Transport is also high carbon and comprises both necessary spending given current infrastructure and luxury spending. Thus a radical macroeconomic framework needs to endorse and devise new ‘eco-social’ policies to serve both justice and sustainability goals, alongside income redistribution and public social consumption. Three approaches are suggested: taxing high-carbon luxury consumption, variable pricing of high-carbon necessities, and rationing carbon

Can growth be green?

This short article, based on a presentation at the London School of Economics, criticizes the common opinion that “green growth” offers a relatively painless – some even say pain-free – transition path for capitalist economies. After a brief summary of the daunting arithmetic entailed in combining fast decarbonization with continuing growth, the article advances 3 propositions. First, market-based carbon mitigation programs, such as carbon trading, cannot be sufficient and must be coupled with other policy pillars that foster transformative investment and widespread regulation. Second, a political economy of climate policy needs to draw on the lessons of comparative social policy research, which emphasizes the role of international pressures, interests, institutions, and ideas. Taking these into account gives a more realistic perspective on climate policy making in today’s neoliberal world. Third, more radical policies on both consumption and production are called for, to ensure that carbon mitigation is not pursued at the expense of equity and social welfare. These include policies to restrain high-carbon luxury consumption and a transition toward shorter paid working time. The conclusion is that a realistic program of green growth will be immensely difficult and entail radical political change