What Has Happened to Wages in Mexico since NAFTA?

In this paper, I examine the impacts of trade and investment liberalization on the wage structure of Mexico. Part one of the paper surveys recent literature on the labor-market consequences of Mexico's economic reforms in the 1980?s. Mexico's policy reforms appear to have raised the demand for skill in the country, reduced rents in industries that prior to reform paid their workers high wages, and raised the premium paid to workers in states along the U.S. border. These changes have resulted in an increase in wage dispersion in the country. Part two of the paper examines changes in Mexico's wage structure during the 1990's. In the last decade, Mexico has experienced rising returns to skill, which mirror closely wage movements in the United States. There is, however, little evidence of wage convergence between the two countries. Regional wage differentials in Mexico have widened and appear to be explained largely by variation in regional access to foreign trade and investment and in regional opportunities for migration to the United States. I discuss implications of Mexico's experience for the rest of Latin America in the event a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas is enacted.

Localization Economies, Vertical Organization and Trade

This paper develops a model of regional production networks based on localization economies. I consider an industry with two activities: one with location-specific external economies, the other with constant returns. Under autarky, localization economies imply the formation of an industry center. Agglomeration drives up wages in the center, causing the constant returns activity to disperse to outlying regions. Trade recreates the regional production network on a global scale. I apply the model to data from the Mexican apparel industry. Estimation results on Mexico's pre- and post-trade regional apparel wage structure are consistent with localization economies. Implications for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are discussed.

Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico

In this paper, I examine changes in the distribution of labor income across regions of Mexico during the country's decade of globalization in the 1990's. I focus the analysis on men born in states with either high-exposure or low-exposure to globalization, as measured by the share of foreign direct investment, imports, or export assembly in state GDP. Controlling for regional differences in the distribution of observable characteristics and for initial differences in regional incomes, the distribution of labor income in high-exposure states shifted to the right relative to the distribution of income in low-exposure states. This change was primarily the result of a shift in mass in the income distribution for low-exposure states from upper-middle income earners to lower income earners. Labor income in low-exposure states fell relative to high-exposure states by 10% and the incidence of wage poverty (the fraction of wage earners whose labor income would not sustain a family of four at above-poverty consumption levels) in low-exposure states increased relative to high-exposure states by 7%.

Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States

In this paper, I selectively review recent literature on illegal migration from Mexico to the United States. I begin by discussing methods for estimating stocks and flows of illegal migrants. While there is uncertainty about the size of the unauthorized population, new data sources make it possible to examine the composition of legal and illegal populations and the time-series covariates of illegal labor flows. I then consider the supply of and demand for illegal migrants. Wage differentials between the United States and Mexico are hardly a new phenomenon, yet illegal migration from Mexico did not reach high levels until recently. An increase in the relative size of Mexico%u2019s working-age population, greater volatility in U.S.-Mexico relative wages, and changes in U.S. immigration policies are all candidate explanations for increasing labor flows from Mexico. Finally, I consider policies that regulate the cross-border flow of illegal migrants. While U.S. laws mandate that authorities prevent illegal entry and punish firms that hire unauthorized immigrants, these laws are imperfectly enforced. Lax enforcement may reflect political pressure by employers and other interests that favor open borders.

The Governance of Migration Policy

In this paper, I examine high-income country motives for restricting immigration. Abundant evidence suggests that allowing labor to move from low-income to high-income countries would yield substantial gains in global income. Yet, most high-income countries impose strict limits on labor inflows and set their admission policies unilaterally. A core principle underlying the World Trade Organization is reciprocity in tariff setting. When it comes to migration from poor to rich countries, however, labor flows are rarely bidirectional, making reciprocity moot and leaving labor importers with all the bargaining power. One motivation for barriers to labor inflows is political pressure from groups that are hurt by immigration. Raising immigration would depend on creating mechanisms to transfer income from those that immigration helps to those that it hurts. Another motivation for immigration restrictions is that labor inflows from abroad may exacerbate distortions in an economy associated with redistributive tax and transfer policies. Making immigration more attractive would require creating mechanisms that limit the negative fiscal impacts of labor inflows on natives. Fiscal distortions create an incentive for receiving countries to screen immigrants according to their perceived economic impact. For high skilled immigrants, screening can be based on educational degrees and professional credentials, which are relatively easy to observe. For low skilled immigrants, illegal immigration represents an imperfect but increasingly common screening device. For policy makers in labor-importing nations, the modest benefits freer immigration brings may simply not be worth the political hassle. To induce high-income countries to lower border barriers, they need to get more out of the bargain.international migration, labor mobility, political economy, illegal migration

SHOULD COUNTRIES PROMOTE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT?

This paper examines whether policies to promote foreign direct investment (FDI) make economic sense. The discussion focuses on whether existing academic research suggests that the benefits of FDI are sufficient to justify the kind of policy interventions seen in practice. For small open economies, efficient taxation of foreign and domestic capital depends on their relative mobility. If foreign and domestic capital are equally mobile internationally, it will be optimal for countries to subject both types of capital to equal tax treatment. If foreign capital is more mobile internationally, it will be optimal to have lower taxes on capital owned by foreign residents than on capital owned by domestic residents. Absent market failure, there is no justification for favouring FDI over foreign portfolio investment. In practice, countries appear to tax income from foreign capital at rates lower than those for domestic capital and to subject different forms of foreign investment to very different tax treatment. FDI appears to be sensitive to host-country characteristics. Higher taxes deter foreign investment, while a more educated work force and larger goods markets attract FDI. There is also some evidence that multinationals tend to agglomerate in a manner consistent with location-specific externalities. There is weak evidence that FDI generates positive spillovers for host economies. While multinationals are attracted to high-productivity countries, and to high-productivity industries within these countries, there is little evidence at the firm or plant level that FDI raises the productivity of domestic enterprises. Indeed, it appears that plants in industries with a larger multinational presence tend to enjoy lower rates of productivity growth over time. Empirical research thus provides little support for the idea that promoting FDI is warranted on welfare grounds. Subsidies to FDI are more likely to be warranted where multinationals are intensive in the use of elastically supplied factors, where the arrival of multinationals to a market does not lower the market share of domestic firms, and where FDI generates strong positive productivity spillovers for domestic agents. Empirical research suggests that the first and third conditions are unlikely to hold. In the three cases we examine, it appears that the second condition holds, but not the first or third conditions. This suggests that Brazil’s subsidies to foreign automobile manufacturers may have lowered national welfare. Costa Rica appears to have been prudent in not offering subsidies in the case of Intel. There clearly is a need for much more research on the host-economy consequences of FDI. The impression from existing academic literature is that countries should be sceptical about claims that promoting FDI will raise national welfare. A sensible approach for policy makes in host countries is to presume that subsidizing FDI is unwarranted, unless clear evidence is presented to support the argument that the social returns to FDI exceed the private returns.

Political Economy, Sectoral Shocks, and Border Enforcement

In this paper, we examine the correlation between sectoral shocks and border enforcement in the United States. Enforcement of national borders is the main policy instrument the U.S. government uses to combat illegal immigration. The motivation for the exercise is to see whether border enforcement falls following positive shocks to sectors that are intensive in the use of undocumented labor, as would be consistent with political economy models of how enforcement policy against illegal immigration is determined. The main finding is that border enforcement is negatively correlated with lagged relative price changes in the apparel, fruits and vegetables, and slaughtered livestock industries and with housing starts in the western United States. This suggests that authorities relax border enforcement when the demand for undocumented workers is high.