Solving congestion (when we must not build roads, increase spending, lose votes, damage the economy or harm the environment, and will never find equilibrium)

An account of the development of transport and traffic policy over the last 30 years, with suggestions for the future constraints and objective

Social support and the wealthy porcupine: Pain, social support, money, and culture

Social support and social integration have been major topics of research for social scientists for many decades (e.g., Durkheim, 1897/1997). Social support is generally portrayed as a “good thing,” with numerous researchers providing evidence of both the buffering and direct impacts of support on mental and physiological well-being (e.g., Kraus, Liang, & Gu, 1998; Litwin, 2001) and the ability of support to be a buffer against physical and psychological pain (e.g., Lpez-Martnez, Esteve-Zarazaga & Ramrez-Maestre, 2008). In their target article, Zhou and Gao (this issue) also suggest that social support is an important buffer against pain but argue for a further buffer against both physical and social pain—money—that may be important if social support fails. They cite a number of ingenious experiments for the link between social support, money, and pain, claiming that money and support “complement each other in managing pain” (p. 127), continuing in a tradition of research examining the compensatory dynamics of money and interpersonal support (e.g., Foa & Foa, 1974). In doing so, they raise a number of important questions about pain management, social exclusion, social support, and material resources. In my commentary I focus in particular on their concerns with social support and materialism, aiming to address three aspects of their model: the relationship between social support and money; the connections between money, materialism, and well-being; and the role of culture in moderating the relationship between social support and money. To do this I draw on some of my own work in changing cultures and conduct brief analyses of data from the latest large-scale European Social Survey (ESS). I conclude by suggesting some ideas for further research that might help further elaborate the intriguing model proposed by Zhou and Gao

Valuing the small: countingthe benefits

This paper contains part of a reportcommissioned by a consortium oforganisations concerned with thesuccessful development of sustainabletransport strategies, and drafted byProfessor Phil Goodwin of UCL. It followsa report, Less Traffic Where People Live,which, using case studies of experiencehere and elsewhere in Europe hasdemonstrated that small-scale, or ?softfactors? can be effective in tacklingtransport problems, especially when usedin combination. Such examples includebus priority schemes, measures forimproving walking and cycling, trafficcalming, car clubs, school and workplacetravel plans, and the use of personalisedadvice and information to assist people inreducing the congestion and pollution theycause. The DfT?s report Smarter Choices ?Changing the Way we Travel, has alsohighlighted the significant potential whichexists to reduce traffic and congestion,providing soft factors are accompanied bysupporting measures to manage demand.The DfT has established a unit dedicatedto developing experience on soft factors,including on appraisal. Coupled with therecent report, there is a gainingmomentum behind expanding the role ofsoft factors in transport policy. These areall initiatives which are supported bynational and local government, and onwhich the sponsoring organisations havein recent years become active advisers aswell as campaigners.Taken together, such relatively cheap andpotentially popular initiatives are not onlypowerful contributions to theGovernment?s transport strategy: they arealso the leading examples of initiativeswhich can produce improvements swiftly? an important consideration both forpolitical reasons, and also in order toproduce the momentum and consensusfor longer term initiatives.This attractive combination of relativecheapness, environmental advantage,demonstrated successes in good practice,and speed of delivery would ? one mightthink ? lead to such policies being very highprofile indeed. However, this is not alwaysthe case. The problem this report addressesis reflected in recurrent concerns that themerits of such initiatives are overshadowedby the bigger, longer-term, much moreambitious ? and often much morecontroversial ??big? policies: especiallymassive rail or road infrastructure projects.In some ways it is natural that the ?big?initiatives should receive more attentionthan the ?small?, especially in view of along period of inadequate or distortedinvestment. But taken too far, this can becounter-productive. The question thisreport addresses is whether there is somesystematic reason, deep in the appraisaland forecasting methods, which preventsperfectly good initiatives receiving theattention and funding they deserve. Thesuggestion is that there are indeed someimportant biases of this kind, and thatsorting them out will have very helpfuleffects in avoiding wasted opportunitiesand accelerating delivery.This report addresses the followingquestions and is intended to be a helpfulcontribution to this area of work:> what are the barriers that prevent thesmall, good value-for-money schemesbeing taken up with greaterenthusiasm than the big, poor valuefor-money projects?> are there ways of restoring a balancedimplementation process?It is obvious that such barriers will includepolitical and ideological considerations,and the role of vested interests, but theyare not the focus of this report. Rather,the concern is that there may beweaknesses in the process of appraisaland assessment, preceding anyimplementation, which produce a biasagainst the small schemes. This processis intended to resolve practical questionsof design, economic questions of value formoney, planning questions of consistency,and the relationship between short andlong term objectives: it depends on a setof formal procedures and practices ?surveys, models, forecasts, appraisalframeworks ? built up over many years,and originating in the economic costbenefitanalyses whose principles andbasic features were established in the1960s and 1970s.The suggestion is made that there aresome in-built biases in current appraisaltechniques ? developed, as they were, ina different time and for a different agenda? which discriminate against some of thebest measures, and for some of the leasteffective

The economic costs of road traffic congestion

The main cause of road traffic congestion is that the volume of traffic is tooclose to the maximum capacity of a road or network. Congestion in the UK isworse than many, perhaps most, other European countries. More important, itis getting worse, year by year. Current official forecasts imply that congestionwill be substantially worse by the end of this decade, even on the veryfavourable assumption that all current Government projects and policies areimplemented in full, successfully, and to time. This is because road traffic isgrowing faster than road capacity. This is not a temporary problem: it willcontinue to be the case, in the absence of measures to reduce traffic, because itis infeasible to match a road programme to unrestricted trends in traffic growth.The effect, using the current Government method of measuring congestion,and a long established method of valuing it, would be that the widely quotedfigure of an annual cost of £20 billion, would increase to £30 billion by 2010.Under current social and economic frameworks, there are no feasible policiesthat could reduce congestion to zero in practice, or that would be worthwhiledoing in theory. But savings worth £4b-£6b a year could in principle be madeby congestion charging alone, over the whole network, of which (veryapproximately) half might be reflected in the prices of goods, and half insavings in individuals? own time spent travelling. A good proportion of thiscould alternatively be secured by an appropriate package of alternativemeasures: priority lanes and signalling; switching to other modes includingfreight to rail and passenger movements to public transport, walking andcycling; ?soft? policies to encourage reduced travel by car; land-use patternswhich reduce unnecessary travel; and associated measures to prevent benefitsfrom being eroded by induced travel. The combined effects of road chargingand a supportive set of complementary measures represent the best that couldbe reasonably achieved in the short to medium run. This could reducecongestion costs (as distinct from slowing down their increase) by 40%-50%.These broad-brush figures, though based on long-established methods, must betreated with great caution. The ?cost of congestion?, as used for thesecalculations, is based on relationships which in reality are not exact, stable oreven meaningful. The wrong indicator has been used, comparing average realspeeds with average ideal speeds. But in the real world, speeds are differentevery day, and so is the level of congestion. For just-in-time operation, and formuch personal and business travel, variability and reliability are much moreimportant. The really costly effect of congestion is not the slightly increasedaverage time, but the greater than average effect in particular locations andmarkets, and the greatly increased unreliability.During the near future, until road pricing is implemented, increases in roadcongestion can lead to some shift in the balance of attractiveness of rail freight,sufficient for a proportion of the freight market to transfer from road. Thiswould in turn make a small but significant contribution to reducing congestion,especially in some specific important corridors. Even though rail freight isusually a small proportion of all freight, the annual economic saving incongestion cost, to road users generally, from transferring a 5-times a week,200 mile round trip, mostly on congested motorways, from road to rail wouldbe in the order of £40,000 to £80,000, to which should be added thecommercial cost savings made by the freight operator who chooses to do so. Itshould be emphasised that sustaining this would require measures to preventinduced car traffic filling up the relieved road space.An example of the impact of factoring in unreliability is given by approximatecalculations made for journeys such as Glasgow to Newcastle, Cardiff toDover, or London to Manchester. In free-flow theory these could be 3-hourjourneys, but moderate congestion requires adding an hour to the average timeand another hour safety margin to ensure that a tight delivery slot is not missedtoo often. In congestion so severe as to double the average time, the extrasafety margin for unreliability could be as much as 4 hours, which is simply notfeasible in many cases.The ?total cost of congestion? is a large number, but it is practicallymeaningless and by ?devaluing the currency? it distracts attention from moreimportant, achievable, objectives. It would be better not to use it as a target forpolicy. The two key important things to do are:· Strategic action to reduce traffic volume to a level where conditions do notvary too much from day to day. In some circumstances this will slightlyincrease average speed, though not always: in some road conditions areduction of average speed can greatly improve the smoothness of trafficflow. But in both cases, it will greatly increase reliability, this being moreimportant than the change in average speed;· Practical measures to provide good alternatives for freight and passengermovements which reduce the intensity of use of scarce road space incongested conditions. Even where this only applies to a minority ofmovements, significant effects are possible.The Government plans to ?re-launch? the Ten Year Plan for Transport thisSummer or Autumn. It is not reasonable to expect that the re-launch willinclude congestion charging for cars within the decade, so it will need to planfor it as soon as possible after, and a short-term coping strategy of prioritymeasures to protect the most important classes of movement (both passengerand freight) from congestion in the period before charging is implemented

The Burwood Way of Life

Postcard from Laura Goodwin, during the Linfield College Semester Abroad Program at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australi

Buffalo Arts and Culture

A 2003 study found that the combined spending of 700,000 tourists at 17 sample arts and cultural attractions and the organization\u27s own spending during the 2003 summer, had a $75 million impact on the Buffalo Niagara region. What is the Arts Council in Buffalo & Erie County? The Arts Council is a local organization, dedicated to advocating for and promoting the region\u27s arts and cultural industry. What role does New York State government play in supporting Buffalo\u27s arts and cultural organizations? The New York State Council on the Arts makes over 2500 grants each year to a variety of arts organizations throughout the state. What effect does Buffalo\u27s decreasing population have on arts and cultural organizations? A 2007 study found that 3.3 million people visited 61 arts and cultural organizations in the Greater Buffalo Region in 2005.40 87% of these visitors however, lived locally