Production Control and Production Contracts: Why Do Integrators Control Inputs?

Industrial Organization,

Liability Rules, Collective Organizations and the Provision of Food Safety

Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

PESTICIDE REGULATION IN CALIFORNIA

A necessary condition for socially desirable regulation is that total social benefits outweigh total social costs. We report available information regarding the costs of pesticide regulation in California, and evaluate the likelihood that the generated benefits outweigh these costs. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for future policy research and reforms.Crop Production/Industries,

Modeling Processor Market Power and the Incidence of Agricultural Policy: A Non-parametric Approach

Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy,

DETERMINANTS OF ADOPTION OF ALTERNATIVES TO ORGANOPHOSPHATE USE IN CALIFORNIA ALMONDS

In order to explain trends in pesticide use, modeling efforts were undertaken related to dormant season organophosphate use in California almonds. Over time, growers are less likely to choose to use environmentally unfriendly pesticides, especially when effective alternatives are available.Farm Management,

Selective vs. Broad-Spectrum Pesticides: When Do Private Decisions Differ from Socially Optimal Decisions?

This paper examines the spatial externalities of conventional and organic pest control methods to determine if, and how, the two types affect each other. These interactions make the problem more complicated than the usual analysis of a single externality. The numerical simulation model includes one organically managed and one conventionally managed field. One pest and one predator of the pest move between the two fields over five seasons. In each season, the conventional grower has the option of applying a broad-spectrum pesticide that kills the predator a selective pesticide that has no adverse effects on the predator but is either more expensive or less effective than the broad-spectrum pesticide. The organic grower can apply an organic pesticide, augment the predator population, or both. The simulation model identifies the socially optimal pest control decisions and the Nash equilibrium decisions of both growers over the five growing seasons. The relative price and efficacy of the selective pesticide, the type of predator, and the type of pest introduction all influence whether or not either or both growers make inefficient decisions. Under certain conditions, regional pest management, equivalent to coordination of pest control across growers, could increase total regional profits.spatial-dynamic games, spatial externalities, non-cooperative games, organic agriculture, biological control, agricultural policy, Agricultural and Food Policy, Crop Production/Industries, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, C61, C72, Q18, Q52, Q57,

IS COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT BENEFICIAL FOR PUBLIC POLICY EFFICIENCY?

Replaced with revised version of paper 08/02.Political Economy,

Dynamic Diffusion with Disadoption: The Case of Crop Biotechnology in the USA

Controversy over the use of genetically engineered (GE) crops may have induced some farmers to disadopt these seeds, making a traditional diffusion model inappropriate. In this study, we develop and estimate a dynamic diffusion model, examine the diffusion paths of GE corn, soybeans, and cotton, predict the adoption of those crops over the next two years, and explore the main determinants of the diffusion rate. Our estimates indicate that future growth of Bt crops will be slower or negative, depending mainly on the infestation levels of the target pests. Adoption of herbicide-tolerant soybeans and cotton will continue to increase, unless consumer sentiment in the United States changes radically.Crop Production/Industries,

Wine Taxes, Production, Aging and Quality

We consider the impact of taxes on the quantity and quality produced of goods, such as wine, for which market value accrues with age by a competitive producer. Any pair of taxes that includes a volumetric sales tax and any one of three other types of tax – an ad valorem sales tax, an ad valorem storage tax, or a volumetric storage tax – spans the full range of feasible tax revenues with positive tax rates. For any tax system that reduces quality relative to the firm’s no-tax equilibrium, there is another tax system that increases tax revenues, eliminates the quality distortion, and does not increase the quantity distortion. Many wine industry observers believe that most, if not all, existing tax systems tend to result in the suboptimal provision of quality. Our results suggest that the wide variety of wine tax systems is not prima facie evidence that these systems, or most of them, are inefficient. Provided the system includes a volumetric sales tax it may be efficient, regardless of which of the other instruments, or how many of them, are used. Assertions regarding inefficiency must be evaluated on an empirical case-by-case basis. Our analysis provides a theoretical framework for such research.aging, Alchian-Allen effect, tax policy, wine

Farmers Adoption of Genetically Modified Varieties with Input Traits

Crop Production/Industries, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,