Modeling Monetary Policy

We develop a macroeconomic framework where money issupplied against only few eligible securities in open marketoperations. The relationship between the policy rate,expected inflation and consumption growth is affected bymoney market conditions, i.e. the varying liquidity value ofeligible assets and the associated risk. This induces a liquiditypremium, which explains the observed systematic wedgebetween the policy rate and consumption Euler interest ratethat standard models equate. It further implies a dampenedresponse of consumption to policy rate shocks that is humpshapedwhen we account for realistic central bank transfersand the dynamics of bond holdings

Reserves, Liquidity and Money: An Assessment of Balance Sheet Policies

The financial crisis and its aftermath has stimulated a vigorous debate on the use of macro-prudential instruments for both regulating the banking system and for providing additional tools for monetary policy makers. The widespread adoption of non-conventional monetary policies has provided some evidence on the efficacy of liquidity and asset purchases for offsetting the lower zero bound. Central banks have thus been reminded as to the effectiveness of extended open market operations as a supplementary tool of monetary policy. These tools are essentially fiscal instruments, as they issue central bank liabilities backed by fiscal transfers. And so having written these tools into the fiscal budget constraint, we can examine the consequences of these operations within the context of a micro-founded macroeconomic model of banking and money. We can mimic the responses of the Federal Reserve balance sheet to the crisis. Specifically, we examine the role of reserves for bond and capital swaps in stabilising the economy and also the impact of changing the composition of the central bank balance sheet. We find that such policies can significantly enhance the ability of the central bank to stabilise the economy. This is because balance sheet operations supply (remove) liquidity to a financial market that is otherwise short (long) of liquidity and hence allows other .nancial spreads to move less violently over the cycle to compensate

Discretion and the Transmission Lags of Monetary Policy

Monetary policy transmission lags create credibility problems for the inflationtargeting policy maker who acts under discretion. We show that if prices react to monetary policy with a longer lag than output, the welfare maximizing inflationtargeting policy implies no policy stabilization of cost-push shocks in the canonical New Keynesian model. The reason is simple: for the period monetary policy influences output, inflation is predetermined and the best discretionary policy is to stabilize the output gap fully. We find that money growth targeting comes close to replicating the welfare-maximizing policy under commitment if there are transmission lags

Price stability in open economies

This paper studies the theoretical conditions under which price stability is the optimal policy in a two-country open-economy model with imperfect competition and price stickiness. Special conditions on the levels of country-specific distortionary taxation and the intratemporal and intertemporal elasticities of substitution need to be satisfied. These restrictions apply to both cooperative and non-cooperative settings. Importantly, we show that cooperative and non-cooperative solutions do not coincide despite market completeness and producer currency pricing. We study the conditions under which quadratic approximations of single countries' welfare can be correctly evaluated by relying only on log-linear approximations of the equilibrium condition