BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT TO DETERMINE ATTORNEYS\u27 FEES FOR SERVICES RENDERED IN CHAPTER X REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS

A committee for preferred stockholders entered into an agreement with petitioners, wherein it was provided that certain shares of stock of the debtor corporation, placed in escrow with the committee by four preferred shareholders, would be delivered to petitioners as added compensation for their services in the reorganization proceeding. Pursuant to this agreement petitioners performed valuable services connected with the reorganization. The bankruptcy court allowed petitioners $37,500 from the debtor\u27s estate, but held it had no jurisdiction to pass on the amount of the allowance which should be paid under the escrow agreement. Petitioners then sued in a state court for specific performance of the escrow agreement. On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States from a holding that the state court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter, held, affirmed (three justices dissenting). The bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over petitioners\u27 claim by virtue of section 221(4), chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. Leiman v. Guttman, (U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct. 371

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-LIMITATIONS ON USE OF SOUND AMPLIFICATION DEVICES

Appellant used sound equipment mounted on his truck to comment on a labor dispute. He was convicted in a police court of violating a city ordinance which prohibited the use on any public street of sound amplifying devices emitting loud and raucous noises. The intermediate court of appeal of New Jersey, in affirming the conviction, construed the ordinance to be an absolute prohibition. The conviction was sustained on appeal to the highest court of New Jersey by an evenly divided court of twelve justices. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. Justice Reed, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Burton, found that the ordinance was not a denial of due process of law in that it was sufficiently definite and did not constitute an abridgment of free speech. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred specially. Four justices dissented. Kovacs v. Cooper, (U.S. 1949) 69 S. Ct. 448

BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT TO DETERMINE STOCKHOLDERS\u27 VOTE NECESSARY TO APPROVE PROPOSED SALE OF CORPORATION\u27S ASSETS TO DEBTOR IN REORGANIZATION

Lessee railroad, which had leased and operated property of lessor railroad for many years, entered reorganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Under the plan of reorganization promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission and approved by the bankruptcy court, lessor was given the alternative of selling its property to the reorganized railroad or having the lease disaffirmed by the debtor and its property returned. This proposal was submitted for acceptance by a majority vote of lessor\u27s stockholders. Respondents, stockholders of lessor, sought an injunction in a state court of Georgia to restrain lessor\u27s officers from certifying the acceptance in the event that a majority approved the sale, on the theory that state law prevented the sale of all corporate assets without unanimous approval by the stockholders. Before the state court acted, a majority of lessor\u27s stockholders voted to approve the sale. The bankruptcy court then confirmed the plan, found the acceptance valid under state law and enjoined respondents from further prosecution of the action in the state court. Despite this, the state court enjoined lessor\u27s officers from selling its property. The bankruptcy court then permanently enjoined prosecution of the state action and declared the state court injunction void. This decree was reversed by the circuit court of appeals. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed (two justices dissenting). The bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the suit in the state court, since the controversy did not involve property of the debtor within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court under section 77. Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 69 S. Ct. 435 (1949)

Guidelines for the use and interpretation of assays for monitoring autophagy (4th edition)1.

In 2008, we published the first set of guidelines for standardizing research in autophagy. Since then, this topic has received increasing attention, and many scientists have entered the field. Our knowledge base and relevant new technologies have also been expanding. Thus, it is important to formulate on a regular basis updated guidelines for monitoring autophagy in different organisms. Despite numerous reviews, there continues to be confusion regarding acceptable methods to evaluate autophagy, especially in multicellular eukaryotes. Here, we present a set of guidelines for investigators to select and interpret methods to examine autophagy and related processes, and for reviewers to provide realistic and reasonable critiques of reports that are focused on these processes. These guidelines are not meant to be a dogmatic set of rules, because the appropriateness of any assay largely depends on the question being asked and the system being used. Moreover, no individual assay is perfect for every situation, calling for the use of multiple techniques to properly monitor autophagy in each experimental setting. Finally, several core components of the autophagy machinery have been implicated in distinct autophagic processes (canonical and noncanonical autophagy), implying that genetic approaches to block autophagy should rely on targeting two or more autophagy-related genes that ideally participate in distinct steps of the pathway. Along similar lines, because multiple proteins involved in autophagy also regulate other cellular pathways including apoptosis, not all of them can be used as a specific marker for bona fide autophagic responses. Here, we critically discuss current methods of assessing autophagy and the information they can, or cannot, provide. Our ultimate goal is to encourage intellectual and technical innovation in the field

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-LIMITATIONS ON USE OF SOUND AMPLIFICATION DEVICES

Appellant used sound equipment mounted on his truck to comment on a labor dispute. He was convicted in a police court of violating a city ordinance which prohibited the use on any public street of sound amplifying devices emitting loud and raucous noises. The intermediate court of appeal of New Jersey, in affirming the conviction, construed the ordinance to be an absolute prohibition. The conviction was sustained on appeal to the highest court of New Jersey by an evenly divided court of twelve justices. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. Justice Reed, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Burton, found that the ordinance was not a denial of due process of law in that it was sufficiently definite and did not constitute an abridgment of free speech. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred specially. Four justices dissented. Kovacs v. Cooper, (U.S. 1949) 69 S. Ct. 448

BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT TO DETERMINE ATTORNEYS\u27 FEES FOR SERVICES RENDERED IN CHAPTER X REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS

A committee for preferred stockholders entered into an agreement with petitioners, wherein it was provided that certain shares of stock of the debtor corporation, placed in escrow with the committee by four preferred shareholders, would be delivered to petitioners as added compensation for their services in the reorganization proceeding. Pursuant to this agreement petitioners performed valuable services connected with the reorganization. The bankruptcy court allowed petitioners $37,500 from the debtor\u27s estate, but held it had no jurisdiction to pass on the amount of the allowance which should be paid under the escrow agreement. Petitioners then sued in a state court for specific performance of the escrow agreement. On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States from a holding that the state court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter, held, affirmed (three justices dissenting). The bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over petitioners\u27 claim by virtue of section 221(4), chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. Leiman v. Guttman, (U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct. 371

BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT TO DETERMINE STOCKHOLDERS\u27 VOTE NECESSARY TO APPROVE PROPOSED SALE OF CORPORATION\u27S ASSETS TO DEBTOR IN REORGANIZATION

Lessee railroad, which had leased and operated property of lessor railroad for many years, entered reorganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Under the plan of reorganization promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission and approved by the bankruptcy court, lessor was given the alternative of selling its property to the reorganized railroad or having the lease disaffirmed by the debtor and its property returned. This proposal was submitted for acceptance by a majority vote of lessor\u27s stockholders. Respondents, stockholders of lessor, sought an injunction in a state court of Georgia to restrain lessor\u27s officers from certifying the acceptance in the event that a majority approved the sale, on the theory that state law prevented the sale of all corporate assets without unanimous approval by the stockholders. Before the state court acted, a majority of lessor\u27s stockholders voted to approve the sale. The bankruptcy court then confirmed the plan, found the acceptance valid under state law and enjoined respondents from further prosecution of the action in the state court. Despite this, the state court enjoined lessor\u27s officers from selling its property. The bankruptcy court then permanently enjoined prosecution of the state action and declared the state court injunction void. This decree was reversed by the circuit court of appeals. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed (two justices dissenting). The bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the suit in the state court, since the controversy did not involve property of the debtor within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court under section 77. Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 69 S. Ct. 435 (1949)