Repression in the digital age : Communication technology and the politics of state violence

The effect of the digital revolution on citizens’ ability to voice dissatisfaction with their government and to coordinate dissent via social media has been the subject of much recent research. Optimistic accounts have so far failed to address the salient fact that the state maintains de facto control over the access to social media, which means that new digital technology also provides abusive governments with tools to repress challengers. This dissertation investigates how states’ strategies of violent repression are informed by the use of these opportunities to control the internet. I identify two main forms of control, which are the restriction or disruption of the internet on the one hand, and digital surveillance on the other hand. States face a trade-off: they can either restrict access to the internet and with it diminish opposition groups’ capabilities, or they can permit the digital exchange of information and monitor it to their own advantage. I argue that the choice of internet control affects the type and scale of state-sanctioned violence used against perceived domestic threats. The choice of digital surveillance as a form of control is likely to be used in conjunction with targeted acts of localised violence against those identified as critical to the future success of opposition movements. The availability of highly specified intelligence on the intentions and location of opposition leaders enables states to use targeted violence. Where states have chosen to respond to critical domestic threats in the form of censorship, they will also be more likely to visibly demonstrate their authority through a heightened use of violent repression. In addition, censorship severely limits the choices for violent action on the side of the government, by restricting the state’s own access to the required intelligence for selecting precise targets. Consequently, during periods of censorship, state-sanctioned violence is likely to affect the domestic population indiscriminately. I present a global analysis of the relationship between internet disruptions and the level of state-sanctioned violence, confirming that states who use net- work disruptions are also more likely to abuse the rights of their citizens. Evidence presented in case examples provides contextual understanding for the variety of different digital control tools which states have at their disposal. The full implications of the theoretical argument are tested by moving to the sub-national level, and investigating the relationship between internet control and state violence, spatially and temporally in the Syrian conflict. I present a new integrated database on incidences of state killing in Syria, as well as disaggregated measures of network accessibility. First, I show that internet shutdowns occur in conjunction with significantly higher levels of state violence, most notably in areas where government forces are actively challenged by opposition groups. Second, I use supervised machine-learning to analyze over 60,000 records of state killings by the Syrian regime, and classify them to distinguish between targeted and untargeted acts of repression. I show that higher levels of internet accessibility are consistently linked to an increase in targeted repression, whereas areas with little or no access to the internet witness more indiscriminate campaigns of violence. I conclude the dissertation by discussing the implications of the theoretical argument and the results, which have important ramifications for research and policy attempting to limit state abuse in the twenty-first century

Challenges and opportunities of democracy in the digital society: report from Dagstuhl Seminar 22361

Digital technologies amplify and change societal processes. So far, society and intellectuals have painted two extremes of viewing the effects of the digital transformation on democratic life. While the early 2000s to mid-2010s declared the "liberating" aspects of digital technology, the post-Brexit events and the 2016 US elections have emphasized the "dark side" of the digital revolution. Now, explicit effort is needed to go beyond tech saviorism or doom scenarios. To this end, we organized the Dagstuhl Seminar 22361 "Challenges and Opportunities of Democracy in the Digital Society" to discuss the future of digital democracy. This report presents a summary of the seminar, which took place in Dagstuhl in September 2022. The seminar attracted scientific scholars from various disciplines, including political science, computer science, jurisprudence, and communication science, as well as civic technology practitioners

The Cost of Compliance : The effect of the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW) on the situation of women's political, social and economic human rights

Recent studies have called into question the effectiveness of international human rights treaties. In this study I examine the variations in compliance that governments display concerning the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). I argue that states will only keep their promises if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs involved. In distinguishing between implementation, reputation and domestic audience costs, I contend that states parties are more likely to comply with women s political rights than their social and economic rights, as respect for the latter categories yields fewer benefits to governments. This expectation is confirmed, measuring the effect for 152 countries across a period of 20 years with the help of ordered logistic regression. Also, I find that religious influences have a negative effect on respect for women s rights, while democratic institutions improve women s position in society

From repressing digital content to repressing people

Turkey's strategy of repressing opposing voices in the aftermath of the failed coup of 15 July 2016 has transformed from surveilling perceived enemies and repressing specific digital content to arresting and silencing anyone who has been classified as a threat to Erdoğan's position of power. The ruling party's willingness and ability to rapidly produce lists of individuals and institutions deemed threatening to the country's political stability should not come as a surprise

Repression in the Digital Age : Communication Technology and the Politics of State Violence

The effect of the digital revolution on citizens’ ability to voice dissatisfaction with their government and to coordinate dissent via social media has been the subject of much recent research. Optimistic accounts have so far failed to address the salient fact that the state maintains de facto control over the access to social media, which means that new digital technology also provides abusive governments with tools to repress challengers. This dissertation investigates how states’ strategies of violent repression are informed by the use of these opportunities to control the internet. I identify two main forms of control, which are the restriction or disruption of the internet on the one hand, and digital surveillance on the other hand. States face a trade-off: they can either restrict access to the internet and with it diminish opposition groups’ capabilities, or they can permit the digital exchange of information and monitor it to their own advantage. I argue that the choice of internet control affects the type and scale of state-sanctioned violence used against perceived domestic threats. The choice of digital surveillance as a form of control is likely to be used in conjunction with targeted acts of localised violence against those identified as critical to the future success of opposition movements. The availability of highly specified intelligence on the intentions and location of opposition leaders enables states to use targeted violence. Where states have chosen to respond to critical domestic threats in the form of censorship, they will also be more likely to visibly demonstrate their authority through a heightened use of violent repression. In addition, censorship severely limits the choices for violent action on the side of the government, by restricting the state’s own access to the required intelligence for selecting precise targets. Consequently, during periods of censorship, state-sanctioned violence is likely to affect the domestic population indiscriminately. I present a global analysis of the relationship between internet disruptions and the level of state-sanctioned violence, confirming that states who use net- work disruptions are also more likely to abuse the rights of their citizens. Evidence presented in case examples provides contextual understanding for the variety of different digital control tools which states have at their disposal. The full implications of the theoretical argument are tested by moving to the sub-national level, and investigating the relationship between internet control and state violence, spatially and temporally in the Syrian conflict. I present a new integrated database on incidences of state killing in Syria, as well as disaggregated measures of network accessibility. First, I show that internet shutdowns occur in conjunction with significantly higher levels of state violence, most notably in areas where government forces are actively challenged by opposition groups. Second, I use supervised machine-learning to analyze over 60,000 records of state killings by the Syrian regime, and classify them to distinguish between targeted and untargeted acts of repression. I show that higher levels of internet accessibility are consistently linked to an increase in targeted repression, whereas areas with little or no access to the internet witness more indiscriminate campaigns of violence. I conclude the dissertation by discussing the implications of the theoretical argument and the results, which have important ramifications for research and policy attempting to limit state abuse in the twenty-first century

Internet Outages and State Repression

Presented online via Bluejeans Events and in-person in the CODA Building, 9th floor atrium on February 18, 2022 at 12:30 p.m.Anita R. Gohdes is a Professor of International and Cyber Security at the Hertie School in Berlin, Germany. Her research focuses on political violence, state repression and the measurement of human rights.Runtime: 56:37 minutesState-imposed Internet shutdowns, which represent the most extreme form of online censorship, are globally gaining in popularity. Previous research has highlighted the human rights implications of shutdowns, but has thus far largely focused on studying individual countries, while relying on reported online disruptions. This paper takes a global comparative approach, arguing that all else equal, state actors will be more likely to abuse citizens’ physical integrity rights in countries with Internet outages that in countries where no outages occur. To account for all Internet outages, I construct two new indicators based on network measurement data that globally monitor the Internet for instances of outages in near real-time. I present a multivariate analysis of the relationship between Internet shutdowns and physical integrity violations across 168 countries between 2017 and 2020. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that Internet outages are significantly associated with an increase in repression, when compared to years and countries where uninterrupted Internet access is available. With more and more governments making use of cyber controls, the results have important ramifications for research and policy attempting to limit state abuse in the digital age