Cooperation in the Classroom: Experimenting with Research Joint Ventures

This paper describes a classroom exercise that illustrates the investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages in which student “sellers” first make investment decisions then production decisions. The classroom game can be used to motivate discussions of research joint ventures, the free-rider problem, collusion, and antitrust policy regarding research and development.

Advertising in the US Personal Computer Industry

Traditional models of consumer choice assume consumers are aware of all products for sale.This assumption is questionable, especially when applied to markets characterized by a high degree of change, such as the personal computer (PC) industry. I present an empirical discrete-choice model of limited information on the part of consumers, where advertising influences the set of products from which consumers choose to purchase. Multi-product firms choose prices and advertising in each medium to maximize their profits. I apply the model to the US PC market, in which advertising expenditures are over $2 billion annually. The estimation technique incorporates macro and micro data from three sources. Estimated median industry markups are 19% over production costs. The high industry markups are explained in part by the fact that consumers know only some of the products for sale.Indeed estimates from traditional consumer choice models predict median markups of one fourth this magnitude. I find that product-specific demand curves are biased towards being too elastic under traditional models of consumer choice. The estimates suggest that PC firms use advertising media to target high-income households, that there are returns to scope in group advertising, and that word-of-mouth or experience plays a role in informing consumers. The top firms engage in higher than average advertising and earn higher than average markups.

Limited Information and Advertising in the U.S. Personal Computer Industry

Traditional discrete-choice models assume buyers are aware of all products for sale. In markets where products change rapidly, the full information assumption is untenable. I present a discrete-choice model of limited consumer information, where advertising influences the set of products from which consumers choose to purchase. I apply the model to the U.S. personal computer market where top firms spend over $2 billion annually on advertising. I find estimated markups of 19% over production costs, where top firms advertise more than average and earn higher than average markups. High markups are explained to a large extent by informational asymmetries across consumers, where full information models predict markups of one-fourth the magnitude. I find that estimated product demand curves are biased toward being too elastic under traditional models. I show how to use data on media exposure to improve estimated price elasticities in the absence of micro ad data. Copyright 2008 The Econometric Society.

Will you still want me tomorrow? The dynamics of families' long-term care arrangements

We estimate dynamic models of elder-care arrangements using data from the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old Survey. We model the use of institutional care, formal home health care, care provided by a child, and care provided by a spouse in the selection of each care arrangement, the primary arrangement, and hours in each arrangement. Our results indicate that both observed heterogeneity and true state dependence play roles in the persistence of care arrangements. We find that positive state dependence (i.e., inertia) dominates caregiver burnout, and that formal care decisions depend on the cost and quality of care