Diffusion covariation and co-jumps in bidimensional asset price processes with stochastic volatility and infinite activity Levy jumps

In this paper we consider two processes driven by diffusions and jumps. The jump components are Levy processes and they can both have finite activity and infinite activity. Given discrete observations we estimate the covariation between the two diffusion parts and the co-jumps. The detection of the co-jumps allows to gain insight in the dependence structure of the jump components and has important applications in finance. Our estimators are based on a threshold principle allowing to isolate the jumps. This work follows Gobbi and Mancini (2006) where the asymptotic normality for the estimator of the covariation, with convergence speed given by the squared root of h, was obtained when the jump components have finite activity. Here we show that the speed is the squared root of h only when the activity of the jump components is moderate

A Viable Alternative: the Scandinavian Model of "Social Democracy"

This paper aims at discussing how far the Scandinavian model of "social democracy", which is assumed to be the Swedish model, still represents a viable alternative for the development of other industrial relations systems. The Scandinavian model, characterised by labour market peace and centralised bargaining, is based on two main pillars: "active labour market" and "solidaristic wage" policies. Its "golden age" lasted more than forty years targeting full employment, therefore here it is argued if it is possible to transfer such a model, as a whole or partially, to Italy. In examining such issue this analysis develops a short comparison between the industrial relations systems in the two countries identifying the main convergences and divergences at the institutional level and considering the possible effects on employment and wage growth.

Does the Underground Economy Hold Back Financial Deepening? Evidence from the Italian Credit Market

The paper investigates the relationship between underground activities and financial deepening. The access to external finance requires entrepreneurs to disclose credible information through formal documentation. This requirement may be impossible to oblige to for many informal producers who lack a proper book-keeping of their operations. For the same reason irregular workers may find difficult to borrow for financing both consumption and housing purchase. Using panel data on Italian regional credit markets we find a strong negative impact of the share of irregular employment on outstanding credit to the private sector. According to our estimates a shift of 1 per cent of the employees from regular activities to irregular ones corresponds to a decline of about 2 percentage points in the volume of business lending and of 0.3 percentage points in outstanding credit to households, both expressed as ratios to GDP. Conversely, the feedback effects from financial deepening to the size of the informal sector are weak and statistically not significant. Through a difference-in-difference approach exploiting the regularisation program for immigrant workers launched in 2002 we also identify a negative effect of the irregular labour on banks' entry decisions in the local credit markets, now defined in terms of provinces.irregular employment, bank lending, school drop-out, entry, branching, regularisation programme

Bad Loans and Entry into Local Credit Markets

Is deregulation sufficient to grant free entry in local credit markets? Economic theory suggests at least two ways in which asymmetric information between incumbents and entrants can work as an endogenous barrier to entry. First, entrantsÂ’ pool of applicants contains a larger share of potential customers who are not creditworthy because it includes all those would-be borrowers who were previously rejected by mature banks in the market. Second, since a substantial amount of the information used by banks to screen loan applicants and monitor borrowers is generated through repeated interaction with their customers and the local business community, incumbentsÂ’ creditworthiness tests are likely to be more accurate. Other things being equal, entrants are therefore expected to experience higher loan default rates than incumbents. Using a unique database of 7,275 observations on 729 individual banksÂ’ lending in 95 Italian local markets, we find that both adverse selection and informational disadvantage play a significant role in explaining entrantsÂ’ loan default rates. We argue that these endogenous barriers can help to explain why in many local credit markets by domestic and foreign banks was slow, even after substantial deregulation.Credit Markets, Barriers to Entry, Winner's Curse, Asymmetric Information

Life cycle assessment of photovoltaic implementation: an Italian case study

The energy efficiency is the possibility and ability to carry out a production process consume with the involves of less energy and minor environmental impact. Life Cycle Assessment is one of the major tools involved in the economic, social and environmental evaluation. The aim of this work is the LCA application to an Italian company that provides to install a photovoltaic plant for the energy self-maintenance, in order to break down costs and environmental impacts. The photovoltaic business can be an interesting solution especially for companies which consume more energy during the day. In the case study was highlighted that an average of 400.00 €/month was spent, equal to about 900 kWh / month. The company installed a 10 kWp photovoltaic system and with this implementation the energy consumption diminished of 84% and the costs of 57%

Entry decisions and adverse selection: an empirical analysis of a local credit markets

During the last decades there has been a widespread relaxation of legal entry barriers into the banking industry, with potential benefits for financial integration and competition. Obstacles to banks' geographical and business expansion have been removed and branching has been substantially liberalized. This paper analyzes the determinants of entry decisions into local credit markets using a unique data set before and after deregulation of the Italian banking industry. We estimate an entry model à la Poisson and find evidence that spreads between loan and deposit rates drive entry only for newly chartered banks, but does not affect the decision to open branches of banks operating in other markets. Branching by outside banks is instead positively correlated with business opportunities in the provision of financial services which do not require the acquisition of substantial proprietary information. Both these results are consistent with the hypothesis that in credit markets incumbents have an informational advantage over new entrants.Entry, deregulation, informational barriers, count data, overdispersion