Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats

The paper analyzes the welfare properties of voluntary agreements (VA) with polluters, when they are obtained under the legislative threat of an alternative stricter policy option. In the model, the threat is an abatement quota. Both the threat and its probability of implementation are endogenous. The latter is the outcome of a rent-seeking contest between a green and a polluter lobby group influencing the legislature. We show that a welfare-improving VA systematically emerges in equilibrium and that it is more efficient than the pollution quota. We also discuss various VA design aspects.Environmental policy, voluntary agreements, bargaining, legislatures, rent seeking, rent-seeking contests

Does foreign environmental policy influence domestic innovation? Evidence from the wind industry

This paper examines the relative influence of domestic and foreign renewable energy policies on innovation activity in wind power using patent data from OECD countries from 1994 to 2005. We distinguish between the impact of demand-pull policies (e.g., guaranteed tariffs, investment and production tax credits), as reflected by wind power capacities installed annually, and technology-push policies (government support to R&D). We show that inventors respond to both domestic and foreign new capacities by increasing their innovation effort. However, the effect on innovation of the marginal wind turbine installed at home is 28 times stronger than that of the foreign marginal wind turbine. Unlike demand-pull policies, public R&D expenditures only affect domestic inventors. A simple calculation suggests that the marginal million dollars spent on R&D support generates 0.82 new inventions, whereas the same amount spent on the deployment of wind turbines induces, at best, 0.06 new inventions (0.03 locally and 0.03 abroad)

Does foreign environmental policy influence domestic innovation ? Evidence from the wind industry

This paper examines the relative influence of domestic and foreign renewable energy policies on innovation activity in wind power using patent data from OECD countries from 1994 to 2005. We distinguish between the impact of demand-pull policies (e.g., guaranteed tariffs, investment and production tax credits), as reflected by wind power capacities installed annually, and technology-push policies (government support to R&D). We show that inventors respond to both domestic and foreign new capacities by increasing their innovation effort. However, the effect on innovation of the marginal wind turbine installed at home is 28 times stronger than that of the foreign marginal wind turbine. Unlike demandpull policies, public R&D expenditures only affect domestic inventors. A simple calculation suggests that the marginal million dollars spent on R&D support generates 0.82 new inventions, whereas the same amount spent on the deployment of wind turbines induces, at best, 0.06 new inventions (0.03 locally and 0.03 abroad).innovation;public R&D;renewable energy policies;wind power

Technology transfer by CDM projects: A comparison of Brazil, China, India and Mexico

In a companion paper [Dechezleprêtre, A., Glachant, M., Ménière, Y., 2008. The Clean Development Mechanism and the international diffusion of technologies: An empirical study, Energy Policy 36, 1273–1283], we gave a general description of technology transfers by Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects and we analyzed their drivers. In this paper, we use the same data and similar econometric models to explain inter-country differences. We focus on 4 countries gathering about 75% of the CDM projects: Brazil, China, India and Mexico. Sixty eight percent of Mexican projects include an international transfer of technology. The rates are, respectively, 12%, 40% and 59% for India, Brazil and China. Our results show that transfers to Mexico and Brazil are mainly related to the strong involvement of foreign partners and good technological capabilities. Besides a relative advantage with respect to these factors, the higher rate of international transfers in Mexico seems to be due to a sector-composition effect. The involvement of foreign partners is less frequent in India and China, where investment opportunities generated by fast growing economies seem to play a more important role in facilitating international technology transfers through the CDM. International transfers are also related to strong technology capabilities in China. In contrast, the lower rate of international transfer (12%) in India may be due to a better capability to diffuse domestic technologies.

The Clean Development Mechanism and the International Diffusion of Technologies: An Empirical Study

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is expected to stimulate the North-South transfer of climate-friendly technologies. This paper provides an assessment of the technology transfers that take place through the CDM using a unique data set of 644 registered projects. It provides a detailed description of the transfers (frequency, type, by sector, by host country, etc.). It also includes an econometric analysis of their drivers. We show that transfer likeliness increases with the size of the projects. The transfer probability is 50% higher in projects implemented in a subsidiary of Annex 1 companies while the presence of an official credit buyer has a lower-albeit positive-impact. The analysis also yields interesting results on how technological capabilities of the host country influence technology diffusion in the CDM.Protocole de Kyoto; Mécanisme de Développement Propre; Transfert International de Technologie

Distributional effects of road pricing: Assessment of nine scenarios for Paris

International audienceThe starting point of this paper is to consider that there is no general answer to the question of the equity of urban road pricing. We therefore simulate and compare the distributional effects on commuters of nine toll scenarios for Paris, assuming that utility is nonlinear in income. We show that the distributional pattern across income groups depends crucially on the level of traffic reduction induced by tolling. Stringent tolls are more favourable to low-income motorists. Equity effects also vary with toll design. Compared to a reference scenario which uniformly charges all motorists driving within Paris, an inbound cordon toll is detrimental to low-incomes. Conversely, granting a rebate to low CO2 emission cars slightly improves their situation while an exemption for Paris residents is neutral. Surprisingly, it matters little for social equity whether toll revenues are allocated to all commuters or solely to public transport users

The informational role of nongovernmental organizations to induce self-regulation: Cheering the leaders or booing the laggards?

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a key role in creating incentives for firms to develop a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy by disclosing publicly self-regulatory corporate efforts. Their informational behavior is heterogeneous: Some NGOs mostly disclose information on firms that do not behave responsibly (e.g., Greenpeace). Others are specialized in revealing firms that are socially or environmentally responsible (e.g., the Marine Stewardship Council). We develop a model describing the interactions between a NGO, a continuum of firms and a representative stakeholder to explain what drives the NGO communication choice and its impact on the level of self-regulation. We show that the NGO specializes in equilibrium: depending on the size of its budget, it either chooses to cheer the leaders or to boo the laggards. We extend the model to the case with multiple NGOs. We also introduce the possibility of NGO corporate partnerships and derive policy implications

The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation

The authors are grateful to the publisher, Elsevier, for letting the manuscript being archived in this Open Access repository.International audienceThe paper analyzes the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) for waste management. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly where endogenous market quality affects waste disposal costs. Each producer has to meet a take-back requirement that forces it to collect and treat the waste associated with its products. In line with reality, we assume that the producers either organize themselves individually or cooperate by setting up a producer responsibility organization (PRO). We study the various implementations of EPR. Central to the analysis is the trade-off between collusion through the PRO and market power in the waste industry