Experts and Decision Making: First Steps Towards a Unifying Theory of Decision Making in Novices, Intermediates and Experts

Expertise research shows quite ambiguous results on the abilities of experts in judgment and decision making (JDM) classic models cannot account for. This problem becomes even more accentuated if different levels of expertise are considered. We argue that parallel constraint satisfaction models (PCS) might be a useful base to understand the processes underlying expert JDM and the hitherto existing, differentiated results from expertise research. It is outlined how expertise might influence model parameters and mental representations according to PCS. It is discussed how this differential impact of expertise on model parameters relates to empirical results showing quite different courses in the development of expertise; allowing, for example, to predict under which conditions intermediates might outperform experts. Methodological requirements for testing the proposed unifying theory under complex real-world conditions are discussed.Judgment and Decision Making, Expertise, Intermediate Effects, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction, Mental Representation

Base-rate Respect by Intuition: Approximating Rational Choices in Base-rate Tasks with Multiple Cues

Although intuitive-automatic processes sometimes lead to systematic biases in judgment and choice, in many situations especially this kind of processes enables people to approximate rational choices. In complex base-rate tasks with repeated outcome feedback we observed choices which were in line with the Bayes’ solution in 86% of the cases and which were made within a relatively short time (i.e., 2.2 seconds). The results indicate reliance on extremely well-calibrated intuition. This view is supported by the findings that choice proportions are almost perfectly predicted by posterior probabilities (r = .93), and that error rates, response times and confidence ratings are highly correlated with inconsistency in the provided information. Our results support the hypothesis that parallel constraint satisfaction models may account for the processes underlying intuition and make the application of simple heuristics and deliberate strategies very unlikely. Taking an interdisciplinary perspective, implications for economic and psychological modeling are outlined.Decision Making, Intuition, Base-rate Neglect, Heuristics, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction

Do People Make Decisions Under Risk Based on Ignorance? An Empirical Test of the Priority Heuristic against Cumulative Prospect Theory

Brandstätter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig (2006) put forward the priority heuristic (PH) as a fast and frugal heuristic for decisions under risk. According to the PH, individuals do not make trade-offs between gains and probabilities, as proposed by expected utility models such as cumulative prospect theory (CPT), but use information in a non-compensatory manner and ignore information. We conducted three studies to test the PH empirically by analyzing individual choice patterns, decision times and information search parameters in diagnostic decision tasks. Results on all three dependent variables conflict with the predictions of the PH and can be better explained by the CPT. The predictive accuracy of the PH was high for decision tasks in which the predic-tions align with the predictions of the CPT but very low for decision tasks in which this was not the case. The findings indicate that earlier results supporting the PH might have been caused by the selection of decision tasks that were not diagnostic for the PH as compared to CPT.Decision Strategy, Fast and Frugal Heuristics, Bounded Rationality, Decision Latency, Process Tracing, Cumulative Prospect Theory

Modeling Option and Strategy Choices with Connectionist Networks: Towards an Integrative Model of Automatic and Deliberate Decision Making

We claim that understanding human decisions requires that both automatic and deliberate processes be considered. First, we sketch the qualitative differences between two hypothetical processing systems, an automatic and a deliberate system. Second, we show the potential that connectionism offers for modeling processes of decision making and discuss some empirical evidence. Specifically, we posit that the integration of information and the application of a selection rule are governed by the automatic system. The deliberate system is assumed to be responsible for information search, inferences and the modification of the network that the automatic processes act on. Third, we critically evaluate the multiple-strategy approach to decision making. We introduce the basic assumption of an integrative approach stating that individuals apply an all-purpose rule for decisions but use different strategies for information search. Fourth, we develop a connectionist framework that explains the interaction between automatic and deliberate processes and is able to account for choices both at the option and at the strategy level.System 1, Intuition, Reasoning, Control, Routines, Connectionist Model, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction

Role Induced Bias in Court: An Experimental Analysis

Criminal procedure is organized as a tournament with predefined roles. We show that assuming the role of a defense counsel or prosecutor leads to role induced bias even if participants are asked to predict a court ruling after they have ceased to act in that role, and if they expect a substantial financial incentive for being accurate. The bias is not removed either if participants are instructed to predict the court ruling in preparation of plea bargaining. In line with parallel constraint satisfaction models for legal decision making, findings indicate that role induced bias is driven by coherence effects (Simon, 2004), that is, systematic information distortions in support of the favored option. This is mainly achieved by downplaying the importance of conflicting evidence. These distortions seem to stabilize interpretations, and people do not correct for this bias. Implications for legal procedure are briefly discussed.Coherence effects, Legal Decision Making, Biases, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction, Intuition

Information Processing in Decisions under Risk: Evidence for Compensatory Strategies based on Automatic Processes

Many everyday decisions have to be made under risk and can be interpreted as choices between gambles with different outcomes that are realized with specific probabilities. The underlying cognitive processes were investigated by testing six sets of hypotheses concerning choices, decision times, and information search derived from cumulative prospect theory, decision field theory, priority heuristic and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Our participants completed forty decision tasks of two gambles with two non-negative outcomes each. Information search was recorded using eye-tracking technology. Results for all dependent measures conflict with the prediction of the non-compensatory priority heuristic and indicate that individuals use compensatory strategies. Choice proportions are well predicted by a cumulative prospect theory. Process measures, however, indicate that individuals do not rely on deliberate calculations of weighted sums. Information integration processes seem to be better explained by models that partially rely on automatic processes such as decision field theory or parallel constraint satisfaction models.Risky Decisions, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Decision Field Theory, Priority Heuristic, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction, Eye Tracking, Intuition

Sticky Rebates: Rollback Rebates Induce Non-Rational Loyalty in Consumers

Competition policy often relies on the assumption of a rational consumer, although other models may better account for people’s decision behavior. In three experiments, we investigate the influence of loyalty rebates on consumers based on the alternative Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), both theoretically and experimentally. CPT predicts that loyalty rebates could harm consumers by impeding rational switching from an incumbent to an outside option (e.g., a market entrant). In a repeated trading task, participants decided whether or not to enter a loyalty rebate scheme and to continue buying within that scheme. Meeting the condition triggering the rebate was uncertain. Loyalty rebates considerably reduced the likelihood that participants switched to a higher-payoff outside option later. We conclude that loyalty rebates may inflict substantial harm on consumers and may have an underestimated potential to foreclose consumer markets.

Coherence Shifts in Probabilistic Inference Tasks

The fast-and-frugal heuristics approach to probabilistic inference assumes that individuals often employ simple heuristics to integrate cue information that commonly function in a non-reciprocal fashion. Specifically, the subjective validity of a certain cue remains stable during the application of a heuristic and is not changed by the presence or absence of another cue. The parallel-constraint-satisfaction model, in contrast, predicts that information is processed in a reciprocal fashion. Specifically, it assumes that subjective cue validities interactively af-fect each other and are modified to coherently support the favored choice. Corresponding to the model’s simulation, we predicted the direction of such coherence shifts.Cue validities were measured before, after (Exp. 1) and during judgment (Exp. 2 & 3). Coherence shifts were found in environments involving real-world cue knowledge (weather forecasts) and in a domain for which the application of fast-and-frugal heuristics has been demonstrated (city-size tasks). The results indicate that subjective cue validities are not fixed parameters, but that they are interactively changed to form coherent representations of the task.Judgment, Connectionism, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction, Fast-and-Frugal Heuristics, Adaptive Decision Making, Bounded Rationality

How Distinct are Intuition and Deliberation? An Eye-Tracking Analysis of Instruction-Induced Decision Modes

In recent years, numerous studies comparing intuition and deliberation have been published. However, until now relatively little is known about the cognitive processes underlying the two decision modes. Therefore, we analyzed processes of information search and integration using eye-tracking technology. We tested hypotheses derived from dual-process models which postulate that intuition and deliberation are completely distinct processes against predictions of interventionist models. The latter assume that intuitive and deliberate decisions are based on the same basic process which is supplemented by additional processes in the deliberate decision mode. We manipulated decision mode between-participants by means of instructions and participants completed simple and complex city-size tasks as well as complex legal inference tasks. Our findings indicate that the instruction to deliberate does not necessarily increase levels of processing. We found no difference in mean fixation duration and the distribution of short, medium and long fixations. Instruction-induced deliberation led to a higher number of fixations, a more complete information search and more repeated information investigations. Overall, the data support interventionist models suggesting that decisions mainly rely on automatic processes which are supplemented by additional operations in the deliberate decision mode.Decision Making, Decision Mode, Intuition, Deliberation, Eye-Tracking

The benefits of latent payback in social dilemmas

Latent payback is a natural element of social interactions: Non-cooperators face substantial threats of not being supported in situations of dire need, or of being punished in seemingly unrelated situations. In the controlled environment of the laboratory, we experimentally explore the effects of latent sanctions on cooperation per se, as well as on the effectiveness of immediate sanctions. Our data indicate that latent sanctions alone are able to sustain cooperation in groups. However, the real power of latent sanctions is unleashed when combined with immediate sanctions. These situations enormously enhance cooperation within groups - and, do so moreover, with less intense sanctioning. This surprising result provides a potential explanation for the co-existence of latent and immediate sanctions in social interactions