Strukturwandel im Bankensektor: Eine Bestandsaufnahme

Aktuell hat der Bankensektor - und vor allem die Großbanken - eine Krise durchzustehen. Schon seit längerem ist aber der Wettbewerb zwischen den Banken härter geworden. Wie hat sich die Marktstruktur im Bankensektor seit Anfang der 90er Jahre verändert? Welche Anpassungen an die Wettbewerbssituation hat es gegeben? Wie entwickelten sich die Risiken? --

Competition, Resilience, and Stability – Implications for Institutional Protection Schemes and Systemic Risk in the European Banking Union

The finalization of the European Banking Union (EBU) requires the completion of the third pillar, the system of depositor protection. However, whereas the two first pillars, while set-ting common standards, allow for elements of decentralization and institutional diversity, some authors claim that the third pillar is only established with a single and joint deposit guarantee scheme (DSG) for all countries in the Monetary Union. Limits to joint liability, or alternative concepts like the existing institutional protection schemes (IPS) in some member states, are seen as imperfections that can only be temporarily accepted for political reasons. According to this view, such elements of compromise and differentiation should be over-come. In our paper, we argue that neither the DGS nor the IPS is always efficient. Choosing an IPS is a response to a special way to organize banking business. It contains no element of regulato-ry arbitrage, as it represents a cost-efficient mean to protect depositors in decentralized banking networks marked by a larger number of regional banks and by a business model with a strong focus on long-term client relationships. Making decentralized banking and rela-tionship banking costlier through discriminating regulations (like the non-recognition of IPS) would thus have a negative impact on the common market, as it distorts the competition between different organizational concepts of banking

Domestic Systemically Important Banks: An Indicator-Based Measurement Approach for the Australian Banking System

This paper serves as a response to the assessment methodology of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to identify systemically important banks. Based on the official technique, which requires an extensive collection of bank data, our paper develops a practicable modification. Utilising readily available indicators, we determine the domestic systemic risk of each licensed bank in Australia in the period 2002-2011. Our quantitative results uncover not only high levels of systemic risk for the four major banks, but their rising dominance during the global financial crisis. Consequently, we introduce a regulatory proposal that enables authorities to reduce the systemic risk of individual institutions

Entwicklung der Immobilienpreise im Euroraum: Bestandsaufnahme und makroökonomische Konsequenzen

Sowohl theoretische Überlegungen als auch die aktuellen Entwicklungen offenbaren, dass die (Wohn-)Immobilienmärkte eine nicht zu vernachlässigende Einflussgröße auf Konjunktur, Preisniveau und Finanzmarktstabilität darstellen. Zum einen bestehen Rückwirkungen auf die gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage, und zum anderen werden die Kreditentscheidungen der privaten Haushalte beeinflusst. Horst Gischer und Mirko Weiß, Universität Magdeburg, untersuchen in dem Beitrag die makroökonomischen Konsequenzen der Entwicklung der Immobilienpreisentwicklung im Euroraum.Immobilienpreis, Immobilienmarkt, EU-Staaten

STRUKTURWANDEL IM BANKENSEKTOR: EIN KURSORISCHER ÜBERBLICK

Banken gehören zu den herausgehobenen privatwirtschaftlich-organisierten Unternehmen in einer Marktwirtschaft. Sie erfüllen Aufgaben, ohne die eine moderne, entwickelte Ökonomie kaum vorstellbar wäre. Insbesondere in Deutschland ist die Rolle der Banken aber auch wiederkehrend Gegenstand kontroverser (wirtschafts-)politischer Diskussionen. Hierbei geht es u. a. um die personellen Verflechtungen zwischen Banken und von ihnen – mutmaßlich – beaufsichtigten Unternehmen, die in der jüngeren Vergangenheit nicht zuletzt in spektakulären Insolvenzfällen fragwürdige Aufmerksamkeit erfahren haben, hingewiesen sei hier nur auf die Fälle „Holzmann“ oder „Kirch“. Gegenwärtig macht die Branche, die gemeinhin zu den krisensicheren und profitabelsten gezählt wurde, durch außergewöhnliche Ertrags- bzw. Gewinneinbrüche von sich reden. Es besteht Grund zur Annahme, dass diese Ereignisse (auch) Folgen eines noch anhaltenden Strukturwandels im Bankensektor sind, dessen Konturen im vorliegenden Beitrag nachgezeichnet werden sollen

Tricky Figures: Why the Assessment of Competition in Banking Industries is Rather a Matter of Taste

Economic studies on the degree of competition (DC) in banking systems use various measures which are subsumed under the 1) structure- (e.g. Hirschman-Herfindahl index), 2) conduct- (e.g. Boone indicator) or 3) performance-oriented approach (e.g. Lerner index). Yet, the respective empirical operationalizations of the different DC measures are expected to represent one central construct – the true DC of a banking system. We review 35 studies covering 15 European banking systems from 1998 to 2007. Contrasting the central construct hypothesis, we find substantial differences in the produced DC measures. Thus, the economic validity of derived conclusions regarding the competition intensity is chal-lenged

Regional Competition in US Banking: Trends and Determinants

Competition in the US banking industry as measured by the Lerner Index has on average increased substantially during the last decade. At the same time, regional differences in competition on the state level have decreased considerably. Based on a dynamic panel framework we find that these developments are mainly driven by industry specific factors such as the costs to income ratio. The empirical evidence indicates that inefficiency and the Lerner index are significant negatively correlated. Macroeconomic conditions appear to have supported these trends in competition, however, to a somewhat lesser extent

Analyzing Cost Structures in the Banking Industry: An Unconventional Approach

Our paper deals with empirical and technical problems to derive (conventional) cost functions in banks and other financial institutions. One main reason is based on the still ongoing discussion on inputs and outputs of financial intermediaries. A second obstacle is due to the fact that most of the banks are multi-product firms. The existing literature provides an impressive variety of methods but rather focuses on productivity or efficiency, respectively. We suggest a completely different approach instead which might be suitable to identify the relevant cost drivers in banking. Our “model” uses FDIC Call Report data to outline the procedure exemplarily for North Dakota. Of course, additional improvements are necessary, hence our contribution is work in progress on new ground

Algebraic Principles for Rely-Guarantee Style Concurrency Verification Tools

We provide simple equational principles for deriving rely-guarantee-style inference rules and refinement laws based on idempotent semirings. We link the algebraic layer with concrete models of programs based on languages and execution traces. We have implemented the approach in Isabelle/HOL as a lightweight concurrency verification tool that supports reasoning about the control and data flow of concurrent programs with shared variables at different levels of abstraction. This is illustrated on two simple verification examples

Diverse Degrees of Competition within the EMU and their Implications for Monetary Policy

Our paper calls attention to the heterogeneous levels of competition in EMU banking systems. We enhanced the ECB MFI interest rate statistics by calculating a lending rate average weighted by loan volumes for each EMU member country. Employing a modified Lerner Index, our unique data set enables us to calculate banks\u27 price setting power in the national lending business alone, instead of measuring market power for banks\u27 total business. For 12 countries, we ultimately show that market power in the exclusive segment of lending is greater than market power in total banking business. In an OLS regression model, we investigate to what extent loan rate variations can be explained by changing degrees of market power during the period 2003-2009. Significant cross-country differences can be observed. We find that changes in the national degree of competition considerably affect funding conditions in the individual countries and therefore hinder a homogeneous transmission of ECB monetary policy