Access to capital in rural Thailand : an estimated model of formal versus informal credit

The aim of this paper is to understand the mechanism underlying access to credit. The author focuses on two important aspects of rural credit markets in Thailand. First, moneylenders and other informal lenders coexist with formal lending institutions such as government or commercial banks, and more recently, micro-lending institutions. Second, potential borrowers presumably face sizable transaction costs obtaining external credit. The author develops and estimates a model based on limited enforcement and transaction costs that provides a unified view of those facts. The results show that the limited ability of banks to enforce contracts, more than transaction costs, is crucial in understanding the observed diversity of lenders.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Financial Intermediation,Environmental Economics&Policies

Cultivate or rent out ? Land security in rural Thailand

In the 1980s the Thai government tried to legalize squatters by issuing special titles that restricted the sale and rental of the land. Using data from 2,874 farming households collected in 1997, the author finds that in places where these government titles where issued, leased plots are more likely to be titled than those that are self-cultivated. For these areas, he uses a model to estimate a 6 percent risk premium in the rental rate for untitled plots. In other areas, however, land rights play no role in the decision to lease land and the rental rate of untitled plots does not include a risk premium. The results indicate that this policy distorted the land rental market by triggering a sense of insecurity among landowners.Wetlands,Forestry,Rural Land Policies for Poverty Reduction,Land Use and Policies,Municipal Housing and Land

Do reorganization costs matter for efficiency ? Evidence from a bankruptcy reform in Colombia

The authors study the effect of reorganization costs on the efficiency of bankruptcy laws. They develop a simple model that predicts that in a regime with high costs, the law fails to achieve the efficient outcome of liquidating unviable businesses and reorganizing viable ones. The authors test the model using the Colombian bankruptcy reform of 1999. Using data from 1,924 firms filing for bankruptcy between 1996 and 2003, they find that the pre-reform reorganization proceeding was so inefficient that it failed to separate economically viable firms from inefficient ones. In contrast, by substantially lowering reorganization costs, the reform improved the selection of viable firms into reorganization. In this sense, the new law increased the efficiency of the bankruptcy system in Colombia.Banks&Banking Reform,Corporate Law,Small Scale Enterprise,Microfinance,Economic Theory&Research

Insurance, credit, and technology adoption : field experimental evidence from Malawi

The adoption of new agricultural technologies may be discouraged because of their inherent riskiness. This study implemented a randomized field experiment to ask whether the provision of insurance against a major source of production risk induces farmers to take out loans to invest in a new crop variety. The study sample was composed of roughly 800 maize and groundnut farmers in Malawi, where by far the dominant source of production risk is the level of rainfall. We randomly selected half of the farmers to be offered credit to purchase high-yielding hybrid maize and improved groundnut seeds for planting in the November 2006 crop season. The other half of the farmers were offered a similar credit package but were also required to purchase (at actuarially fair rates) a weather insurance policy that partially or fully forgave the loan in the event of poor rainfall. Surprisingly, take up was lower by 13 percentage points among farmers offered insurance with the loan. Take-up was 33.0 percent for farmers who were offered the uninsured loan. There is suggestive evidence that the reduced take-up of the insured loan was due to the high cognitive cost of evaluating the insurance: insured loan take-up was positively correlated with farmer education levels. By contrast, the take-up of the uninsured loan was uncorrelated with farmer education.,Access to Finance,Debt Markets,Hazard Risk Management,Crops&Crop Management Systems

Group versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines

Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor and enforce each other’s loans. However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability. Therefore, it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender’s overall profitability and the poor’s access to financial markets. We worked with a bank in the Philippines to conduct a field experiment to examine these issues. We randomly assigned half of the 169 pre-existing group liability “centers” of approximately twenty women to individual-liability centers (treatment) and kept the other half as-is with group liability (control). We find that the conversion to individual liability does not affect the repayment rate, and leads to higher growth in center size by attracting new clients.Microfinance, group liability, joint liability, social capital, micro-enterprises, informal economies

Credit Constraints as a Barrier to Technology Adoption by the Poor: Lessons from South-Indian Small-Scale Fishery

technology adoption, inequality, fishing sector, India

Evaluation of financial liberalization : a general equilibrium model with constrained occupation choice

The objective of this paper is to assess both the aggregate growth effects and the distributional consequences of financial liberalization as observed in Thailand from 1976 to 1996. A general equilibrium occupational choice model with two sectors, one without intermediation, and the other with borrowing and lending, is taken to Thai data. Key parameters of the production technology and the distribution of entrepreneurial talent are estimated by maximizing the likelihood of transition into business given initial wealth as observed in two distinct datasets. Other parameters of the model are calibrated to try to match the two decades of growth as well as observed changes in inequality, labor share, savings, and the number of entrepreneurs. Without an expansion in the size of the intermediated sector, Thailand would have evolved very differently, namely, with a drastically lower growth rate, high residual subsistence sector, non-increasing wages, but lower inequality. The financial liberalization brings welfare gains and losses to different subsets of the population. Primary winners are talented would-be entrepreneurs who lack credit and cannot otherwise go into business (or invest little capital). Mean gains for these winners range from 17 to 34 percent of observed overall average household income. But liberalization also induces greater demand by entrepreneurs for workers resulting in increases in the wage and lower profits of relatively rich entrepreneurs of the same order of magnitude as the observed overall average income of firm owners. Foreign capital has no significant impact on growth or the distribution of observed income.Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Conditions and Volatility,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Conditions and Volatility,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism

Group versus individual liability : a field experiment in the Philippines

Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor, and enforce each other's loans. However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability. Therefore, it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender’s overall profitability and the poor's access to financial markets. The authors worked with a bank in the Philippines to conduct a field experiment to examine these issues. They randomly assigned half of the 169 pre-existing group liability'centers'of approximately twenty women to individual-liability centers (treatment) and kept the other half as-is with group liability (control). We find that the conversion to individual liability does not affect the repayment rate, and leads to higher growth in center size by attracting new clients.Banks&Banking Reform,Knowledge Economy,Banking Law,Education for the Knowledge Economy,Contract Law

Identification strategy : a field experiment on dynamic incentives in rural credit markets

How do borrowers respond to improvements in a lender's ability to punish defaulters? This paper reports the results of a randomized field experiment in rural Malawi that examines the impact of fingerprinting borrowers in a context where a unique identification system is absent. Fingerprinting allows the lender to more effectively use dynamic repayment incentives: withholding future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. Consistent with a simple model of borrower heterogeneity and information asymmetries, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. The change in repayment rates is driven by reductions in adverse selection (smaller loan sizes) and lower moral hazard (for example, less diversion of loan-financed fertilizer from its intended use on the cash crop).Access to Finance,Debt Markets,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress,Microfinance,Economic Theory&Research

Eliciting probabilistic expectations with visual aids in developing countries : how sensitive are answers to variations in elicitation design ?

Eliciting subjective probability distributions in developing countries is often based on visual aids such as beans to represent probabilities and intervals on a sheet of paper to represent the support. The authors conducted an experiment in India that tested the sensitivity of elicited expectations to variations in three facets of the elicitation methodology: the number of beans, the design of the support (pre-determined or self-anchored), and the ordering of questions. The results show remarkable robustness to variations in elicitation design. Nevertheless, the added precision offered by using more beans and a larger number of intervals with a predetermined support improves accuracy.Economic Theory&Research,Information Security&Privacy,Markets and Market Access,Statistical&Mathematical Sciences,Crops&Crop Management Systems